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guideline.txt
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Site Selection and Design
Site Size
Building Area
Building Expansion
Parking
Staff
Access to the Site and the Facility
Support Elements
Total Site Area
Site Location
Linkages
Surroundings
Views and Inmate Contact
Technical Requirements
Site Costs
Site Selection Process
Image/Appearance
Exterior
Interior
Maintenance of Physical Security
Operations: Key to Normalization
Describing Desired Appearance
Classification/Separation
Separation Problems
Inmate Types
Program Space Considerations
Cost of Housing for Different Inmate Types Versus Frequency of Need
Changes in Inmate Population
Surveillance/Supervision Method
Cell Occupancy
Classification Systems
When and Where Classification Occurs
Juveniles
Resolving the Numbers Problem in Smaller Jails
Multijurisdictional Options
Designing for Proper Separation
Inmate Types
Degree of Inmate Separation Required
Options for Housing Area Flexibility
Strengths and Weaknesses of Different Surveillance Methods
Use of Temporary Holding Cells
Use of Single-Occupancy Cells
Separate Housing of Work Release and Periodic-Sentence Inmates
Privacy Concerns
Surveillance/Supervision
Methods of Surveillance/Supervision
Constant Staff Presence Required
Periodic Staff Presence Required
Design Considerations
Selecting Inmate Management and Supervision Modes
Staffing Versus Facility Durability
Remote Surveillance Design
Intermittent Surveillance Design
Direct Supervision Design
Electronic Surveillance Design
Nonhousing Surveillance
Staffing Impact
Legal Issues
Hour Coverage
Possible Staff Types
Design Factors
Facility Location
Single-Level Versus Multilevel Design
Vertically Connected Posts
Inmate Separation
Surveillance/Supervision Methods
Circulation and Movement
Shared Activities
Security Perimeter
Emergency Response
Staff Backup
Designing Staff Workstations
Cell Occupancy
Electronic Monitoring Versus Staff Monitoring
Work Environment
Conclusion
Security Perimeter
Ingredients of Security
Design Focus
Perimeters and Zones
Building Areas Outside the Security Envelope
Design Considerations
General Considerations
Main Security Envelope
Perimeter Fences/Walls
Internal Security Zones
Conclusion
Criminal Justice Interface
A General Caution
Law Enforcement Interface
Public/Staff Separation
Law Enforcement Dispatch and Jail Control in Small Jails
Records
Arrest Processing
Investigations and Lineups
Jail Administration and Staff
Food Service
Deliveries
Courts Interface
Corridor Movements
Movement to Offsite Court
Appearances at the Jail
Attorneys
Public Defenders
Probation/Parole
Conclusion
Functional Components and Relationships
Jail Components
Degrees of Development
Food Service
Laundry Service
Component Relationships
Relationship Matrix
Relationship Diagram
Critical Relationships
Space-Sharing Possibilities
Special Housing
Indoor Programs and Services
General Housing in the Smaller Jail
Contact Visiting/Counseling
Indoor/Outdoor Recreation
Space-Sharing Problem
Planning and Designing to Standards
State Standards
American Correctional Association and the Commission
on Accreditation for Corrections
National Fire Protection Association Life Safety Code®
Americans with Disabilities Act
Location or Dispersion of Accessible Cells
Basic Features of the Accessible Cell
Furniture, Hardware, and Equipment
Common-Use Areas
Public and Staff Areas
design and operational question is whether to
fully enclose and secure the post or to leave it an
open, counter-like area, as discussed in
, “Surveillance/Supervision ”
The open-counter area is much more versatile
from a staff point of view, allowing the officer to
move freely from the post to perform duties and
services other than those demanded within the
post itselfSuch versatility potentially distributes
work better, improves supervision by allowing
better and more frequent inmate contact, facilitates
two-way communication between staff and
inmates, and minimizes the need for additional
staffWithout careful planning and design, however,
the open design can lead to security
compromises
The following questions should be considered
when determining the design of a staff post:
Can tasks be performed more efficiently from
a post that restricts staff movement or one that
enhances staff movement and flexibility?
National Fire Protection Association, NFPA®: Life Safety Code® (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, )
C h a p t e r :
S t a f f i n g I m p a c t
Staff Backup in the Smaller Jail
In many smaller jails, a single master control officer
will be able to observe most inmate housing
areas from a remote, fixed postHowever, that staff
member’s ability to physically respond, unassisted, to
incidents such as assaults, medical emergencies, or
escape attempts may be severely limited by a need
to retain control of the secure post and by concerns
for his/her own personal safetyAlthough that officer
cannot respond directly to a problem, he/she is able
to provide direct visual backup assistance to officers
who do enter the housing units or other inmateoccupied
areas
Unfortunately, it can be assumed that numerous
small jails may be staffed with two-person, male/
female teams on each shift, with one officer in a
secure master control station and the other in a roving
capacityGiven the need to maintain the security
of a master control room, the officer can ill afford
to leave it to render assistanceTherefore, his/
her chief tool in providing backup assistance is an
unobstructed view of all inmate-occupied areas and
communication linkages through which to interact
verbally with inmates and, most critically, to summon
outside assistanceHowever, if outside assistance,
such as from law enforcement personnel in adjacent
areas of the facility, is not immediately available,
this two-person approach becomes quite problematic
when serious problems ariseThe goal should be to
provide backup for any staff member in any area of
the jail, with the desired approach of providing sufficient
staff within the secure perimeter at all timesIf
this is not achievable, the alternative option of using
sworn law enforcement staff who are available at
any time from an adjacent, attached building may be
considered
Through this team approach, which combines direct
interaction of the roving officer with the backup of a
master control officer and outside assistance, the welldesigned
small jail can respond to most occurrences
without creating excessive risk to staff or inmates
Is backup security available to reduce the risks
of an open-counter arrangement?
What is at stake if the post is lost?
What is the impact on inmate surveillance and
supervision if the post is opened or closed?
What level of inmate contact and communication
is desired?
Do staff have the ability to communicate with
other staff in the area?
What are the potential staff savings?
The open-counter housing post is not viable unless
the jail maintains a secure master control
room with complete override capability on all
security systems and full control of the perimeter
of the housing area
Cell Occupancy
Although there is no irrefutable evidence that
single-cell jails are less costly to staff than facilities
with multiple-occupancy cells, there are
strong arguments that single-cell housing results
in more efficient use of staffThese arguments
generally include the following:
Multiple-occupancy housing greatly reduces
the staff’s ability to prevent physical or sexual
assaults, especially during night lockdown,
when staffing levels tend to be reduced
Multiple-occupancy housing may eliminate
the ability to reduce staffing at night
During a disturbance in a multiple-occupancy
cell, the staff’s ability to take full control of the
incident is reduced due to the inability to fully
separate combative inmates
Multiple-occupancy cells diminish staff’s ability
to maintain discipline and control because
vandalism is difficult to attribute to individual
inmates
:
However, these arguments assume a limited measure
of control on the part of the officer and/or
the absence of staff in the unit during most of the
day and night (remote observation or linear surveillance)
A well-run housing unit, with a staff
member presenthours a day, that is designed
to provide the maximum amount of vision into
all areas of the unit will generally mitigate or
eliminate the concerns expressed above
Electronic Monitoring Versus Staff Monitoring
Audio monitoring and CCTV have their place in
the jail security system, but such equipment is
effective only when staff are provided to monitor
the systems and summon assistanceOften,
surveillance equipment is installed, but staffing
is not appropriately allocated to monitor it, thus
compromising its effectivenessIn addition to
the staff assigned to monitor the electronic systems,
other staff must be available to respond
to inappropriate inmate behavior detected by
the electronic surveillancePersonal supervision
by trained staff should be provided in all jails,
regardless of the electronic tools used to supplement
itElectronic monitoring should be used
to enhance rather than supplant staff functions
The appropriate blending of staff and technology
should be reinforced during the transition process
Work Environment
A key fact to remember when creating the jail
environment is that it is not only an inmate environment
but a staff environmentBuildings
contain behaviorStaff control inmate behavior
Indeed, the jail is more of a staff work environment,
in that the average officer works in the facility
over a period of years, whereas the average
inmate stays only about – days
Additionally, jails often experience a major problem
with staff turnoverMuch of it has to do
with salary and career opportunities, but some
of it has to do with very poor and stressful work
conditions in older jailsConsequently, designs
developed with staff in mind may help eliminate
this trend and even set in motion improvements
in other areas
Staff-oriented considerations include the
following:
Personal safety and security
Ease of movement and ease of general
job performance
Pleasantness of environment:
Natural light
Artificial light
Sound
Color
Ventilation
Control over personal environment, especially
staff posts
Amenities
Lockers and showers
Training areas
Lounge/break room
Exercise facilities
Parking
Conclusion
It is important to remember that the design of the
facility can greatly enhance the ability of staff to
do their jobs effectively and safelyConversely, a
poorly planned facility can create problems with
facility operations and the management of inmate
behaviorSpending the time to develop a wellthought-
out operational plan and working with
the planners and architects to design a facility
C h a p t e r :
S t a f f i n g I m p a c t
that achieves the goal of safety and security for
staff and inmates is the key to developing a facility
that can be safely operated using an appropriate
number of staff
It is also important to remember that there is no
one-size-fits-all staffing plan, and it is incumbent
on each agency to take the time necessary to collect
accurate and complete staffing information to
ensure staffing decisions are made based on desired
operations for the new facility and real data
that can be used to justify those decisions
C h a p t e r
Security Perimeter
Escape and contraband are deeply troubling
words to sheriffs and jail administrators
They represent the manifestation of basic
security defects within the jail’s physical plant
or problems with its operationNew jail design
approaches, hardware technology, and improved
training for jail staff during the recent past have
reduced, but not eliminated, problems of escape,
contraband passage, and related breaches in jail
security
Many breaches in jail security result from human
error in recruitment, selection, and supervision
of jail staff or a lack of adequate training and
written policies and proceduresSome escapes
early in the life of a new jail occur because staff
were inadequately trained in the new building’s
control equipment, which is frequently more
complex than that found in the old jailHowever,
even the most elite correctional staff cannot be
expected to make an inadequately designed and
equipped jail consistently secure through staff effort
aloneThey must rely, to some extent, on the
integrity of the materials, hardware, and design
to complement effective security procedures
The failure to define and establish, through planning
and design, a clearly identifiable and reliable
security perimeter (envelope) is a primary
contributor to problems in small and mediumsized
jailsArchitecture, operational procedures,
and technology are elements of jail security
Equipment, materials, and design decisions are
influenced by the nature of the inmate population
and are oriented toward basic security objectives
Thisdescribes an overall approach
to security and recommends measures to enhance
jail security
Ingredients of Security
Security systems engineers and analysts have
identified four major ingredients involved in
providing building security: denial, detection,
response, and assessment
DenialIn practical terms, denial means that
the building is designed to restrict inmate access
to unauthorized internal areas or the outside;
provide physical separation for various
inmate classifications (e g , separate housing
for inmate workers); control inmate movement
through the use of sallyports, staff supervision,
and other means; and eliminate the potential
for the passage of contraband in the jail by
building and maintaining a secure perimeter
DetectionIf the denial element fails or is
compromised (e g , a lock malfunctions or
security glass is penetrated), then detection is
necessaryDetection in jails often comes about
through regular inmate counts or random cell
checks and searches that reveal an escape or
contrabandDetection might also mean that
an officer observes an inmate scaling a fence
or bolting through a door to an unsecured
areaIn modern jails, detection can involve
sophisticated technology such as perimetersensing
devices to detect attempts at escape
or intrusion
ResponseAfter detection and assessment,
the response is the action taken by staff to
counteract the problemIn addition to sending
staff to the affected area, this may include triggering
alarms, lighting selected areas, closing
gates, and initiating evacuation procedures
AssessmentAssessment is simply an evaluation
of the problem that has been detectedIt
is largely a matter of determining the nature
:
and degree of a situation (e g , escape attempt,
window tampering, unauthorized movement
in a secure zone)Assessment may or may not
be made with the assistance of sophisticated
technology
Design Focus
The focus during jail planning is on the fundamental
design features and the staffing required
for effective denial, detection, response, and assessment
Detection, response, and assessment
primarily require the involvement of staff, supplemented
by technologies such as closed-circuit
television (CCTV), motion detection, audio monitoring,
and remote control of locks, lights, and
alarmsStaff can be helped to effectively do their
job in these areas by operational decisions and
building designs that use constant and effective
staff surveillance or supervision of all inmateoccupied
or inmate-utilized areas, routes of
egress, and the exterior of the facility
Thisis devoted to the fundamental design
features that provide the ingredient of denial
Denial of escape and contraband passage is
fundamentally accommodated in the design of
the physical plant in the following ways:
Creating an overall barrier, commonly referred
to as a “security perimeter,” that precludes
contraband passage from the outside and unauthorized
access to and egress from the jail
Creating internal security zones that preclude
escape and contraband passage within the jail
by controlling internal movement and maintaining
separation between key activities and
inmate-occupied areas, especially those that
house inmates who pose the greatest risk of
escape or contraband passage according to the
facility’s classification plan(See ,
“Classification/Separation ”)
Perimeters and Zones
The different kinds of perimeters and zones that
might be created to assist staff in denying escape
and contraband passage are described below
Main security perimeter
The main security perimeter is the fundamental
barrier that is intended to preclude escape, unauthorized
ingress or egress, and contraband passage
It might best be thought of as a security
envelope because the main security perimeter is a
three-dimensional rather than a two-dimensional
elementThat is, it consists of the ceilings, roofs,
and floors, as well as the exterior and interior
walls, doors, passthroughs, and windows, which
help deny escape or contraband passage from
the outside
Secondary security perimeter
The secondary security perimeter is a wall, security
fence, or other support elements that complement
the main security perimeter of the jailThis
element normally consists of fences that define
large outdoor exercise or farm and garden areas
and that inhibit (though not necessarily prohibit)
access to the main security perimeterIt may also
consist of walls that create controlled exterior
spaces to preclude view as well as inhibit access
These perimeter fences and walls do not create a
three-dimensional security envelope
Primary internal security zones
Primary internal security zones are threedimensional
areas within the main security
perimeter that provide for basic security separation
and control of primary movement routes
within the jail, denying or delaying access to
other zonesTypical examples of primary security
zones in a jail include:
C h a p t e r :
S e c u r i t y P e r i m e t e r
Master control
Housing pods or areas
Female housing areas
Special housing areas, especially those for
work release or periodically confined inmates
Program and support service areas
Visiting areas, especially those accessible to
the public
Access to these zones is typically controlled remotely
by master controlIn some cases, selected
primary internal security zones coincide with fire
and smoke containment zones within the overall
structure
Secondary internal security zones
Secondary internal security zones are threedimensional
areas within both the main security
perimeter and the primary internal security
zones (exhibit)Their purpose is typically to
preclude unauthorized and uncontrolled access
between functional components (e g , laundry
and food services) or between areas that are part
of functional components (e g , separate housing
units) within a primary internal security zone
Access to these zones is typically controlled remotely
by master control or either remotely or
directly by other facility staff
E x h i b i t Secondary Internal Security Zones
Housing
unit
Secondary zones
within primary internal
security zone
Housing
unit
Primary internal
security zone
(housing perimeter)
Main security
perimeter
Zoning may go to a third level because individual
spaces, such as cells and medication storage,
frequently require fully secure protection from
outside intrusion, escape attempts, and uncontrolled
access within a secondary internal security
zoneThese spaces might be referred to as
“tertiary internal security zones ”
Building Areas Outside the Security Envelope
The overall building envelope is virtually never
the same as the security envelope of the jail
There are functions outside of the jail security
envelope that often share the building and contribute
to the effectiveness of jail operationsTypically,
these include the sheriff’s law enforcement
functions and, possibly, court and probation
functionsFor these nonjail functions to share the
building with the jail effectively, their needs must
be recognized, their interrelationship with the jail
understood, and their components integrated into
the design in a way that avoids security conflicts
These issues are examined more closely in
, “Criminal Justice Interface ”
Jail-related functions that need to be outside of
the primary jail security envelope (like the lobby
or jail administration) also share the overall
building envelope (exhibit)Access to some
or all of these areas may be controlled by jail
staff within the security envelope
E x h i b i t Relationship of Overall Building to
Main Security Perimeter
Main security
perimeter
Overall building
envelope
Nonjail areas
of building
:
The most common functions affiliated with the
jail, but outside its main security envelope, are
the public lobby, the night lobby/vestibule, and
the jail administration and staff areas (these can
be provided in association with the law enforcement
area)These public areas require different
levels of access controlNonjail spaces should be
grouped depending on the type of access control
required:
Uncontrolled public areasThese areas consist
of spaces to which the public has unrestricted
access, although they may be monitored by
direct observation from a constantly staffed
post and/or by electronic means (CCTV and/
or audio)Spaces that frequently fall into this
category are the main lobby and its affiliated
spaces (e g , public restrooms, property locker
areas) and the night lobby/vestibule
Periodically controlled areasThese are areas
to which the public has unrestricted access
only during portions of the dayAt other times,
access is precluded and controlled by jail staff
(usually master control) or by law enforcement
staff (normally the dispatcher)The public
lobby and its affiliated spaces can fall into
this category, especially when a night lobby/
vestibule is incorporated to accommodate unrestricted
public contact after visiting and office
hours
Controlled access areasThese are areas to
which public access must be controlled or
restricted at all timesThe jail administration
area is the main example of a set of spaces to
which the public must have access only in a
controlled and regulated wayThe staff spaces
(lockers, training, and exercise) are normally
within this area because public access should
be restricted
Design Considerations
Following are design considerations for the development
of the main security envelope and the
internal security zones essential to the denial of
escape, unauthorized access, and contraband
passageMore information on the security development
of different functional components
and spaces within functional components can be
found in section, “Functional Components ”
General Considerations
Overlapping perimeters/zones
Because of the nature of internal zoning, the
floors, walls, and/or roof areas that define internal
zones and the main security envelope frequently
overlapFor example, the exterior wall of
an individual cell, which may be defined as part
of a tertiary internal security zone, is frequently
also the wall of the housing unit (secondary security
zone), the general population male housing
area (primary security zone), and the jail as a
whole (main security envelope)In such a case,
it is critical to design the wall according to the
needs of the most stringent security condition—
in this case, those of the main security envelope
In the same example, however, the ceiling of the
cell might not coincide, or overlap, with that
of other zonesThis is because the security demands
of the cell, or tertiary zone, might require
the use of a securely constructed ceiling (concrete,
steel, cement plaster on metal lath) that
precludes access to a roof system aboveIf the
roof system is securely constructed, it may serve
separately as part of the main security perimeter
or part of a secondary or a primary security
zoneIn another instance, the cell may be located
under another cell sharing the same two-tier
housing unit, or under a floor of another internal
security zone
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S e c u r i t y P e r i m e t e r
Impact on design
The primary reason for establishing a main security
perimeter (envelope) and internal security
zones is basic facility safety and securityHowever,
an important architectural and economic
benefit also accrues: development of a sound
security envelope and effective internal zones
allows wider latitude in the development of individual
internal spaces in terms of material finishes,
hardware, and furniture selectionThis
is especially true when perimeter and zoning
concepts are coupled with a well-developed
classification/separation plan and with concepts
of constant staff presence and surveillance, thus
providing detection, assessment, and response
capabilities
For example, if the main security envelope and
the primary internal security zone of a housing
area consisting of several housing units are well
defined and properly designed, as well as constantly
observed by staff, some of the following
options and associated cost savings might become
available
Less heavily reinforced and constructed partitions
and less costly security glazing to separate
housing-unit dayrooms from the zone
corridor because the zone is clearly defined
and controlled, offering little gain to inmates
penetrating the wall
Less costly doors, frames, hardware, and locks
on general-population cells because there is
little to be gained by penetration
Less costly dayroom ceiling materials because
penetration offers no viable escape route from
the zone
Elimination of costly security vestibules at the
entry to housing units because escape from the
individual unit is contained within the primary
housing area security zone
Elimination of costly enclosed housing control
posts because assaultive behavior by inmates
will not result in egress from the primary
housing area security zone
In evaluating these types of options, the issue of
durability should not be neglected, nor should
it be forgotten that physical security is still a
required ingredientFrom an operational viewpoint,
good perimeter and good internal zoning
may also allow for unescorted inmate movement
between different points in the facility without
fear of a successful escape attemptAn example
would be unescorted movement between housing
and visiting zones
Master control
A key consideration in the development of an effective
security envelope and effective internal
security zones is creation of a master control
positionThis position, which must be a primary
internal security zone in its own right, must be
able to:
Housing unit within the secure perimeter and primary internal security
zone with solid-core wood doors, nonfixed furnishings, and open officer’s
station
(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services )
:
Monitor all security systems (e g , CCTV,
alarms, pressure-sensitive motion detectors)
Communicate with, control and monitor, and
observe people at all ingress/egress points in
the main security envelope
Communicate with, control and monitor, and
observe people at the doors or gates that help
define internal security zones and inhibit
movement between them
Communicate with facility staff, wherever they
are located in the facility
Control entry into the master control space
(Note: An emergency key should be kept outside
the facility’s security perimeter to open
the room if the officer becomes incapacitated )
Facilitate efficient staff and inmate movement
throughout the facility
More on the design of this space can be found in
, “Master Control ”
Compatibility of construction
In creating the security envelope and internal
security zones, it is important that materials, finishes,
and hardware in perimeter and zone barriers
are compatible and comparableFor example,
it is not helpful to provide glass-clad polycarbonate
glazing material (a very high security window
material) when the base wall consists of gypsum
board (standard drywall)Similarly, it is inappropriate
to provide a high-security lock for a lightweight
hollow metal door and door frameOther
incompatible elements are concrete floors and
reinforced concrete masonry unit walls combined
with lightweight suspended metal acoustic ceiling
panels that lead to unsecured ceiling plenums
(the space between ceilings and roofs)
Security above the zone
One often-overlooked consideration in the development
of the security envelope and internal
security zones is security above the space or
area that is being defined as a zone or envelope
Failing to realize that the envelope and zones
are three-dimensional, planners often give inadequate
attention to the development of the ceiling
in relation to the ceiling plenum and the roof as
a key element of the envelope or zoneThere are
several considerations in this regard:
The ceiling of a space should be securely constructed
if the walls around the zone do not
extend to the roof or construction above and/
or if the roof or construction above is not secured
(exhibit)
The ceiling should be securely constructed
regardless of the nature of the roof or construction
above and regardless of the degree
to which the walls exceed the ceiling line if
elements in the ceiling (e g , electrical lines,
water lines, ductwork) need protection or if
access to the plenum is intolerable under any
circumstance
Openings in a secure ceiling should be
sized and designed to preclude unwanted
penetration
Main Security Envelope
The following design considerations apply to
the main security envelope of the jailThe main
security envelope must assist in denying escape
E x h i b i t Security Ceiling
Roof
Security
ceiling
Security
ceiling
Open attic
plenum
C h a p t e r :
S e c u r i t y P e r i m e t e r
and contraband passage and must be constructed
with the assumption that extremely dangerous
and sophisticated criminals may be held in the
jailEscape and contraband passage are constant
risks that can be initiated by individual inmates
or in conjunction with outside collaboratorsThe
preservation of a safe environment inside the jail
and the prevention of assisted escapes or contraband
passage from the outside require strict control
over all penetrations of the security envelope
A variety of design considerations to prevent escapes
and contraband passage pertain to the development
of the main security envelope:
Limited access pointsThe number of access
points must be limited to the minimum necessary
for the efficient operation of the building,
separation of conflicting traffic flows, and compliance
with life safety codesThe fewer entry
and exit points into the building, the fewer
chances that security at these areas will be
compromisedMinimum access points needed
in a security perimeter to properly control traffic
flow and satisfy codes include:
Main public access to visiting and program
areas
Staff access to the perimeter, which may be
the same as the public access, although this
may not be desirable
Arrestee/arresting officer access
Access for delivery of food/supplies and
garbage removal
Required points of emergency egress
Security vestibule with interlocking doorsAll
access points into the main security perimeter
should be through a security vestibule with interlocking
doors that allow for override of the
interlock by master control during an emergency
(exhibit)
E x h i b i t Security Vestibule
Security
vestibule
Observation
Main security
perimeter
Interlock doors Entry
Key override capabilityAccess points into the
main security perimeter should have a key
override capabilityKeys to these doors should
be under the direct control of the master control
officer and should never be removed from
the master control area except in an emergency
However, it is sometimes desirable to keep
a master key in a secure location outside the
secure perimeter (most frequently the sheriff’s
office) in case of an equipment failure or other
emergency in master control
Metal detectorsMetal detectors should be
available at all access points used by the public
and outside service providers and, depending
on the policy of the jail administration, at
access points used by jail staff and other officials
Metal detectors can be integrated into
the architecture of the facility in ways that
hide them from viewAlthough the integrated
detectors may be more visually appealing,
the use of freestanding or hand-held detectors
might be more of a deterrent at access points
Secure construction of access pointsAll access
points should be securely constructedFollowing
are some examples:
Swing or sliding doors of or -gauge
steel
:
Frames grouted and anchored securely to
the wall
High-security detention-grade locks and
hardware
Windows, if used, that employ the strongest
security glass products
Walls, floors, and ceilings that are securely
constructed and create their own threedimensional
security zone
Use of impenetrable materialsThe materials
and construction methods used for the envelope
must be relatively impenetrable, even
from sustained attack with toolsFor example:
❏ Floors: concrete with various finishes
Walls: precast or cast-in-place concrete; concrete
masonry units reinforced and grouted
every toinches on center
Ceilings: precast or cast-in-place concrete;
steel security panels; cement plaster on expanded
metal lath
Roof: precast or cast-in-place concrete with
built-up roofing membrane; heavy-gauge
metal deck securely fixed in place with roofing
membrane
Windows: typically inoperable unless heavily
screened with security-grade products;
and constructed with the strongest security,
detention grade glass products available and
securely anchored
Secured openingsOther types of openings into
the main security envelope (other than the access
points) should be securedFor example:
Passthroughs for such things as packages,
money, and mail
Ductwork
Electrical openings
Roof fan openings
Secured windows in an indoor recreation yardNote that these windows
open for air circulation but have security mesh to prevent penetration
(Photograph courtesy of Voorhis Robertson Justice Services )
Air supply grills
Skylights
In general, these openings or penetrations in
the walls, ceilings, and roof of the main security
perimeter should not exceed inches
in one dimension unless the opening can be
confined to an area of x inches or less
Openings exceeding these dimensional limits
should be protected by steel bars or other
security elements that effectively reduce the
size of the opening
Limited public viewPublic view of inmate living
or activity areas must be limited as much
as possibleTechniques to accomplish this and
still provide natural light to inmate-occupied
areas are discussed in , “Site Selection
and Design ”
Secured outdoor exercise areasOutdoor exercise
areas traditionally present special problems
for security envelope design, including at
least five typical concerns:
Eliminating view conflicts and physical
contact with the public
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S e c u r i t y P e r i m e t e r
Controlling the introduction of contraband
from outside sources
Preventing intrusion or escape through, under,
or over the exercise area fence or wall
Providing a means of egress from the area if
it is to serve as a containment area for facility
evacuations
Outdoor exercise areas represent a particularly
vulnerable point in the main security
envelope, and special care must be taken during
the design effort to close potential holes
Related design considerations are addressed
in, “Exercise Areas ”
Use of CCTVCCTV monitoring systems can
provide some control over the exterior of the
main security perimeterIf CCTV is used, several
considerations apply:
The number of cameras should be minimized
to facilitate effective monitoring by
master control
Recesses and pockets in the exterior of the
building should be minimized to reduce the
number of cameras and monitors required
and facilitate a better exterior view
Cameras should be placed in locations inaccessible
to public contact and potential
tampering
Cameras should be able to accommodate
changes in light level (day-night), where
applicable
Cameras with swivel and zoom features are
desirable, to allow master control to focus
on specific areas on the perimeter
If a CCTV system is used, monitoring of the
rooftop should be considered, especially if
the facility is a single-story structureBuilding
rooftops should be as clear of obstructions as
possibleDesigns can discourage access
to the roof via downspouts, light fixtures,
and other elements that protrude from the
exterior
Use of perimeter lightingPerimeter lighting is
a useful feature for discouraging approaches to
the security envelope by the public or persons
collaborating with inmates on escape attempts
Secured access to mechanical rooms, buildings,
or penthousesAccess to these areas should be
secured at both the outside and inside access
points to the rest of the jail
Security-sensitive landscapingFacility landscaping
must be considered in light of overall
security designAll shrubs and trees should
be placed to ensure that sightlines to the perimeter
are not obscuredThey should not
be positioned where they can be used by an
intruder to scale perimeter walls and fences
Landscaping may be useful to help preclude
approaches to the exterior (tough, thorny
bushes, for example)
Climate-controlled heating, ventilating, and
air-conditioning (HVAC) systemInstallation of
a fully climate-controlled HVAC system should
be considered to avoid the need for operable
windows
Limited access for inmate visitorsThe design
should limit inmate visitors to a primary
internal security zone created for visitation
purposes adjacent to the public lobby (exhibit
)Contact visits, if permitted, should occur
in a designated area within this zone under
staff supervision
Special considerations for denying contraband
Most of the preceding design considerations that
help deny escapes fundamentally help deny contraband
passage from outside partiesHowever,
contraband can be introduced into the facility
: