-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 1
/
corrections.patch
160 lines (160 loc) · 388 KB
/
corrections.patch
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
12c12
< "markup": "<h2>TABLE OF CONTENTS - VOLUME I</h2><p><a href=\"#g-page-9\">INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I</a></p><p><a href=\"#g-page-12\">EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME</a></p><p>I. <a href=\"#g-page-19\">THE SPECIAL COUNSEL’S INVESTIGATION</a></p><p>II. <a href=\"#g-page-22\">RUSSIAN “ACTIVE MEASURES” SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>A. <a href=\"#g-page-23\">Structure of the Internet Research Agency</a></p><p>B. <a href=\"#g-page-24\">Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin</a></p><p>C. <a href=\"#g-page-27\">The IRA Targets U.S. Elections</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>1. <a href=\"#g-page-27\">The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Early As 2014</a></p><p>2. <a href=\"#g-page-30\">U.S. Operations Through IRA-Controlled Social Media Accounts</a></p><p>3. <a href=\"#g-page-32\">U.S. Operations Through Facebook</a></p><p>4. <a href=\"#g-page-34\">U.S. Operations Through Twitter</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-34\">Individualized Accounts</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-36\">IRA Botnet Activities</a></p></div><p>5. <a href=\"#g-page-37\">U.S. Operations Involving Political Rallies</a></p><p>6. <a href=\"#g-page-39\">Targeting and Recruitment of U.S. Persons</a></p><p>7. <a href=\"#g-page-41\">Interactions and Contacts with the Trump Campaign</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-41\">Trump Campaign Promotion of IRA Political Materials</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-43\">Contact with Trump Campaign Officials in Connection to Rallies</a></p></div></div></div><p>III. <a href=\"#g-page-44\">RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING OPERATIONS</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>A. <a href=\"#g-page-44\">GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>1. <a href=\"#g-page-44\">GRU Units Target the Clinton Campaign</a></p><p>2. <a href=\"#g-page-45\">Intrusions into the DCCC and DNC Networks</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-46\">Initial Access</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-46\">Implantation of Malware on DCCC and DNC Networks</a></p><p>c. <a href=\"#g-page-48\">Theft of Documents from DNC and DCCC Networks</a></p></div></div><p>B. <a href=\"#g-page-49\">Dissemination of the Hacked Materials</a>.</p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>1. <a href=\"#g-page-49\">DCLeaks</a></p><p>2. <a href=\"#g-page-50\">Guccifer 2.0</a></p><p>3. <a href=\"#g-page-52\">Use of WikiLeaks</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-52\">WikiLeaks’s Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-53\">WikiLeaks’s First Contact with Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks</a></p></div></div></div>"
---
> "markup": "<h2>TABLE OF CONTENTS - VOLUME I</h2><p><a href=\"#g-page-9\">INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I</a></p><p><a href=\"#g-page-12\">EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME I</a></p><p>I. <a href=\"#g-page-19\">THE SPECIAL COUNSEL’S INVESTIGATION</a></p><p>II. <a href=\"#g-page-22\">RUSSIAN “ACTIVE MEASURES” SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>A. <a href=\"#g-page-23\">Structure of the Internet Research Agency</a></p><p>B. <a href=\"#g-page-24\">Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin</a></p><p>C. <a href=\"#g-page-27\">The IRA Targets U.S. Elections</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>1. <a href=\"#g-page-27\">The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Early As 2014</a></p><p>2. <a href=\"#g-page-30\">U.S. Operations Through IRA-Controlled Social Media Accounts</a></p><p>3. <a href=\"#g-page-32\">U.S. Operations Through Facebook</a></p><p>4. <a href=\"#g-page-34\">U.S. Operations Through Twitter</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-34\">Individualized Accounts</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-36\">IRA Botnet Activities</a></p></div><p>5. <a href=\"#g-page-37\">U.S. Operations Involving Political Rallies</a></p><p>6. <a href=\"#g-page-39\">Targeting and Recruitment of U.S. Persons</a></p><p>7. <a href=\"#g-page-41\">Interactions and Contacts with the Trump Campaign</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-41\">Trump Campaign Promotion of IRA Political Materials</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-43\">Contact with Trump Campaign Officials in Connection to Rallies</a></p></div></div></div><p>III. <a href=\"#g-page-44\">RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING OPERATIONS</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>A. <a href=\"#g-page-44\">GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>1. <a href=\"#g-page-44\">GRU Units Target the Clinton Campaign</a></p><p>2. <a href=\"#g-page-45\">Intrusions into the DCCC and DNC Networks</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-46\">Initial Access</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-46\">Implantation of Malware on DCCC and DNC Networks</a></p><p>c. <a href=\"#g-page-48\">Theft of Documents from DNC and DCCC Networks</a></p></div></div><p>B. <a href=\"#g-page-49\">Dissemination of the Hacked Materials</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>1. <a href=\"#g-page-49\">DCLeaks</a></p><p>2. <a href=\"#g-page-50\">Guccifer 2.0</a></p><p>3. <a href=\"#g-page-52\">Use of WikiLeaks</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-52\">WikiLeaks’s Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-53\">WikiLeaks’s First Contact with Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks</a></p></div></div></div>"
16c16
< "markup": "<div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>c. <a href=\"#g-page-53\">The GRU’s Transfer of Stolen Materials to WikiLeaks</a></p><p>d. <a href=\"#g-page-56\">WikiLeaks Statements Dissembling About the Source of Stolen Material</a></p></div></div><p>C. <a href=\"#g-page-57\">Additional GRU Cyber Operations</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>1. <a href=\"#g-page-57\">Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims</a></p><p>2. <a href=\"#g-page-58\">Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections</a></p></div><p>D. <a href=\"#g-page-59\">Trump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>1. <span data-color=\"white\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-white g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-59\">Background</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-60\">Contacts with the Campaign about WikiLeaks</a></p><p>c. <span data-color=\"white\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-white g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p>d. <a href=\"#g-page-66\">WikiLeaks’s October 7, 2016 Release of Stolen Podesta Emails</a></p><p>e. <a href=\"#g-page-67\">Donald Trump Jr. Interaction with WikiLeaks</a></p></div><p>2. <a href=\"#g-page-69\">Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-69\">Henry Oknyansky (a/k/a Henry Greenberg)</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-70\">Campaign Efforts to Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails</a></p></div></div></div><p>IV. <a href=\"#g-page-74\">RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT LINKS TO AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>A. <a href=\"#g-page-74\">Campaign Period (September 2015 – November 8, 2016)</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>1. <a href=\"#g-page-75\">Trump Tower Moscow Project</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-75\">Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013 – 2014)</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-77\">Communications with I.C. Expert Investment Company and Giorgi Rtskhiladze (Summer and Fall 2015)</a></p><p>c. <a href=\"#g-page-78\">Letter of Intent and Contacts to Russian Government (October 2015 – January 2016)</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>i. <a href=\"#g-page-78\">Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the Trump Organization</a></p><p>ii. <a href=\"#g-page-80\">Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia</a></p></div><p>d. <a href=\"#g-page-84\">Discussions about Russia Travel by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump (December 2015 – June 2016)</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>i. <a href=\"#g-page-84\">Sater’s Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia</a></p><p>ii. <a href=\"#g-page-86\">Candidate Trump’s Opportunities to Travel to Russia</a></p></div></div><p>2. <a href=\"#g-page-88\">George Papadopoulos</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-89\">Origins of Campaign Work</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-90\">Initial Russia-Related Contacts</a></p><p>c. <a href=\"#g-page-93\">March 31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting</a></p></div></div></div>"
---
> "markup": "<div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>c. <a href=\"#g-page-53\">The GRU’s Transfer of Stolen Materials to WikiLeaks</a></p><p>d. <a href=\"#g-page-56\">WikiLeaks Statements Dissembling About the Source of Stolen Materials</a></p></div></div><p>C. <a href=\"#g-page-57\">Additional GRU Cyber Operations</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>1. <a href=\"#g-page-57\">Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims</a></p><p>2. <a href=\"#g-page-58\">Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections</a></p></div><p>D. <a href=\"#g-page-59\">Trump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>1. <span data-color=\"white\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-white g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-59\">Background</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-60\">Contacts with the Campaign about WikiLeaks</a></p><p>c. <span data-color=\"white\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-white g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p>d. <a href=\"#g-page-66\">WikiLeaks’s October 7, 2016 Release of Stolen Podesta Emails</a></p><p>e. <a href=\"#g-page-67\">Donald Trump Jr. Interaction with WikiLeaks</a></p></div><p>2. <a href=\"#g-page-69\">Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-69\">Henry Oknyansky (a/k/a Henry Greenberg)</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-70\">Campaign Efforts to Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails</a></p></div></div></div><p>IV. <a href=\"#g-page-74\">RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT LINKS TO AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>A. <a href=\"#g-page-74\">Campaign Period (September 2015 – November 8, 2016)</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>1. <a href=\"#g-page-75\">Trump Tower Moscow Project</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-75\">Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013 – 2014)</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-77\">Communications with I.C. Expert Investment Company and Giorgi Rtskhiladze (Summer and Fall 2015)</a></p><p>c. <a href=\"#g-page-78\">Letter of Intent and Contacts to Russian Government (October 2015 – January 2016)</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>i. <a href=\"#g-page-78\">Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the Trump Organization</a></p><p>ii. <a href=\"#g-page-80\">Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia</a></p></div><p>d. <a href=\"#g-page-84\">Discussions about Russia Travel by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump (December 2015 – June 2016)</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>i. <a href=\"#g-page-84\">Sater’s Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia</a></p><p>ii. <a href=\"#g-page-86\">Candidate Trump’s Opportunities to Travel to Russia</a></p></div></div><p>2. <a href=\"#g-page-88\">George Papadopoulos</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-89\">Origins of Campaign Work</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-90\">Initial Russia-Related Contacts</a></p><p>c. <a href=\"#g-page-93\">March 31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting</a></p></div></div></div>"
20c20
< "markup": "<div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>d. <a href=\"#g-page-94\">George Papadopoulos Learns That Russia Has “Dirt” in the Form of Clinton Emails</a></p><p>e. <a href=\"#g-page-97\">Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign</a></p><p>f. <a href=\"#g-page-101\">Trump Campaign Knowledge of “Dirt” </a></p><p>g. <a href=\"#g-page-102\">Additional George Papadopoulos Contact</a></p></div><p>3. <a href=\"#g-page-103\">Carter Page</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-104\">Background</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-105\">Origins of and Early Campaign Work</a></p><p>c. <a href=\"#g-page-106\">Carter Page’s July 2016 Trip To Moscow</a></p><p>d. <a href=\"#g-page-110\">Later Campaign Work and Removal from the Campaign</a></p></div><p>4. <a href=\"#g-page-111\">Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-111\">CNI and Dimitri Simes Connect with the Trump Campaign</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-113\">National Interest Hosts a Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel</a></p><p>c. <a href=\"#g-page-115\">Jeff Sessions’s Post-Speech Interactions with CNI</a></p><p>d. <a href=\"#g-page-116\">Jared Kushner’s Continuing Contacts with Simes</a></p></div><p>5. <a href=\"#g-page-118\">June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-118\">Setting Up the June 9 Meeting</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>i. <a href=\"#g-page-118\">Outreach to Donald Trump Jr.</a></p><p>ii. <a href=\"#g-page-122\">Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign </a></p></div><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-124\">The Events of June 9, 2016</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>i. <a href=\"#g-page-118\">Arrangements for the Meeting</a></p><p>ii. <a href=\"#g-page-125\">Conduct of the Meeting</a></p></div><p>c. <a href=\"#g-page-128\">Post-June 9 Events</a></p></div><p>6. <a href=\"#g-page-131\">Events at the Republican National Convention</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-131\">Ambassador Kislyak’s Encounters with Senator Sessions and J.D. Gordon the Week of the RNC</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-132\">Change to Republican Party Platform</a></p></div><p>7. <a href=\"#g-page-135\">Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-135\">Ambassador Kislyak Invites J.D. Gordon to Breakfast at the Ambassador’s Residence</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-135\">Senator Sessions’s September 2016 Meeting with Ambassador Kislyak</a></p></div><p>8. <a href=\"#g-page-137\">Paul Manafort</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-139\">Paul Manafort’s Ties to Russia and Ukraine</a></p></div></div></div>"
---
> "markup": "<div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>d. <a href=\"#g-page-94\">George Papadopoulos Learns That Russia Has “Dirt” in the Form of Clinton Emails</a></p><p>e. <a href=\"#g-page-97\">Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign</a></p><p>f. <a href=\"#g-page-101\">Trump Campaign Knowledge of “Dirt” </a></p><p>g. <a href=\"#g-page-102\">Additional George Papadopoulos Contact</a></p></div><p>3. <a href=\"#g-page-103\">Carter Page</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-104\">Background</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-105\">Origins of and Early Campaign Work</a></p><p>c. <a href=\"#g-page-106\">Carter Page’s July 2016 Trip To Moscow</a></p><p>d. <a href=\"#g-page-110\">Later Campaign Work and Removal from the Campaign</a></p></div><p>4. <a href=\"#g-page-111\">Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-111\">CNI and Dimitri Simes Connect with the Trump Campaign</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-113\">National Interest Hosts a Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel</a></p><p>c. <a href=\"#g-page-115\">Jeff Sessions’s Post-Speech Interactions with CNI</a></p><p>d. <a href=\"#g-page-116\">Jared Kushner’s Continuing Contacts with Simes</a></p></div><p>5. <a href=\"#g-page-118\">June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-118\">Setting Up the June 9 Meeting</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>i. <a href=\"#g-page-118\">Outreach to Donald Trump Jr.</a></p><p>ii. <a href=\"#g-page-122\">Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign </a></p></div><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-124\">The Events of June 9, 2016</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>i. <a href=\"#g-page-118\">Arrangements for the Meeting</a></p><p>ii. <a href=\"#g-page-125\">Conduct of the Meeting</a></p></div><p>c. <a href=\"#g-page-128\">Post-June 9 Events</a></p></div><p>6. <a href=\"#g-page-131\">Events at the Republican National Convention</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-131\">Ambassador Kislyak’s Encounters with Senator Sessions and J.D. Gordon the Week of the RNC</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-132\">Change to Republican Party Platform</a></p></div><p>7. <a href=\"#g-page-135\">Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-135\">Ambassador Kislyak Invites J.D. Gordon to Breakfast at the Ambassador’s Residence</a></p><p>b. <a href=\"#g-page-135\">Senator Sessions’s September 2016 Meeting with Ambassador Kislyak</a></p></div><p>8. <a href=\"#g-page-137\">Paul Manafort</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>a. <a href=\"#g-page-139\">Paul Manafort’s Ties to Russia and Ukraine</a></p></div></div></div>"
200c200
< "markup": "<p>GRU officers operated a Facebook page under the DCLeaks moniker, which they primarily used to promote releases of materials.<sup>141</sup> The Facebook page was administered through a small number of preexisting GRU-controlled Facebook accounts.<sup>142</sup></p><p>GRU officers also used the DCLeaks Facebook account, the Twitter account @dcleaks_, and the email account dcleaksproject@gmail.com to communicate privately with reporters and other U.S. persons. GRU officers using the DCLeaks persona gave certain reporters early access to archives of leaked files by sending them links and passwords to pages on the dcleaks.com website that had not yet become public. For example, on July 14, 2016, GRU officers operating under the DCLeaks persona sent a link and password for a non-public DCLeaks webpage to a U.S. reporter via the Facebook account.<sup>143</sup> Similarly, on September 14, 2016, GRU officers sent reporters Twitter direct messages from @dcleaks_, with a password to another non-public part of the dcleaks.com website.<sup>144</sup></p><p>The DCLeaks.com website remained operational and public until March 2017.</p><h2><u>2. Guccifer 2.0</u></h2><p>On June 14, 2016, the DNC and its cyber-response team announced the breach of the DNC network and suspected theft of DNC documents. In the statements, the cyber-response team alleged that Russian state-sponsored actors (which they referred to as “Fancy Bear") were responsible for the breach.<sup>145</sup> Apparently in response to that announcement, on June 15, 2016, GRU officers using the persona Guccifer 2.0 created a WordPress blog. In the hours leading up to the launch of that WordPress blog, GRU officers logged into a Moscow-based server used and managed by Unit 74455 and searched for a number of specific words and phrases in English, including “some hundred sheets,” “illuminati,” and “worldwide known.” Approximately two hours after the last of those searches, Guccifer 2.0 published its first post, attributing the DNC server hack to a lone Romanian hacker and using several of the unique English words and phrases that the GRU officers had searched for that day.<sup>145</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>141</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\">Netyksho</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\"> Indictment</a> ¶ 38.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>142</sup> <em>See, e.g.,</em> Facebook Account 100008825623541 (Alice Donovan).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>143</sup>7/14/16 Facebook Message, ID 793058100795341 (DC Leaks) to ID <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>144</sup><em>See, e.g., </em>9/14/16 Twitter DM, @dcleaks_ to <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> ; 9/14/16 Twitter DM, @dcleaks_to <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> The messages read: “Hi https://t.co/QTVKUjQcOx pass: KvFsg%*14@gPgu& enjoy ;).”</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>145</sup> Dmitri Alperovitch, <em><a href=\"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/\">Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee</a></em>, CrowdStrike Blog (June 14, 2016). CrowdStrike updated its post after the June 15, 2016 post by Guccifer 2.0 claiming responsibility for the intrusion.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>146</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\">Netyksho</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\"> Indictment</a> ¶¶ 41-42.</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>GRU officers operated a Facebook page under the DCLeaks moniker, which they primarily used to promote releases of materials.<sup>141</sup> The Facebook page was administered through a small number of preexisting GRU-controlled Facebook accounts.<sup>142</sup></p><p>GRU officers also used the DCLeaks Facebook account, the Twitter account @dcleaks_, and the email account dcleaksproject@gmail.com to communicate privately with reporters and other U.S. persons. GRU officers using the DCLeaks persona gave certain reporters early access to archives of leaked files by sending them links and passwords to pages on the dcleaks.com website that had not yet become public. For example, on July 14, 2016, GRU officers operating under the DCLeaks persona sent a link and password for a non-public DCLeaks webpage to a U.S. reporter via the Facebook account.<sup>143</sup> Similarly, on September 14, 2016, GRU officers sent reporters Twitter direct messages from @dcleaks_, with a password to another non-public part of the dcleaks.com website.<sup>144</sup></p><p>The DCLeaks.com website remained operational and public until March 2017.</p><h2><u>2. Guccifer 2.0</u></h2><p>On June 14, 2016, the DNC and its cyber-response team announced the breach of the DNC network and suspected theft of DNC documents. In the statements, the cyber-response team alleged that Russian state-sponsored actors (which they referred to as “Fancy Bear") were responsible for the breach.<sup>145</sup> Apparently in response to that announcement, on June 15, 2016, GRU officers using the persona Guccifer 2.0 created a WordPress blog. In the hours leading up to the launch of that WordPress blog, GRU officers logged into a Moscow-based server used and managed by Unit 74455 and searched for a number of specific words and phrases in English, including “some hundred sheets,” “illuminati,” and “worldwide known.” Approximately two hours after the last of those searches, Guccifer 2.0 published its first post, attributing the DNC server hack to a lone Romanian hacker and using several of the unique English words and phrases that the GRU officers had searched for that day.<sup>146</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>141</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\">Netyksho</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\"> Indictment</a> ¶ 38.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>142</sup> <em>See, e.g.,</em> Facebook Account 100008825623541 (Alice Donovan).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>143</sup>7/14/16 Facebook Message, ID 793058100795341 (DC Leaks) to ID <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>144</sup><em>See, e.g., </em>9/14/16 Twitter DM, @dcleaks_ to <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> ; 9/14/16 Twitter DM, @dcleaks_to <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> The messages read: “Hi https://t.co/QTVKUjQcOx pass: KvFsg%*14@gPgu& enjoy ;).”</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>145</sup> Dmitri Alperovitch, <em><a href=\"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/\">Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee</a></em>, CrowdStrike Blog (June 14, 2016). CrowdStrike updated its post after the June 15, 2016 post by Guccifer 2.0 claiming responsibility for the intrusion.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>146</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\">Netyksho</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\"> Indictment</a> ¶¶ 41-42.</p>"
204c204
< "markup": "<p>That same day, June 15, 2016, the GRU also used the Guccifer 2.0 WordPress blog to begin releasing to the public documents stolen from the DNC and DCCC computer networks. The Guccifer 2.0 persona ultimately released thousands of documents stolen from the DNC and DCCC in a series of blog posts between June 15, 2016 and October 18, 2016.<sup>147</sup> Released documents included opposition research performed by the DNC (including a memorandum analyzing potential criticisms of candidate Trump), internal policy documents (such as recommendations on how to address politically sensitive issues), analyses of specific congressional races, and fundraising documents. Releases were organized around thematic issues, such as specific states (<em>e.g., </em>Florida and Pennsylvania) that were perceived as competitive in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.</p><p>Beginning in late June 2016, the GRU also used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to release documents directly to reporters and other interested individuals. Specifically, on June 27, 2016, Guccifer 2.0 sent an email to the news outlet The Smoking Gun offering to provide “exclusive access to some leaked emails linked ſto] Hillary Clinton’s staff."<sup>148</sup> The GRU later sent the reporter a password and link to a locked portion of the dcleaks.com website that contained an archive of emails stolen by Unit 26165 from a Clinton Campaign volunteer in March 2016.<sup>149</sup> That the Guccifer 2.0 persona provided reporters access to a restricted portion of the DCLeaks website tends to indicate that both personas were operated by the same or a closely-related group of people.<sup>150</sup></p><p>The GRU continued its release efforts through Guccifer 2.0 into August 2016. For example, on August 15, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent a candidate for the U.S. Congress documents related to the candidate’s opponent.<sup>151</sup> On August 22, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona transferred approximately 2.5 gigabytes of Florida-related data stolen from the DCCC to a U.S. blogger covering Florida politics.<sup>152</sup> On August 22, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent a U.S. reporter documents stolen from the DCCC pertaining to the Black Lives Matter movement.<sup>153</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>147</sup> Releases of documents on the Guccifer 2.0 blog occurred on June 15, 2016; June 20, 2016; June 21, 2016; July 6, 2016; July 14, 2016; August 12, 2016; August 15, 2016; August 21, 2016; August 31, 2016; September 15, 2016; September 23, 2016; October 4, 2016; and October 18, 2016.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>148</sup>6/27/16 Email, guccifer20@aol.fr to <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> (subject “leaked emails"); <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-yellow \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>159</sup> 6/27/16 Email, guccifer20@aol.fr to <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> (subject “leaked emails”); <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-yellow \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span>;<em> see also</em> 6/27/16 Email, guccifer20@aol.fr to <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-yellow \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> (subject “leaked emails”); <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-yellow g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> (claiming DCLeaks was a “Wikileaks sub project”).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>150</sup> Before sending the reporter the link and password to the closed DCLeaks website, and in an apparent effort to deflect attention from the fact that DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 were operated by the same organization, the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent the reporter an email stating that DCLeaks was a “Wikileaks sub project” and that Guccifer 2.0 had asked DCLeaks to release the leaked emails with “closed access” to give reporters a preview of them.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>151</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\">Netyksho</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\"> Indictment</a> ¶ 43(a).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>152</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\">Netyksho</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\"> Indictment</a> ¶ 43(b).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>153</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\">Netyksho</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\"> Indictment</a> ¶ 43(c).</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>That same day, June 15, 2016, the GRU also used the Guccifer 2.0 WordPress blog to begin releasing to the public documents stolen from the DNC and DCCC computer networks. The Guccifer 2.0 persona ultimately released thousands of documents stolen from the DNC and DCCC in a series of blog posts between June 15, 2016 and October 18, 2016.<sup>147</sup> Released documents included opposition research performed by the DNC (including a memorandum analyzing potential criticisms of candidate Trump), internal policy documents (such as recommendations on how to address politically sensitive issues), analyses of specific congressional races, and fundraising documents. Releases were organized around thematic issues, such as specific states (<em>e.g., </em>Florida and Pennsylvania) that were perceived as competitive in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.</p><p>Beginning in late June 2016, the GRU also used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to release documents directly to reporters and other interested individuals. Specifically, on June 27, 2016, Guccifer 2.0 sent an email to the news outlet The Smoking Gun offering to provide “exclusive access to some leaked emails linked ſto] Hillary Clinton’s staff."<sup>148</sup> The GRU later sent the reporter a password and link to a locked portion of the dcleaks.com website that contained an archive of emails stolen by Unit 26165 from a Clinton Campaign volunteer in March 2016.<sup>149</sup> That the Guccifer 2.0 persona provided reporters access to a restricted portion of the DCLeaks website tends to indicate that both personas were operated by the same or a closely-related group of people.<sup>150</sup></p><p>The GRU continued its release efforts through Guccifer 2.0 into August 2016. For example, on August 15, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent a candidate for the U.S. Congress documents related to the candidate’s opponent.<sup>151</sup> On August 22, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona transferred approximately 2.5 gigabytes of Florida-related data stolen from the DCCC to a U.S. blogger covering Florida politics.<sup>152</sup> On August 22, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent a U.S. reporter documents stolen from the DCCC pertaining to the Black Lives Matter movement.<sup>153</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>147</sup> Releases of documents on the Guccifer 2.0 blog occurred on June 15, 2016; June 20, 2016; June 21, 2016; July 6, 2016; July 14, 2016; August 12, 2016; August 15, 2016; August 21, 2016; August 31, 2016; September 15, 2016; September 23, 2016; October 4, 2016; and October 18, 2016.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>148</sup>6/27/16 Email, guccifer20@aol.fr to <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> (subject “leaked emails"); <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-yellow \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>149</sup> 6/27/16 Email, guccifer20@aol.fr to <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> (subject “leaked emails”); <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-yellow \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span>;<em> see also</em> 6/27/16 Email, guccifer20@aol.fr to <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-yellow \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> (subject “leaked emails”); <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-yellow g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> (claiming DCLeaks was a “Wikileaks sub project”).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>150</sup> Before sending the reporter the link and password to the closed DCLeaks website, and in an apparent effort to deflect attention from the fact that DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 were operated by the same organization, the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent the reporter an email stating that DCLeaks was a “Wikileaks sub project” and that Guccifer 2.0 had asked DCLeaks to release the leaked emails with “closed access” to give reporters a preview of them.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>151</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\">Netyksho</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\"> Indictment</a> ¶ 43(a).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>152</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\">Netyksho</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\"> Indictment</a> ¶ 43(b).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>153</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\">Netyksho</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\"> Indictment</a> ¶ 43(c).</p>"
228c228
< "markup": "<p>circumstances, it doesn’t necessarily mean that the two are connected. But it is a very serious matter...that type of allegation is very serious, as it’s taken very seriously by us.”<sup>181</sup></p><p>After the U.S. intelligence community publicly announced its assessment that Russia was behind the hacking operation, Assange continued to deny that the Clinton materials released by WikiLeaks had come from Russian hacking. According to media reports, Assange told a U.S. congressman that the DNC hack was an “inside job,” and purported to have “physical proof that Russians did not give materials to Assange.<sup>182</sup></p><h2>C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations</h2><p>While releasing the stolen emails and documents through DCLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, and WikiLeaks, GRU officers continued to target and hack victims linked to the Democratic campaign and, eventually, to target entities responsible for election administration in several states.</p><h2>1. Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims</h2><p>On July 27, 2016, Unit 26165 targeted email accounts connected to candidate Clinton’s personal office <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■</span>. Earlier that day, candidate Trump made public statements that included the following: “Russia, if you’re listening, I hope you’re able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press."183 The “30,000 emails” were apparently a reference to emails described in media accounts as having been stored on a personal server that candidate Clinton had used while serving as Secretary of State.</p><p>Within approximately five hours of Trump’s statement, GRU officers targeted for the first time Clinton’s personal office. After candidate Trump’s remarks, Unit 26165 created and sent malicious links targeting 15 email accounts at the domain <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■</span> including an email account belonging to Clinton aide <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■</span> The investigation did not find evidence of earlier GRU attempts to compromise accounts hosted on this domain. It is unclear how the GRU was able to identify these email accounts, which were not public.<sup>184</sup></p><p>Unit 26165 officers also hacked into a DNC account hosted on a cloud-computing service <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> On September 20, 2016, the GRU began to generate copies of the DNC data using <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■</span> function designed to allow users to produce backups of databases (referred to <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■</span> as “snapshots”). The GRU then stole those snapshots by moving</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>181</sup> See Assange: “<em><a href=\"http://www.fox5dc.com/news/wikileaks-founder-addresses-death-of-dnc-staffer-seth-rich-in-fox-news-interview\">Murdered DNC Staffer Was ‘Potential’ WikiLeaks Source</a></em>,” Fox News (Aug. 25, 2016)(containing video of Assange interview by Megyn Kelly).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>182</sup> M. Raju & Z. Cohen, <em><a href=\"https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/23/politics/rohrabacher-assange-interview/index.html\">A GOP Congressman’s Lonely Quest Defending Julian Assange</a></em>, CNN (May 23, 2018).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>183</sup> “<a href=\"https://www.c-span.org/video/?413263-1/donald-trump-urges-russia-find-hillary-clinton-emails-criticizes-record-tpp\">Donald Trump on Russian & Missing Hillary Clinton Emails</a>,” YouTube Channel C-SPAN, Posted 7/27/16, <em>available at</em> <a href=\"https://youtu.be/3kxG8uJUsWU?t=41\">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kxG8uJUsWU</a> (starting at 0:41).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>184</sup> <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-1 g-redacted-yellow g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80 g-c-100 g-c-120\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>circumstances, it doesn’t necessarily mean that the two are connected. But it is a very serious matter...that type of allegation is very serious, as it’s taken very seriously by us.”<sup>181</sup></p><p>After the U.S. intelligence community publicly announced its assessment that Russia was behind the hacking operation, Assange continued to deny that the Clinton materials released by WikiLeaks had come from Russian hacking. According to media reports, Assange told a U.S. congressman that the DNC hack was an “inside job,” and purported to have “physical proof that Russians did not give materials to Assange.<sup>182</sup></p><h2>C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations</h2><p>While releasing the stolen emails and documents through DCLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, and WikiLeaks, GRU officers continued to target and hack victims linked to the Democratic campaign and, eventually, to target entities responsible for election administration in several states.</p><h2>1. Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims</h2><p>On July 27, 2016, Unit 26165 targeted email accounts connected to candidate Clinton’s personal office <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■</span>. Earlier that day, candidate Trump made public statements that included the following: “Russia, if you’re listening, I hope you’re able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press."<sup>183</sup> The “30,000 emails” were apparently a reference to emails described in media accounts as having been stored on a personal server that candidate Clinton had used while serving as Secretary of State.</p><p>Within approximately five hours of Trump’s statement, GRU officers targeted for the first time Clinton’s personal office. After candidate Trump’s remarks, Unit 26165 created and sent malicious links targeting 15 email accounts at the domain <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■</span> including an email account belonging to Clinton aide <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■</span> The investigation did not find evidence of earlier GRU attempts to compromise accounts hosted on this domain. It is unclear how the GRU was able to identify these email accounts, which were not public.<sup>184</sup></p><p>Unit 26165 officers also hacked into a DNC account hosted on a cloud-computing service <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> On September 20, 2016, the GRU began to generate copies of the DNC data using <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■</span> function designed to allow users to produce backups of databases (referred to <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■</span> as “snapshots”). The GRU then stole those snapshots by moving</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>181</sup> See Assange: “<em><a href=\"http://www.fox5dc.com/news/wikileaks-founder-addresses-death-of-dnc-staffer-seth-rich-in-fox-news-interview\">Murdered DNC Staffer Was ‘Potential’ WikiLeaks Source</a></em>,” Fox News (Aug. 25, 2016)(containing video of Assange interview by Megyn Kelly).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>182</sup> M. Raju & Z. Cohen, <em><a href=\"https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/23/politics/rohrabacher-assange-interview/index.html\">A GOP Congressman’s Lonely Quest Defending Julian Assange</a></em>, CNN (May 23, 2018).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>183</sup> “<a href=\"https://www.c-span.org/video/?413263-1/donald-trump-urges-russia-find-hillary-clinton-emails-criticizes-record-tpp\">Donald Trump on Russian & Missing Hillary Clinton Emails</a>,” YouTube Channel C-SPAN, Posted 7/27/16, <em>available at</em> <a href=\"https://youtu.be/3kxG8uJUsWU?t=41\">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kxG8uJUsWU</a> (starting at 0:41).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>184</sup> <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-1 g-redacted-yellow g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80 g-c-100 g-c-120\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p>"
232c232
< "markup": "<p>them to <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■</span> account that they controlled; from there, the copies were moved to GRU-controlled computers. The GRU stole approximately 300 gigabytes of data from the DNC cloud-based account.<sup>185</sup></p><h2>2. Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections</h2><p>In addition to targeting individuals involved in the Clinton Campaign, GRU officers also targeted individuals and entities involved in the administration of the elections. Victims included U.S. state and local entities, such as state boards of elections (SBOEs), secretaries of state, and county governments, as well as individuals who worked for those entities.<sup>186</sup> The GRU also targeted private technology firms responsible for manufacturing and administering election-related software and hardware, such as voter registration software and electronic polling stations.<sup>187</sup> The GRU continued to target these victims through the elections in November 2016. While the investigation identified evidence that the GRU targeted these individuals and entities, the Office did not investigate further. The Office did not, for instance, obtain or examine servers or other relevant items belonging to these victims. The Office understands that the FBI, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the states have separately investigated that activity.</p><p>By at least the summer of 2016, GRU officers sought access to state and local computer networks by exploiting known software vulnerabilities on websites of state and local governmental entities. GRU officers, for example, targeted state and local databases of registered voters using a technique known as “SQL injection,” by which malicious code was sent to the state or local website in order to run commands (such as exfiltrating the database contents).<sup>188</sup> In one instance in approximately June 2016, the GRU compromised the computer network of the Illinois State Board of Elections by exploiting a vulnerability in the SBOE’s website. The GRU then gained access to a database containing information on millions of registered Illinois voters,<sup>189</sup> and extracted data related to thousands of U.S. voters before the malicious activity was identified.<sup>190</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>190</sup> GRU officers <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-yellow \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> scanned state and local websites for vulnerabilities. For example, over a two-day period in July 2016, GRU officers <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-yellow g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> for vulnerabilities on websites of more than two dozen states. <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-yellow g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>185</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\">Netyksho</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\"> Indictment</a> ¶ 34; <em>see also</em> SM-2589105-HACK, serial 29 <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-yellow g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>186</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\">Netyksho</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\"> Indictment</a> ¶ 69.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>187</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\">Netyksho</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\"> Indictment</a> ¶ 69; <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-1 g-redacted-yellow g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>188</sup> <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-yellow g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>189</sup> <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-yellow g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>190</sup> <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-1 g-redacted-yellow g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>them to <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■</span> account that they controlled; from there, the copies were moved to GRU-controlled computers. The GRU stole approximately 300 gigabytes of data from the DNC cloud-based account.<sup>185</sup></p><h2>2. Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections</h2><p>In addition to targeting individuals involved in the Clinton Campaign, GRU officers also targeted individuals and entities involved in the administration of the elections. Victims included U.S. state and local entities, such as state boards of elections (SBOEs), secretaries of state, and county governments, as well as individuals who worked for those entities.<sup>186</sup> The GRU also targeted private technology firms responsible for manufacturing and administering election-related software and hardware, such as voter registration software and electronic polling stations.<sup>187</sup> The GRU continued to target these victims through the elections in November 2016. While the investigation identified evidence that the GRU targeted these individuals and entities, the Office did not investigate further. The Office did not, for instance, obtain or examine servers or other relevant items belonging to these victims. The Office understands that the FBI, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the states have separately investigated that activity.</p><p>By at least the summer of 2016, GRU officers sought access to state and local computer networks by exploiting known software vulnerabilities on websites of state and local governmental entities. GRU officers, for example, targeted state and local databases of registered voters using a technique known as “SQL injection,” by which malicious code was sent to the state or local website in order to run commands (such as exfiltrating the database contents).<sup>188</sup> In one instance in approximately June 2016, the GRU compromised the computer network of the Illinois State Board of Elections by exploiting a vulnerability in the SBOE’s website. The GRU then gained access to a database containing information on millions of registered Illinois voters,<sup>189</sup> and extracted data related to thousands of U.S. voters before the malicious activity was identified.<sup>190</sup></p><p GRU officers <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-yellow \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> scanned state and local websites for vulnerabilities. For example, over a two-day period in July 2016, GRU officers <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-yellow g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> for vulnerabilities on websites of more than two dozen states. <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-yellow g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>185</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\">Netyksho</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\"> Indictment</a> ¶ 34; <em>see also</em> SM-2589105-HACK, serial 29 <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-yellow g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>186</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\">Netyksho</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\"> Indictment</a> ¶ 69.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>187</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\">Netyksho</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\"> Indictment</a> ¶ 69; <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-1 g-redacted-yellow g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>188</sup> <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-yellow g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>189</sup> <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-yellow g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>190</sup> <span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-1 g-redacted-yellow g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p>"
432c432
< "markup": "<p>continued\\: “Page is Trump’s adviser on foreign policy. He is a known businessman; he used to work in Russia. . . . If you have any questions, I will be happy to help contact him.”<sup>563</sup> Dmitri Klimentov then contacted Russian Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov about Page’s visit to see if Peskov wanted to introduce Page to any Russian government officials.<sup>564</sup> The following day, Peskov responded to what appears to have been the same Denis Klimentov-Zakharova email thread. Peskov wrote, “I have read about [Page]. Specialists say that he is far from being the main one. So I better not initiate a meeting in the Kremlin.”<sup>565</sup></p><p>On July 7, 2016, Page delivered the first of his two speeches in Moscow at NES,<sup>566</sup> In the speech, Page criticized the U.S. government’s foreign policy toward Russia, stating that “Washington and other Western capitals have impeded potential progress through their often hypocritical focus on ideas such as democratization, inequality, corruption and regime change.”<sup>567</sup> On July 8, 2016, Page delivered a speech during the NES commencement. 568 After Page delivered his commencement address, Russian Deputy Prime Minister and NES board member Arkady Dvorkovich spoke at the ceremony and stated that the sanctions the United States had imposed on Russia had hurt the NES.569 Page and Dvorkovich shook hands at the commencement ceremony, and Weber recalled that Dvorkovich made statements to Page about working together in the future.<sup>570</sup> <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span>.<sup>571</sup></p><p>Page said that, during his time in Moscow, he met with friends and associates he knew from when he lived in Russia, including Andrey Baranov, a former Gazprom employee who had become the head of investor relations at Rosneft, a Russian energy company.<sup>572</sup> Page stated that he and Baranov talked about “immaterial non-public” information.<sup>573</sup> Page believed he and Baranov discussed Rosneft president Igor Sechin, and he thought Baranov might have mentioned</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>563</sup> 7/5/16 Email, Klimentov to Zakharova (translated).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>564</sup> Dm. Klimentov 11/27/18 302, at 1-2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>565</sup> 7/6/16 Email, Peskov to Klimentov (translated).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>566</sup> Page 3/10/17 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>567</sup> See Carter W. Page, <em><a href=\"https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=28&v=1CYF29saA9w\">The Lecture of Trump’s Advisor Carter Page in Moscow</a></em>, YouTube Channel Katehon Think Tank, Posted July 7, 2016, <em>available at</em> https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=28&v=1CYF29saA9w. Page also provided the FBI with a copy of his speech and slides from the speech. See Carter Page, “<a href=\"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1CYF29saA9w\">The Evolution of the World Economy: Trends and Potential</a>,” Speech at National Economic Speech (July 7, 2016).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>568</sup> Page 3/10/17 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>569</sup> Page 3/16/17 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>570</sup> S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at 4.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>571</sup> <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span>.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>572</sup> Page 3/10/17 302, at 3; Page 3/30/17 302, at 3; Page 3/31/17 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>573</sup> Page 3/30/17 302, at 3.</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>continued\\: “Page is Trump’s adviser on foreign policy. He is a known businessman; he used to work in Russia. . . . If you have any questions, I will be happy to help contact him.”<sup>563</sup> Dmitri Klimentov then contacted Russian Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov about Page’s visit to see if Peskov wanted to introduce Page to any Russian government officials.<sup>564</sup> The following day, Peskov responded to what appears to have been the same Denis Klimentov-Zakharova email thread. Peskov wrote, “I have read about [Page]. Specialists say that he is far from being the main one. So I better not initiate a meeting in the Kremlin.”<sup>565</sup></p><p>On July 7, 2016, Page delivered the first of his two speeches in Moscow at NES,<sup>566</sup> In the speech, Page criticized the U.S. government’s foreign policy toward Russia, stating that “Washington and other Western capitals have impeded potential progress through their often hypocritical focus on ideas such as democratization, inequality, corruption and regime change.”<sup>567</sup> On July 8, 2016, Page delivered a speech during the NES commencement. <sup>568</sup> After Page delivered his commencement address, Russian Deputy Prime Minister and NES board member Arkady Dvorkovich spoke at the ceremony and stated that the sanctions the United States had imposed on Russia had hurt the NES.<sup>569</sup> Page and Dvorkovich shook hands at the commencement ceremony, and Weber recalled that Dvorkovich made statements to Page about working together in the future.<sup>570</sup> <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span>.<sup>571</sup></p><p>Page said that, during his time in Moscow, he met with friends and associates he knew from when he lived in Russia, including Andrey Baranov, a former Gazprom employee who had become the head of investor relations at Rosneft, a Russian energy company.<sup>572</sup> Page stated that he and Baranov talked about “immaterial non-public” information.<sup>573</sup> Page believed he and Baranov discussed Rosneft president Igor Sechin, and he thought Baranov might have mentioned</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>563</sup> 7/5/16 Email, Klimentov to Zakharova (translated).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>564</sup> Dm. Klimentov 11/27/18 302, at 1-2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>565</sup> 7/6/16 Email, Peskov to Klimentov (translated).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>566</sup> Page 3/10/17 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>567</sup> See Carter W. Page, <em><a href=\"https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=28&v=1CYF29saA9w\">The Lecture of Trump’s Advisor Carter Page in Moscow</a></em>, YouTube Channel Katehon Think Tank, Posted July 7, 2016, <em>available at</em> https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=28&v=1CYF29saA9w. Page also provided the FBI with a copy of his speech and slides from the speech. See Carter Page, “<a href=\"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1CYF29saA9w\">The Evolution of the World Economy: Trends and Potential</a>,” Speech at National Economic Speech (July 7, 2016).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>568</sup> Page 3/10/17 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>569</sup> Page 3/16/17 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>570</sup> S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at 4.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>571</sup> <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span>.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>572</sup> Page 3/10/17 302, at 3; Page 3/30/17 302, at 3; Page 3/31/17 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>573</sup> Page 3/30/17 302, at 3.</p>"
468c468
< "markup": "<p>Trump.<sup>653</sup> In advance of the meeting, Simes sent Kushner a “Russia Policy Memo” laying out “what Mr. Trump may want to say about Russia.”<sup>634</sup> In a cover email transmitting that memo and a phone call to set up the meeting, Simes mentioned “a well-documented story of highly questionable connections between Bill Clinton” and the Russian government, “parts of [which]” (according to Simes) had even been “discussed with the CIA and the FBI in the late 1990s and shared with the [Independent Counsel] at the end of the Clinton presidency.”<sup>655</sup> Kushner forwarded the email to senior Trump Campaign officials Stephen Miller, Paul Manafort, and Rick Gates, with the note “suggestion only.”<sup>656</sup> Manafort subsequently forwarded the email to his assistant and scheduled a meeting with Simes.<sup>657</sup> (Manafort was on the verge of leaving the Campaign by the time of the scheduled meeting with Simes, and Simes ended up meeting only with Kushner).</p><p>During the August 17 meeting, Simes provided Kushner the Clinton-related information that he had promised.<sup>658</sup> Simes told Kushner that, <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-1 g-redacted-green g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80 g-c-100 g-c-120\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> <sup>659</sup> Simes claimed that he had received this information from former CIA and Reagan White House official Fritz Ermarth, who claimed to have learned it from U.S. intelligence sources, not from Russians.<sup>660</sup></p><p>Simes perceived that Kushner did not find the information to be of interest or use to the Campaign because it was, in Simes’s words, “old news.”<sup>661</sup> When interviewed by the Office, Kushner stated that he believed that there was little chance of something new being revealed about the Clintons given their long career as public figures, and that he never received from Simes information that could be “operationalized” for the Trump Campaign.<sup>662</sup> Despite Kushner’s</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>653</sup> Simes 3/8/18 302, at 29-30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12; C00007269 (8/10/16 Meeting Invitation, Vargas to Simes et al.); DJTFP00023484 (8/11/16 Email, Hagan to Manafort (5:57:15 p.m.)).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>654</sup> C00007981-84 (8/9/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6:09:21 p.m.)). The memorandum recommended “downplaying Russia as a U.S. foreign policy priority at this time” and suggested that “some tend to exaggerate Putin’s flaws.” The memorandum also recommended approaching general Russian-related questions in the framework of “how to work with Russia to advance important U.S. national interests” and that a Trump Administration “not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy.” The memorandum did not discuss sanctions but did address how to handle Ukraine-related questions, including questions about Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>655</sup> C00007981 (8/9/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6:09:21 p.m.)).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>656</sup> DJTFP00023459 (8/10/16 Email, Kushner to S. Miller et al. (11:30:13 a.m.)).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>657</sup> DJTFP00023484 (8/11/16 Email, Hagan to Manafort (5:57:15 p.m.)).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>658</sup> Simes 3/8/18 302, at 29-30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>659</sup> Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>660</sup> Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>661</sup> Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>662</sup> Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12.</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>Trump.<sup>653</sup> In advance of the meeting, Simes sent Kushner a “Russia Policy Memo” laying out “what Mr. Trump may want to say about Russia.”<sup>654</sup> In a cover email transmitting that memo and a phone call to set up the meeting, Simes mentioned “a well-documented story of highly questionable connections between Bill Clinton” and the Russian government, “parts of [which]” (according to Simes) had even been “discussed with the CIA and the FBI in the late 1990s and shared with the [Independent Counsel] at the end of the Clinton presidency.”<sup>655</sup> Kushner forwarded the email to senior Trump Campaign officials Stephen Miller, Paul Manafort, and Rick Gates, with the note “suggestion only.”<sup>656</sup> Manafort subsequently forwarded the email to his assistant and scheduled a meeting with Simes.<sup>657</sup> (Manafort was on the verge of leaving the Campaign by the time of the scheduled meeting with Simes, and Simes ended up meeting only with Kushner).</p><p>During the August 17 meeting, Simes provided Kushner the Clinton-related information that he had promised.<sup>658</sup> Simes told Kushner that, <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-1 g-redacted-green g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80 g-c-100 g-c-120\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> <sup>659</sup> Simes claimed that he had received this information from former CIA and Reagan White House official Fritz Ermarth, who claimed to have learned it from U.S. intelligence sources, not from Russians.<sup>660</sup></p><p>Simes perceived that Kushner did not find the information to be of interest or use to the Campaign because it was, in Simes’s words, “old news.”<sup>661</sup> When interviewed by the Office, Kushner stated that he believed that there was little chance of something new being revealed about the Clintons given their long career as public figures, and that he never received from Simes information that could be “operationalized” for the Trump Campaign.<sup>662</sup> Despite Kushner’s</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>653</sup> Simes 3/8/18 302, at 29-30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12; C00007269 (8/10/16 Meeting Invitation, Vargas to Simes et al.); DJTFP00023484 (8/11/16 Email, Hagan to Manafort (5:57:15 p.m.)).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>654</sup> C00007981-84 (8/9/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6:09:21 p.m.)). The memorandum recommended “downplaying Russia as a U.S. foreign policy priority at this time” and suggested that “some tend to exaggerate Putin’s flaws.” The memorandum also recommended approaching general Russian-related questions in the framework of “how to work with Russia to advance important U.S. national interests” and that a Trump Administration “not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy.” The memorandum did not discuss sanctions but did address how to handle Ukraine-related questions, including questions about Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>655</sup> C00007981 (8/9/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6:09:21 p.m.)).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>656</sup> DJTFP00023459 (8/10/16 Email, Kushner to S. Miller et al. (11:30:13 a.m.)).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>657</sup> DJTFP00023484 (8/11/16 Email, Hagan to Manafort (5:57:15 p.m.)).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>658</sup> Simes 3/8/18 302, at 29-30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>659</sup> Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>660</sup> Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>661</sup> Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>662</sup> Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12.</p>"
492c492
< "markup": "<p>meeting the following day with Trump Jr.<sup>699</sup> Later that day, Trump Jr. forwarded the entirety of his email correspondence regarding the meeting with Goldstone to Manafort and Kushner, under the subject line “FW: Russia - Clinton — private and confidential,” adding a note that the “[m]eeting got moved to 4 tomorrow at my offices.”<sup>700</sup> Kushner then sent his assistant a second email, informing her that the “[m]eeting with don jr is 4pm now.”<sup>701</sup> Manafort responded, “See you then. P.”<sup>702</sup></p><p>Rick Gates, who was the deputy campaign chairman, stated during interviews with the Office that in the days before June 9, 2016 Trump Jr. announced at a regular morning meeting of senior campaign staff and Trump family members that he had a lead on negative information about the Clinton Foundation.<sup>703</sup> Gates believed that Trump Jr. said the information was coming from a group in Kyrgyzstan and that he was introduced to the group by a friend.<sup>704</sup> Gates recalled that the meeting was attended by Trump Jr., Eric Trump, Paul Manafort, Hope Hicks, and, joining late, Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner. According to Gates, Manafort warned the group that the meeting likely would not yield vital information and they should be careful.<sup>705</sup> Hicks denied any knowledge of the June 9 meeting before 2017,<sup>706</sup> and Kushner did not recall if the planned June 9 meeting came up at all earlier that week.<sup>707</sup></p><p>Michael Cohen recalled being in Donald J. Trump’s office on June 6 or 7 when Trump Jr. told his father that a meeting to obtain adverse information about Clinton was going forward.<sup>708</sup> Cohen did not recall Trump Jr. stating that the meeting was connected to Russia.<sup>709</sup> From the tenor of the conversation, Cohen believed that Trump Jr. had previously discussed the meeting with his father, although Cohen was not involved in any such conversation.710 In an interview with the Senate Judiciary Committee, however, Trump Jr. stated that he did not inform his father about the</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>699</sup> NOSC0000007-08 (6/8/18 Email, Kushner to Vargas).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>700</sup> NOSC00000039-42 (6/8/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Kushner & Manafort); DJTJR00485 (6/8/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Kushner & Manafort).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>701</sup> NOSC0000004 (6/8/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>702</sup> 6/8/16 Email, Manafort to Trump Jr.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>703</sup> Gates 1/30/18 302, at 7; Gates 3/1/18 302, at 3-4. Although the March 1 302 refers to “June 19,” that is likely a typographical error; external emails indicate that a meeting with those participants occurred on June 6. <em>See</em> NOSC00023603 (6/6/16 Email, Gates to Trump Jr. et al.).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>704</sup> Gates 1/30/18 302, at 7. Aras Agalarov is originally from Azerbaijan, and public reporting indicates that his company, the Crocus Group, has done substantial work in Kyrgyzstan. <em>See </em>Neil MacFarquhar, <em><a href=\"https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/16/world/europe/aras-agalarov-trump-kremlin.html\">A Russian Developer Helps Out the Kremlin on Occasion. Was He a Conduit to Trump?</a><em>,</em></em> New York Times (July 16, 2017).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>705</sup> Gates 3/1/18 302, at 3-4.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>706</sup> Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>707</sup> Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 8.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>708</sup> Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 4-6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>709</sup> Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 4-5.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>710</sup> Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 15-16.</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>meeting the following day with Trump Jr.<sup>699</sup> Later that day, Trump Jr. forwarded the entirety of his email correspondence regarding the meeting with Goldstone to Manafort and Kushner, under the subject line “FW: Russia - Clinton — private and confidential,” adding a note that the “[m]eeting got moved to 4 tomorrow at my offices.”<sup>700</sup> Kushner then sent his assistant a second email, informing her that the “[m]eeting with don jr is 4pm now.”<sup>701</sup> Manafort responded, “See you then. P.”<sup>702</sup></p><p>Rick Gates, who was the deputy campaign chairman, stated during interviews with the Office that in the days before June 9, 2016 Trump Jr. announced at a regular morning meeting of senior campaign staff and Trump family members that he had a lead on negative information about the Clinton Foundation.<sup>703</sup> Gates believed that Trump Jr. said the information was coming from a group in Kyrgyzstan and that he was introduced to the group by a friend.<sup>704</sup> Gates recalled that the meeting was attended by Trump Jr., Eric Trump, Paul Manafort, Hope Hicks, and, joining late, Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner. According to Gates, Manafort warned the group that the meeting likely would not yield vital information and they should be careful.<sup>705</sup> Hicks denied any knowledge of the June 9 meeting before 2017,<sup>706</sup> and Kushner did not recall if the planned June 9 meeting came up at all earlier that week.<sup>707</sup></p><p>Michael Cohen recalled being in Donald J. Trump’s office on June 6 or 7 when Trump Jr. told his father that a meeting to obtain adverse information about Clinton was going forward.<sup>708</sup> Cohen did not recall Trump Jr. stating that the meeting was connected to Russia.<sup>709</sup> From the tenor of the conversation, Cohen believed that Trump Jr. had previously discussed the meeting with his father, although Cohen was not involved in any such conversation.<sup>710</sup> In an interview with the Senate Judiciary Committee, however, Trump Jr. stated that he did not inform his father about the</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>699</sup> NOSC0000007-08 (6/8/18 Email, Kushner to Vargas).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>700</sup> NOSC00000039-42 (6/8/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Kushner & Manafort); DJTJR00485 (6/8/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Kushner & Manafort).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>701</sup> NOSC0000004 (6/8/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>702</sup> 6/8/16 Email, Manafort to Trump Jr.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>703</sup> Gates 1/30/18 302, at 7; Gates 3/1/18 302, at 3-4. Although the March 1 302 refers to “June 19,” that is likely a typographical error; external emails indicate that a meeting with those participants occurred on June 6. <em>See</em> NOSC00023603 (6/6/16 Email, Gates to Trump Jr. et al.).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>704</sup> Gates 1/30/18 302, at 7. Aras Agalarov is originally from Azerbaijan, and public reporting indicates that his company, the Crocus Group, has done substantial work in Kyrgyzstan. <em>See </em>Neil MacFarquhar, <em><a href=\"https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/16/world/europe/aras-agalarov-trump-kremlin.html\">A Russian Developer Helps Out the Kremlin on Occasion. Was He a Conduit to Trump?</a><em>,</em></em> New York Times (July 16, 2017).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>705</sup> Gates 3/1/18 302, at 3-4.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>706</sup> Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>707</sup> Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 8.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>708</sup> Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 4-6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>709</sup> Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 4-5.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>710</sup> Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 15-16.</p>"
652c652
< "markup": "<p><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span><sup>1077</sup></p><p>After the brief second meeting concluded, Nader and Dmitriev discussed what had transpired.<sup>1078</sup> Dmitriev told Nader that he was disappointed in his meetings with Prince for two reasons: first, he believed the Russians needed to be communicating with someone who had more authority within the incoming Administration than Prince had.<sup>1079</sup> Second, he had hoped to have a discussion of greater substance, such as outlining a strategic roadmap for both countries to follow.<sup>1080</sup> Dmitriev told Nader that <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> Prince’s comments <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> were insulting <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span><sup>1081</sup></p><p>Hours after the second meeting, Prince sent two text messages to Bannon from the Seychelles.<sup>1082 As described further below, investigators were unable to obtain the content of these or other messages between Prince and Bannon, and the investigation also did not identify evidence of any further communication between Prince and Dmitriev after their meetings in the Seychelles.</sup></p><h2>iii. Erik Prince’s Meeting with Steve Bannon after the Seychelles Trip</h2><p>After the Seychelles meetings, Prince told Nader that he would inform Bannon about his discussion with Dmitriev and would convey that someone within the Russian power structure was interested in seeking better relations with the incoming Administration.<sup>1083</sup> On January 12, 2017, Prince contacted Bannon’s personal assistant to set up a meeting for the following week.<sup>1084</sup> Several days later, Prince messaged her again asking about Bannon’s schedule.<sup>1085</sup></p><p>Prince said that he met Bannon at Bannon’s home after returning to the United States in mid-January and briefed him about several topics, including his meeting with Dmitriev.<sup>1086</sup> Prince told the Office that he explained to Bannon that Dmitriev was the head of a Russian sovereign wealth fund and was interested in improving relations between the United States and Russia.<sup>1087</sup> Prince had on his cellphone a screenshot of Dmitriev’s Wikipedia page dated January 16, 2017,</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1077</sup> <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1078</sup> Nader 1/22/18 302, at 15; <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1079</sup> Nader 1/22/18 302, at 9, 15; <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1080</sup> Nader 1/22/18 302, at 15.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1081</sup> <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> Nader 1/22/18 302, at 15.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1082</sup> Call Records of Erik Prince <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1083</sup> Prince 4/4/18 302, at 10; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4; <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1084</sup> 1/12/17 Text Messages, Prince to Preate.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1085</sup> 1/15/17 Text Message, Prince to Preate.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1086</sup> Prince 4/4/18 302, at 11; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1087</sup> Prince 4/4/18 302, at 11; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5.</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span><sup>1077</sup></p><p>After the brief second meeting concluded, Nader and Dmitriev discussed what had transpired.<sup>1078</sup> Dmitriev told Nader that he was disappointed in his meetings with Prince for two reasons: first, he believed the Russians needed to be communicating with someone who had more authority within the incoming Administration than Prince had.<sup>1079</sup> Second, he had hoped to have a discussion of greater substance, such as outlining a strategic roadmap for both countries to follow.<sup>1080</sup> Dmitriev told Nader that <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> Prince’s comments <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> were insulting <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span><sup>1081</sup></p><p>Hours after the second meeting, Prince sent two text messages to Bannon from the Seychelles.<sup>1082</sup> As described further below, investigators were unable to obtain the content of these or other messages between Prince and Bannon, and the investigation also did not identify evidence of any further communication between Prince and Dmitriev after their meetings in the Seychelles.</sup></p><h2>iii. Erik Prince's Meeting with Steve Bannon after the Seychelles Trip</h2><p>After the Seychelles meetings, Prince told Nader that he would inform Bannon about his discussion with Dmitriev and would convey that someone within the Russian power structure was interested in seeking better relations with the incoming Administration.<sup>1083</sup> On January 12, 2017, Prince contacted Bannon’s personal assistant to set up a meeting for the following week.<sup>1084</sup> Several days later, Prince messaged her again asking about Bannon’s schedule.<sup>1085</sup></p><p>Prince said that he met Bannon at Bannon’s home after returning to the United States in mid-January and briefed him about several topics, including his meeting with Dmitriev.<sup>1086</sup> Prince told the Office that he explained to Bannon that Dmitriev was the head of a Russian sovereign wealth fund and was interested in improving relations between the United States and Russia.<sup>1087</sup> Prince had on his cellphone a screenshot of Dmitriev’s Wikipedia page dated January 16, 2017,</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1077</sup> <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1078</sup> Nader 1/22/18 302, at 15; <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1079</sup> Nader 1/22/18 302, at 9, 15; <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1080</sup> Nader 1/22/18 302, at 15.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1081</sup> <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> Nader 1/22/18 302, at 15.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1082</sup> Call Records of Erik Prince <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1083</sup> Prince 4/4/18 302, at 10; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4; <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1084</sup> 1/12/17 Text Messages, Prince to Preate.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1085</sup> 1/15/17 Text Message, Prince to Preate.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1086</sup> Prince 4/4/18 302, at 11; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1087</sup> Prince 4/4/18 302, at 11; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5.</p>"
656c656
< "markup": "<p>and Prince told the Office that he likely showed that image to Bannon.<sup>1088</sup> Prince also believed he provided Bannon with Dmitriev’s contact information.<sup>1089</sup> According to Prince, Bannon instructed Prince not to follow up with Dmitriev, and Prince had the impression that the issue was not a priority for Bannon.<sup>1090</sup> Prince related that Bannon did not appear angry, just relatively uninterested.<sup>1091</sup></p><p>Bannon, by contrast, told the Office that he never discussed with Prince anything regarding Dmitriev, RDIF, or any meetings with Russian individuals or people associated with Putin.<sup>1092</sup> Bannon also stated that had Prince mentioned such a meeting, Bannon would have remembered it, and Bannon would have objected to such a meeting having taken place.<sup>1093</sup></p><p>The conflicting accounts provided by Bannon and Prince could not be independently clarified by reviewing their communications, because neither one was able to produce any of the messages they exchanged in the time period surrounding the Seychelles meeting. Prince’s phone contained no text messages prior to March 2017, though provider records indicate that he and Bannon exchanged dozens of messages.<sup>1094</sup> Prince denied deleting any messages but claimed he did not know why there were no messages on his device before March 2017.<sup>1095</sup> Bannon’s devices similarly contained no messages in the relevant time period, and Bannon also stated he did not know why messages did not appear on his device.<sup>1096</sup> Bannon told the Office that, during both the months before and after the Seychelles meeting, he regularly used his personal Blackberry and personal email for work-related communications (including those with Prince), and he took no steps to preserve these work communications.<sup>1097</sup></p><h2>d. Kirill Dmitriev’s Post-Election Contact with Rick Gerson Regarding U.S.- Russia Relations</h2><p>Dmitriev’s contacts during the transition period were not limited to those facilitated by Nader. In approximately late November 2016, the UAE national security advisor introduced Dmitriev to Rick Gerson, a friend of Jared Kushner who runs a hedge fund in New York,<sup>1098</sup> Gerson stated he had no formal role in the transition and had no involvement in the Trump</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1088</sup> Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5; 1/16/17 Image on Prince Phone (on file with the Office).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1089</sup> Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1090</sup> Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1091</sup> Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1092</sup> Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 10-11.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1093</sup> Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 10-11.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1094</sup> Call Records of Erik Prince <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1095</sup> Prince 4/4/18 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1096</sup> Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 11; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 36.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1097</sup> Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 11.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1098</sup> Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 1, 3; 11/26/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson; 1/25/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader.</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>and Prince told the Office that he likely showed that image to Bannon.<sup>1088</sup> Prince also believed he provided Bannon with Dmitriev’s contact information.<sup>1089</sup> According to Prince, Bannon instructed Prince not to follow up with Dmitriev, and Prince had the impression that the issue was not a priority for Bannon.<sup>1090</sup> Prince related that Bannon did not appear angry, just relatively uninterested.<sup>1091</sup></p><p>Bannon, by contrast, told the Office that he never discussed with Prince anything regarding Dmitriev, RDIF, or any meetings with Russian individuals or people associated with Putin.<sup>1092</sup> Bannon also stated that had Prince mentioned such a meeting, Bannon would have remembered it, and Bannon would have objected to such a meeting having taken place.<sup>1093</sup></p><p>The conflicting accounts provided by Bannon and Prince could not be independently clarified by reviewing their communications, because neither one was able to produce any of the messages they exchanged in the time period surrounding the Seychelles meeting. Prince’s phone contained no text messages prior to March 2017, though provider records indicate that he and Bannon exchanged dozens of messages.<sup>1094</sup> Prince denied deleting any messages but claimed he did not know why there were no messages on his device before March 2017.<sup>1095</sup> Bannon’s devices similarly contained no messages in the relevant time period, and Bannon also stated he did not know why messages did not appear on his device.<sup>1096</sup> Bannon told the Office that, during both the months before and after the Seychelles meeting, he regularly used his personal Blackberry and personal email for work-related communications (including those with Prince), and he took no steps to preserve these work communications.<sup>1097</sup></p><h2>d. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contact with Rick Gerson Regarding U.S.- Russia Relations</h2><p>Dmitriev’s contacts during the transition period were not limited to those facilitated by Nader. In approximately late November 2016, the UAE national security advisor introduced Dmitriev to Rick Gerson, a friend of Jared Kushner who runs a hedge fund in New York,<sup>1098</sup> Gerson stated he had no formal role in the transition and had no involvement in the Trump</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1088</sup> Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5; 1/16/17 Image on Prince Phone (on file with the Office).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1089</sup> Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1090</sup> Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1091</sup> Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1092</sup> Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 10-11.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1093</sup> Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 10-11.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1094</sup> Call Records of Erik Prince <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1095</sup> Prince 4/4/18 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1096</sup> Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 11; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 36.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1097</sup> Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 11.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1098</sup> Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 1, 3; 11/26/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson; 1/25/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader.</p>"
664c664
< "markup": "<p>with.<sup>1109</sup> After his trip to the Seychelles, Dmitriev told Gerson that Bannon had asked Prince to meet with Dmitriev and that the two had had a positive meeting.<sup>1110</sup></p><p>On January 16, 2017, Dmitriev consolidated the ideas for U.S.-Russia reconciliation that he and Gerson had been discussing into a two-page document that listed five main points: (1) jointly fighting terrorism; (2) jointly engaging in anti-weapons of mass destruction efforts; (3) developing “win-win” economic and investment initiatives; (4) maintaining an honest, open, and continual dialogue regarding issues of disagreement; and (5) ensuring proper communication and trust by “key people” from each country.<sup>1111</sup> On January 18, 2017, Gerson gave a copy of the document to Kushner.<sup>1112</sup> Kushner had not heard of Dmitriev at that time.<sup>1113</sup> Gerson explained that Dmitriev was the head of RDIF, and Gerson may have alluded to Dmitriev’s being well connected. 1114 Kushner placed the document in a file and said he would get it to the right people.<sup>1115</sup> Kushner ultimately gave one copy of the document to Bannon and another to Rex Tillerson; according to Kushner, neither of them followed up with Kushner about it.<sup>1116</sup> On January 19, 2017, Dmitriev sent Nader a copy of the two-page document, telling him that this was “a view from our side that I discussed in my meeting on the islands and with you and with our friends. Please share with them - we believe this is a good foundation to start from.”<sup>1117</sup></p><p>Gerson informed Dmitriev that he had given the document to Kushner soon after delivering it.<sup>1118</sup> On January 26, 2017, Dmitriev wrote to Gerson that his “boss" — an apparent reference to Putin — was asking if there had been any feedback on the proposal.<sup>1119</sup> Dmitriev said, “[w]e do not want to rush things and move at a comfortable speed. At the same time, my boss asked me to try to have the key US meetings in the next two weeks if possible.”<sup>1120</sup> He informed Gerson that Putin and President Trump would speak by phone that Saturday, and noted that that information was “very confidential.”<sup>1121</sup></p><p>The same day, Dmitriev wrote to Nader that he had seen his “boss” again yesterday who had “emphasized that this is a great priority for us and that we need to build this communication</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1109</sup> Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 4.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1110</sup> 1/18/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1111</sup> 1/16/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1112</sup> Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3; Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1113</sup> Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1114</sup> Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3; Gerson 6/15/18; 302, at 1-2; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 22.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1115</sup> Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1116</sup> Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 32.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1117</sup> 1/19/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (11:11:56 a.m.).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1118</sup> 1/18/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev; Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1119</sup> 1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1120</sup> 1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1121</sup> 1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>with.<sup>1109</sup> After his trip to the Seychelles, Dmitriev told Gerson that Bannon had asked Prince to meet with Dmitriev and that the two had had a positive meeting.<sup>1110</sup></p><p>On January 16, 2017, Dmitriev consolidated the ideas for U.S.-Russia reconciliation that he and Gerson had been discussing into a two-page document that listed five main points: (1) jointly fighting terrorism; (2) jointly engaging in anti-weapons of mass destruction efforts; (3) developing “win-win” economic and investment initiatives; (4) maintaining an honest, open, and continual dialogue regarding issues of disagreement; and (5) ensuring proper communication and trust by “key people” from each country.<sup>1111</sup> On January 18, 2017, Gerson gave a copy of the document to Kushner.<sup>1112</sup> Kushner had not heard of Dmitriev at that time.<sup>1113</sup> Gerson explained that Dmitriev was the head of RDIF, and Gerson may have alluded to Dmitriev’s being well connected. <sup>1114</sup> Kushner placed the document in a file and said he would get it to the right people.<sup>1115</sup> Kushner ultimately gave one copy of the document to Bannon and another to Rex Tillerson; according to Kushner, neither of them followed up with Kushner about it.<sup>1116</sup> On January 19, 2017, Dmitriev sent Nader a copy of the two-page document, telling him that this was “a view from our side that I discussed in my meeting on the islands and with you and with our friends. Please share with them - we believe this is a good foundation to start from.”<sup>1117</sup></p><p>Gerson informed Dmitriev that he had given the document to Kushner soon after delivering it.<sup>1118</sup> On January 26, 2017, Dmitriev wrote to Gerson that his “boss" — an apparent reference to Putin — was asking if there had been any feedback on the proposal.<sup>1119</sup> Dmitriev said, “[w]e do not want to rush things and move at a comfortable speed. At the same time, my boss asked me to try to have the key US meetings in the next two weeks if possible.”<sup>1120</sup> He informed Gerson that Putin and President Trump would speak by phone that Saturday, and noted that that information was “very confidential.”<sup>1121</sup></p><p>The same day, Dmitriev wrote to Nader that he had seen his “boss” again yesterday who had “emphasized that this is a great priority for us and that we need to build this communication</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1109</sup> Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 4.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1110</sup> 1/18/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1111</sup> 1/16/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1112</sup> Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3; Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1113</sup> Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1114</sup> Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3; Gerson 6/15/18; 302, at 1-2; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 22.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1115</sup> Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1116</sup> Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 32.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1117</sup> 1/19/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (11:11:56 a.m.).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1118</sup> 1/18/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev; Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1119</sup> 1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1120</sup> 1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1121</sup> 1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.</p>"
684c684
< "markup": "<p>The investigation did not resolve the apparent conflict in the accounts of Kushner and Gorkov or determine whether the meeting was diplomatic in nature (as Kushner stated), focused on business (as VEB’s public statement indicated), or whether it involved some combination of those matters or other matters. Regardless, the investigation did not identify evidence that Kushner and Gorkov engaged in any substantive follow-up after the meeting.</p><p>Rather, a few days after the meeting, Gorkov’s assistant texted Kushner’s assistant, “Hi, please inform your side that the information about the meeting had a very positive response!"1163 Over the following weeks, the two assistants exchanged a handful of additional cordial texts. <sup>1164</sup> On February 8, 2017, Gorkov’s assistant texted Kushner’s assistant (Berkowitz) to try to set up another meeting, and followed up by text at least twice in the days that followed. <sup>1165</sup> According to Berkowitz, he did not respond to the meeting request in light of the press coverage regarding the Russia investigation, and did not tell Kushner about the meeting request. <sup>1166</sup></p><h2>5. <u>Petr Aven’s Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team </u></h2><p>In December 2016, weeks after the one-on-one meeting with Putin described in <a href=\"#g-page-154\">Volume I, Section IV.B.1.b</a>, <em>supra</em>, Petr Aven attended what he described as a separate “all-hands” oligarch meeting between Putin and Russia’s most prominent businessmen. <sup>1167</sup> As in Aven’s one-on-one meeting, a main topic of discussion at the oligarch meeting in December 2016 was the prospect of forthcoming U.S. economic sanctions."<sup>1168</sup></p><p>After the December 2016 all-hands meeting, Aven tried to establish a connection to the Trump team. Aven instructed Richard Burt to make contact with the incoming Trump Administration. Burt was on the board of directors for LetterOne (L1), another company headed by Aven, and had done work for Alfa-Bank. <sup>1169</sup> Burt had previously served as U.S. ambassador to Germany and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, and one of his primary roles with Alfa-Bank and Ll was to facilitate introductions to business contacts in the United States and other Western countries. <sup>1170</sup></p><p>While at a Ll board meeting held in Luxembourg in late December 2016, Aven pulled Burt aside and told him that he had spoken to someone high in the Russian government who expressed</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1163</sup> AKINGUMP BERKOWITZ_0000011 (12/19/16 Text Message, Ivanchenko to Berkowitz (9:56 a.m.))</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1164</sup> AKIN GUMP BERKOWITZ_0000011-15 (12/19/16 – 2/16/17 Text Messages, Ivanchenko & Berkowitz).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1165</sup> AKIN GUMP BERKOWITZ 0000015 (2/8/17 Text Message, Ivanchenko to Berkowitz (10:41 a.m.)).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1166</sup> Berkowitz 3/22/18 302, at 4-5.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1167</sup> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 7;<span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1168</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1169</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1170</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 6; Burt 2/9/18 302, at 2.</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>The investigation did not resolve the apparent conflict in the accounts of Kushner and Gorkov or determine whether the meeting was diplomatic in nature (as Kushner stated), focused on business (as VEB’s public statement indicated), or whether it involved some combination of those matters or other matters. Regardless, the investigation did not identify evidence that Kushner and Gorkov engaged in any substantive follow-up after the meeting.</p><p>Rather, a few days after the meeting, Gorkov’s assistant texted Kushner’s assistant, “Hi, please inform your side that the information about the meeting had a very positive response!"<sup>1163</sup> Over the following weeks, the two assistants exchanged a handful of additional cordial texts. <sup>1164</sup> On February 8, 2017, Gorkov’s assistant texted Kushner’s assistant (Berkowitz) to try to set up another meeting, and followed up by text at least twice in the days that followed. <sup>1165</sup> According to Berkowitz, he did not respond to the meeting request in light of the press coverage regarding the Russia investigation, and did not tell Kushner about the meeting request. <sup>1166</sup></p><h2>5. <u>Petr Aven’s Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team </u></h2><p>In December 2016, weeks after the one-on-one meeting with Putin described in <a href=\"#g-page-154\">Volume I, Section IV.B.1.b</a>, <em>supra</em>, Petr Aven attended what he described as a separate “all-hands” oligarch meeting between Putin and Russia’s most prominent businessmen. <sup>1167</sup> As in Aven’s one-on-one meeting, a main topic of discussion at the oligarch meeting in December 2016 was the prospect of forthcoming U.S. economic sanctions."<sup>1168</sup></p><p>After the December 2016 all-hands meeting, Aven tried to establish a connection to the Trump team. Aven instructed Richard Burt to make contact with the incoming Trump Administration. Burt was on the board of directors for LetterOne (L1), another company headed by Aven, and had done work for Alfa-Bank. <sup>1169</sup> Burt had previously served as U.S. ambassador to Germany and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, and one of his primary roles with Alfa-Bank and Ll was to facilitate introductions to business contacts in the United States and other Western countries. <sup>1170</sup></p><p>While at a Ll board meeting held in Luxembourg in late December 2016, Aven pulled Burt aside and told him that he had spoken to someone high in the Russian government who expressed</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1163</sup> AKINGUMP BERKOWITZ_0000011 (12/19/16 Text Message, Ivanchenko to Berkowitz (9:56 a.m.))</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1164</sup> AKIN GUMP BERKOWITZ_0000011-15 (12/19/16 – 2/16/17 Text Messages, Ivanchenko & Berkowitz).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1165</sup> AKIN GUMP BERKOWITZ 0000015 (2/8/17 Text Message, Ivanchenko to Berkowitz (10:41 a.m.)).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1166</sup> Berkowitz 3/22/18 302, at 4-5.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1167</sup> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 7;<span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1168</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1169</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1170</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 6; Burt 2/9/18 302, at 2.</p>"
692c692
< "markup": "<p>According to Burt, the “very influential person” referenced in his email was Simes, and the reference to a “trusted third party” was a fabrication, as no such third party existed. “Project A” was a term that Burt created for Aven’s effort to help establish a communications channel between Russia and the Trump team, which he used in light of the sensitivities surrounding what Aven was requesting, especially in light of the recent attention to Russia’s influence in the U.S. presidential election. <sup>1182</sup> According to Burt, his report that there was “interest in a communications channel reflected Simes’s views, not necessarily those of the Transition Team, and in any event, Burt acknowledged that he added some “hype” to that sentence to make it sound like there was more interest from the Transition Team than may have actually existed. <sup>1183</sup></p><p>Aven replied to Burt’s email on the same day, saying “Thank you. All clear.”<sup>1184</sup> According to Aven, this statement indicated that he did not want the outreach to continue.1185 Burt spoke to Aven some time thereafter about his attempt to make contact with the Trump team, explaining to Aven that the current environment made it impossible, <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-1 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span>.<sup>1186</sup> Burt did not recall discussing Aven’s request with Simes again, nor did he recall speaking to anyone else about the request. <sup>1187</sup></p><p>In the first quarter of 2017, Aven met again with Putin and other Russian officials. <sup>1188</sup> At that meeting, Putin asked about Aven’s attempt to build relations with the Trump Administration, and Aven recounted his lack of success. <sup>1189</sup> <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-1 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> <sup>1190</sup> Putin continued to inquire about Aven’s efforts to connect to the Trump Administration in several subsequent quarterly meetings.<sup>1191</sup></p><p>Aven also told Putin’s chief of staff that he had been subpoenaed by the FBI.<sup>1192</sup> As part of that conversation, he reported that he had been asked by the FBI about whether he had worked to create a back channel between the Russian government and the Trump Administration. <sup>1193</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1182</sup> Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1183</sup> Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3-4.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1184</sup> 12/22/16 Email, Aven to Burt (4:58:22 p.m.).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1185</sup> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 7.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1186</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1187</sup> Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3-4.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1188</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1189</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 7.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1190</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1191</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1192</sup> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 8.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1193</sup> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 8; <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>According to Burt, the “very influential person” referenced in his email was Simes, and the reference to a “trusted third party” was a fabrication, as no such third party existed. “Project A” was a term that Burt created for Aven’s effort to help establish a communications channel between Russia and the Trump team, which he used in light of the sensitivities surrounding what Aven was requesting, especially in light of the recent attention to Russia’s influence in the U.S. presidential election. <sup>1182</sup> According to Burt, his report that there was “interest in a communications channel reflected Simes’s views, not necessarily those of the Transition Team, and in any event, Burt acknowledged that he added some “hype” to that sentence to make it sound like there was more interest from the Transition Team than may have actually existed. <sup>1183</sup></p><p>Aven replied to Burt’s email on the same day, saying “Thank you. All clear.”<sup>1184</sup> According to Aven, this statement indicated that he did not want the outreach to continue.<sup>1185</sup> Burt spoke to Aven some time thereafter about his attempt to make contact with the Trump team, explaining to Aven that the current environment made it impossible, <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-1 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span>.<sup>1186</sup> Burt did not recall discussing Aven’s request with Simes again, nor did he recall speaking to anyone else about the request. <sup>1187</sup></p><p>In the first quarter of 2017, Aven met again with Putin and other Russian officials. <sup>1188</sup> At that meeting, Putin asked about Aven’s attempt to build relations with the Trump Administration, and Aven recounted his lack of success. <sup>1189</sup> <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-1 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> <sup>1190</sup> Putin continued to inquire about Aven’s efforts to connect to the Trump Administration in several subsequent quarterly meetings.<sup>1191</sup></p><p>Aven also told Putin’s chief of staff that he had been subpoenaed by the FBI.<sup>1192</sup> As part of that conversation, he reported that he had been asked by the FBI about whether he had worked to create a back channel between the Russian government and the Trump Administration. <sup>1193</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1182</sup> Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1183</sup> Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3-4.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1184</sup> 12/22/16 Email, Aven to Burt (4:58:22 p.m.).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1185</sup> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 7.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1186</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1187</sup> Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3-4.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1188</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1189</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 7.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1190</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1191</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1192</sup> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 8.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1193</sup> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 8; <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p>"
696c696
< "markup": "<p>According to Aven, the official showed no emotion in response to this report and did not appear to care. <sup>1194</sup></p><h2>6. <u>Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich</u></h2><p>In December 2016, more than two months after he was removed from the Trump Campaign, former Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Page again visited Moscow in an attempt to pursue business opportunities. <sup>1195</sup> <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-3 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80 g-c-100 g-c-120\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> <sup>1196</sup> According to Konstantin Kilimnik, Paul Manafort’s associate, Page also gave some individuals in Russia the impression that he had maintained his connections to President-Elect Trump. In a December 8, 2016 email intended for Manafort, Kilimnik wrote, “Carter Page is in Moscow today, sending messages he is authorized to talk to Russia on behalf of DT on a range of issues of mutual interest, including Ukraine."<sup>1197</sup></p><p>On December 9, 2016, Page went to dinner with NES employees Shlomo Weber and Andrej Krickovic. <sup>1198</sup> Weber had contacted Dvorkovich to let him know that Page was in town and to invite him to stop by the dinner if he wished to do so, and Dvorkovich came to the restaurant for a few minutes to meet with Page. <sup>1199</sup> Dvorkovich congratulated Page on Trump’s election and expressed interest in starting a dialogue between the United States and Russia. <sup>1200</sup> Dvorkovich asked Page if he could facilitate connecting Dvorkovich with individuals involved in the transition to begin a discussion of future cooperation.<sup>1201</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-2 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80 g-c-100 g-c-120\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> <sup>1202</sup> <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-4 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80 g-c-100 g-c-120\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> <sup>1203</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1194</sup> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 8; <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1194</sup> Page 3/10/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> Among other meetings, Page contacted Andrey Baranov, head of investor relations at Rosneft, and they discussed the sale of Rosneft and meetings Baranov had attended with Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin.<span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1196</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1197</sup><span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-yellow g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1198</sup> Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; Page 3/30/17 302, at 8.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1199</sup> Weber 7/28/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1200</sup> Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1201</sup> Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1202</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1203</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>According to Aven, the official showed no emotion in response to this report and did not appear to care. <sup>1194</sup></p><h2>6. <u>Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich</u></h2><p>In December 2016, more than two months after he was removed from the Trump Campaign, former Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Page again visited Moscow in an attempt to pursue business opportunities. <sup>1195</sup> <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-3 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80 g-c-100 g-c-120\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> <sup>1196</sup> According to Konstantin Kilimnik, Paul Manafort’s associate, Page also gave some individuals in Russia the impression that he had maintained his connections to President-Elect Trump. In a December 8, 2016 email intended for Manafort, Kilimnik wrote, “Carter Page is in Moscow today, sending messages he is authorized to talk to Russia on behalf of DT on a range of issues of mutual interest, including Ukraine."<sup>1197</sup></p><p>On December 9, 2016, Page went to dinner with NES employees Shlomo Weber and Andrej Krickovic. <sup>1198</sup> Weber had contacted Dvorkovich to let him know that Page was in town and to invite him to stop by the dinner if he wished to do so, and Dvorkovich came to the restaurant for a few minutes to meet with Page. <sup>1199</sup> Dvorkovich congratulated Page on Trump’s election and expressed interest in starting a dialogue between the United States and Russia. <sup>1200</sup> Dvorkovich asked Page if he could facilitate connecting Dvorkovich with individuals involved in the transition to begin a discussion of future cooperation.<sup>1201</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-2 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80 g-c-100 g-c-120\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> <sup>1202</sup> <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-4 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80 g-c-100 g-c-120\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> <sup>1203</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1194</sup> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 8; <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1195</sup> Page 3/10/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> Among other meetings, Page contacted Andrey Baranov, head of investor relations at Rosneft, and they discussed the sale of Rosneft and meetings Baranov had attended with Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin.<span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1196</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1197</sup><span data-color=\"yellow\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-yellow g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1198</sup> Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; Page 3/30/17 302, at 8.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1199</sup> Weber 7/28/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1200</sup> Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1201</sup> Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1202</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1203</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p>"
700c700
< "markup": "<p><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> Dvorkovich separately discussed working together in the future by forming an academic partnership.1204 <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-2 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80 g-c-100 g-c-120\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> <sup>1205</sup> <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-3 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80 g-c-100 g-c-120\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> <sup>1206 </sup></p><h2>7. <u>Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn</u></h2><p>Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn was the Transition Team’s primary conduit for communications with the Russian Ambassador and dealt with Russia on two sensitive matters during the transition period: a United Nations Security Council vote and the Russian government’s reaction to the United States’s imposition of sanctions for Russian interference in the 2016 election. <sup>1207</sup> Despite Kushner’s conclusion that Kislyak did not wield influence inside the Russian government, the Transition Team turned to Flynn’s relationship with Kislyak on both issues. As to the sanctions, Flynn spoke by phone to K.T. McFarland, his incoming deputy, to prepare for his call to Kislyak; McFarland was with the President-Elect and other senior members of the Transition Team at Mar-a-Lago at the time. Although transition officials at Mar-a-Lago had some concern about possible Russian reactions to the sanctions, the investigation did not identify evidence that the President-Elect asked Flynn to make any request to Kislyak. Flynn asked Kislyak not to escalate the situation in response to U.S. sanctions imposed on December 29, 2016, and Kislyak later reported to Flynn that Russia acceded to that request.</p><h2>a. <em>United Nations Vote on Israeli Settlements</em></h2><p>On December 21, 2016, Egypt submitted a resolution to the United Nations Security Council calling on Israel to cease settlement activities in Palestinian territory. <sup>1208</sup> The Security Council, which includes Russia, was scheduled to vote on the resolution the following day. <sup>1209</sup> There was speculation in the media that the Obama Administration would not oppose the resolution. <sup>1210</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1204</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1205</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1206</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1207</sup>As discussed further in <a href=\"#g-page-199\">Volume I, Section V.C.4</a>,<em> infra</em>, Flynn pleaded guilty to making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, about these communications with Ambassador Kislyak. <a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015121/download\">Plea Agreement, </a><em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015121/download\">United States v. Michael T. Flynn</a></em>, No. 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 3. Flynn’s plea agreement required that he cooperate with this Office, and the statements from Flynn in this report reflect his cooperation over the course of multiple debriefings in 2017 and 2018.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1208</sup> Karen De Young, <em><a href=\"https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-the-us-came-to-abstain-on-a-un-resolution-condemning-israeli-settlements/2016/12/28/fed102ee-cd38-11e6-b8a2-8c2a61b0436f_story.html\">How the U.S. Came to Abstain on a U.N. Resolution Condemning Israeli Settlements</a></em>, Washington Post (Dec. 28, 2016).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1209</sup> Karen De Young, <em><a href=\"https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-the-us-came-to-abstain-on-a-un-resolution-condemning-israeli-settlements/2016/12/28/fed102ee-cd38-11e6-b8a2-8c2a61b0436f_story.html\">How the U.S. Came to Abstain on a U.N. Resolution Condemning Israeli Settlements</a></em>, Washington Post (Dec. 28, 2016).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1210</sup> Michelle Nichols & Lesley Wroughton, <em><a href=\"https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-un-idUSKBN14B033\">U.S. Intended to Allow Passage of U.N. Draft Critical of Israel</a></em>, Reuters (Dec. 21, 2016).</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> Dvorkovich separately discussed working together in the future by forming an academic partnership.<sup>1204</sup> <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-2 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80 g-c-100 g-c-120\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> <sup>1205</sup> <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-3 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80 g-c-100 g-c-120\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> <sup>1206</sup></p><h2>7. <u>Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn</u></h2><p>Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn was the Transition Team’s primary conduit for communications with the Russian Ambassador and dealt with Russia on two sensitive matters during the transition period: a United Nations Security Council vote and the Russian government’s reaction to the United States’s imposition of sanctions for Russian interference in the 2016 election. <sup>1207</sup> Despite Kushner’s conclusion that Kislyak did not wield influence inside the Russian government, the Transition Team turned to Flynn’s relationship with Kislyak on both issues. As to the sanctions, Flynn spoke by phone to K.T. McFarland, his incoming deputy, to prepare for his call to Kislyak; McFarland was with the President-Elect and other senior members of the Transition Team at Mar-a-Lago at the time. Although transition officials at Mar-a-Lago had some concern about possible Russian reactions to the sanctions, the investigation did not identify evidence that the President-Elect asked Flynn to make any request to Kislyak. Flynn asked Kislyak not to escalate the situation in response to U.S. sanctions imposed on December 29, 2016, and Kislyak later reported to Flynn that Russia acceded to that request.</p><h2>a. <em>United Nations Vote on Israeli Settlements</em></h2><p>On December 21, 2016, Egypt submitted a resolution to the United Nations Security Council calling on Israel to cease settlement activities in Palestinian territory. <sup>1208</sup> The Security Council, which includes Russia, was scheduled to vote on the resolution the following day. <sup>1209</sup> There was speculation in the media that the Obama Administration would not oppose the resolution. <sup>1210</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1204</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1205</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1206</sup><span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1207</sup>As discussed further in <a href=\"#g-page-199\">Volume I, Section V.C.4</a>,<em> infra</em>, Flynn pleaded guilty to making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, about these communications with Ambassador Kislyak. <a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015121/download\">Plea Agreement, </a><em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015121/download\">United States v. Michael T. Flynn</a></em>, No. 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 3. Flynn’s plea agreement required that he cooperate with this Office, and the statements from Flynn in this report reflect his cooperation over the course of multiple debriefings in 2017 and 2018.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1208</sup> Karen De Young, <em><a href=\"https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-the-us-came-to-abstain-on-a-un-resolution-condemning-israeli-settlements/2016/12/28/fed102ee-cd38-11e6-b8a2-8c2a61b0436f_story.html\">How the U.S. Came to Abstain on a U.N. Resolution Condemning Israeli Settlements</a></em>, Washington Post (Dec. 28, 2016).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1209</sup> Karen De Young, <em><a href=\"https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-the-us-came-to-abstain-on-a-un-resolution-condemning-israeli-settlements/2016/12/28/fed102ee-cd38-11e6-b8a2-8c2a61b0436f_story.html\">How the U.S. Came to Abstain on a U.N. Resolution Condemning Israeli Settlements</a></em>, Washington Post (Dec. 28, 2016).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1210</sup> Michelle Nichols & Lesley Wroughton, <em><a href=\"https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-un-idUSKBN14B033\">U.S. Intended to Allow Passage of U.N. Draft Critical of Israel</a></em>, Reuters (Dec. 21, 2016).</p>"
704c704
< "markup": "<p>According to Flynn, the Transition Team regarded the vote as a significant issue and wanted to support Israel by opposing the resolution.<sup>1211</sup> On December 22, 2016, multiple members of the Transition Team, as well as President-Elect Trump, communicated with foreign government officials to determine their views on the resolution and to rally support to delay the vote or defeat the resolution. <sup>1212</sup> Kushner led the effort for the Transition Team; Flynn was responsible for the Russian government.<sup>1213</sup> Minutes after an early morning phone call with Kushner on December 22, Flynn called Kislyak.<sup>1214</sup> According to Flynn, he informed Kislyak about the vote and the Transition Team’s opposition to the resolution, and requested that Russia vote against or delay the resolution. <sup>1215</sup> Later that day, President-Elect Trump spoke with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi about the vote. <sup>1216</sup> Ultimately, Egypt postponed the vote. <sup>1217</sup></p><p>On December 23, 2016, Malaysia, New Zealand, Senegal, and Venezuela resubmitted the resolution. <sup>1218<sup> Throughout the day, members of the Transition Team continued to talk with foreign leaders about the resolution, with Flynn continuing to lead the outreach with the Russian government through Kislyak.<sup>1219</sup> When Flynn again spoke with Kislyak, Kislyak informed Flynn that if the resolution came to a vote, Russia would not vote against it. <sup>1220</sup> The resolution later passed 14-0, with the United States abstaining. <sup>1221</sup></sup></sup></p><h2><em> b. U.S. Sanctions Against Russia</em></h2><p>Flynn was also the Transition Team member who spoke with the Russian government when the Obama Administration imposed sanctions and other measures against Russia in response to Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election. On December 28, 2016, then-President Obama signed Executive Order 13757, which took effect at 12:01 a.m. the following day and</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1211</sup> Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1212</sup> Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-14; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1213</sup> Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-14; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2; Kushner 11/1/17 302, at 3; 12/22/16 Email, Kushner to Flynn; 12/22/16 Email, McFarland to <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> et al.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1214</sup> Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 13; Call Records of Michael T. Flynn <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1215</sup> Statement of Offense , 3(d), <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\">United States v. Michael T. Flynn</a></em>, No. 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 4 (“<em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\">Flynn</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\"> Statement of Offense</a>”); Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-13.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1216</sup> Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2; Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 13.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1217</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-un-postponed-idUSKBN14B1UR\">U.N. Vote on Israeli Settlement Postponed, “Potentially Indefinitely”</a></em>, Reuters (Dec. 22, 2016).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1218</sup> Somini Sengupta & Rick Gladstone, <em><a href=\"https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/23/world/middleeast/israel-settlements-un-vote.html\">Rebuffing Israel, U.S. Allows Censure Over Settlements</a></em>, New York Times (Dec. 23, 2016).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1219</sup> Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-14; Kushner 11/1/17 302, at 3; 12/23/16 Email, Flynn to Kushner et al.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1220</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\">Flynn</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\"> Statement of Offense</a> ¶ 3(g).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1221</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12657.doc.htm\">Israel’s Settlements Have No Legal Validity, Constitute Flagrant Violation of International Law, Security Council Reaffirms</a></em>, 7853rd Meeting (PM), United Nations Security Council (Dec. 23, 2016).</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>According to Flynn, the Transition Team regarded the vote as a significant issue and wanted to support Israel by opposing the resolution.<sup>1211</sup> On December 22, 2016, multiple members of the Transition Team, as well as President-Elect Trump, communicated with foreign government officials to determine their views on the resolution and to rally support to delay the vote or defeat the resolution. <sup>1212</sup> Kushner led the effort for the Transition Team; Flynn was responsible for the Russian government.<sup>1213</sup> Minutes after an early morning phone call with Kushner on December 22, Flynn called Kislyak.<sup>1214</sup> According to Flynn, he informed Kislyak about the vote and the Transition Team’s opposition to the resolution, and requested that Russia vote against or delay the resolution. <sup>1215</sup> Later that day, President-Elect Trump spoke with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi about the vote. <sup>1216</sup> Ultimately, Egypt postponed the vote. <sup>1217</sup></p><p>On December 23, 2016, Malaysia, New Zealand, Senegal, and Venezuela resubmitted the resolution. <sup>1218</sup> Throughout the day, members of the Transition Team continued to talk with foreign leaders about the resolution, with Flynn continuing to lead the outreach with the Russian government through Kislyak.<sup>1219</sup> When Flynn again spoke with Kislyak, Kislyak informed Flynn that if the resolution came to a vote, Russia would not vote against it. <sup>1220</sup> The resolution later passed 14-0, with the United States abstaining. <sup>1221</sup></sup></sup></p><h2><em> b. U.S. Sanctions Against Russia</em></h2><p>Flynn was also the Transition Team member who spoke with the Russian government when the Obama Administration imposed sanctions and other measures against Russia in response to Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election. On December 28, 2016, then-President Obama signed Executive Order 13757, which took effect at 12:01 a.m. the following day and</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1211</sup> Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1212</sup> Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-14; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1213</sup> Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-14; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2; Kushner 11/1/17 302, at 3; 12/22/16 Email, Kushner to Flynn; 12/22/16 Email, McFarland to <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> et al.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1214</sup> Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 13; Call Records of Michael T. Flynn <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1215</sup> Statement of Offense , 3(d), <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\">United States v. Michael T. Flynn</a></em>, No. 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 4 (“<em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\">Flynn</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\"> Statement of Offense</a>”); Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-13.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1216</sup> Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2; Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 13.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1217</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-un-postponed-idUSKBN14B1UR\">U.N. Vote on Israeli Settlement Postponed, “Potentially Indefinitely”</a></em>, Reuters (Dec. 22, 2016).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1218</sup> Somini Sengupta & Rick Gladstone, <em><a href=\"https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/23/world/middleeast/israel-settlements-un-vote.html\">Rebuffing Israel, U.S. Allows Censure Over Settlements</a></em>, New York Times (Dec. 23, 2016).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1219</sup> Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-14; Kushner 11/1/17 302, at 3; 12/23/16 Email, Flynn to Kushner et al.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1220</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\">Flynn</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\"> Statement of Offense</a> ¶ 3(g).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1221</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12657.doc.htm\">Israel’s Settlements Have No Legal Validity, Constitute Flagrant Violation of International Law, Security Council Reaffirms</a></em>, 7853rd Meeting (PM), United Nations Security Council (Dec. 23, 2016).</p>"
712c712
< "markup": "<p>p.m., McFarland called Flynn, but they did not talk. <sup>1234</sup> Shortly thereafter, McFarland and Bannon discussed the sanctions.<sup>1235</sup> According to McFarland, Bannon remarked that the sanctions would hurt their ability to have good relations with Russia, and that Russian escalation would make things more difficult. <sup>1236</sup> McFarland believed she told Bannon that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak later that night.1237 McFarland also believed she may have discussed the sanctions with Priebus, and likewise told him that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak that night.<sup>1238</sup> At 3:14 p.m., Flynn texted a Transition Team member who was assisting McFarland, “Time for a call???” <sup>1239</sup> The Transition Team member responded that McFarland was on the phone with Tom Bossert, a Transition Team senior official, to which Flynn responded, “Tit for tat w Russia not good. Russian AMBO reaching out to me today.” <sup>1240</sup></p><p>Flynn recalled that he chose not to communicate with Kislyak about the sanctions until he had heard from the team at Mar-a-Lago.<sup>1241</sup> He first spoke with Michael Ledeen, <sup>1242</sup> a Transition Team member who advised on foreign policy and national security matters, for 20 minutes. <sup>1243</sup> Flynn then spoke with McFarland for almost 20 minutes to discuss what, if anything, to communicate to Kislyak about the sanctions.<sup>1244</sup> On that call, McFarland and Flynn discussed the sanctions, including their potential impact on the incoming Trump Administration’s foreign policy goals. <sup>1245</sup> McFarland and Flynn also discussed that Transition Team members in Mar-a-Lago did not want Russia to escalate the situation.<sup>1246</sup> They both understood that Flynn would relay a message to Kislyak in hopes of making sure the situation would not get out of hand. <sup>1247</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1234</sup> Call Records of K.T. McFarland <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1235</sup> McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 5-6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1236</sup> McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 5-6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1237</sup> McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1238</sup> McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1239</sup> SF000001 (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynn to Flaherty).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1240</sup> SF000001 (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynn to Flaherty).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1241</sup> Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1242</sup> Michael Ledeen is married to Barbara Ledeen, the Senate staffer whose 2016 efforts to locate Hillary Clinton’s missing emails are described in <a href=\"#g-page-69\">Volume I, Section III.D.2</a>, <em>supra</em>.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1243</sup> Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3; Call Records of Michael Ledeen <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1244</sup> Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4; <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\">Flynn</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\"> Statement of Offense</a> ¶ 3(c); Call Records of K.T. McFarland <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span>; Call Records of Michael T. Flynn <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1245</sup> Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1246</sup> Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4; <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\">Flynn</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\"> Statement of Offense</a> ¶ 3(c); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-7</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1247</sup> Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 4; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-7.</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>p.m., McFarland called Flynn, but they did not talk. <sup>1234</sup> Shortly thereafter, McFarland and Bannon discussed the sanctions.<sup>1235</sup> According to McFarland, Bannon remarked that the sanctions would hurt their ability to have good relations with Russia, and that Russian escalation would make things more difficult. <sup>1236</sup> McFarland believed she told Bannon that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak later that night.<sup>1237</sup> McFarland also believed she may have discussed the sanctions with Priebus, and likewise told him that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak that night.<sup>1238</sup> At 3:14 p.m., Flynn texted a Transition Team member who was assisting McFarland, “Time for a call???” <sup>1239</sup> The Transition Team member responded that McFarland was on the phone with Tom Bossert, a Transition Team senior official, to which Flynn responded, “Tit for tat w Russia not good. Russian AMBO reaching out to me today.” <sup>1240</sup></p><p>Flynn recalled that he chose not to communicate with Kislyak about the sanctions until he had heard from the team at Mar-a-Lago.<sup>1241</sup> He first spoke with Michael Ledeen, <sup>1242</sup> a Transition Team member who advised on foreign policy and national security matters, for 20 minutes. <sup>1243</sup> Flynn then spoke with McFarland for almost 20 minutes to discuss what, if anything, to communicate to Kislyak about the sanctions.<sup>1244</sup> On that call, McFarland and Flynn discussed the sanctions, including their potential impact on the incoming Trump Administration’s foreign policy goals. <sup>1245</sup> McFarland and Flynn also discussed that Transition Team members in Mar-a-Lago did not want Russia to escalate the situation.<sup>1246</sup> They both understood that Flynn would relay a message to Kislyak in hopes of making sure the situation would not get out of hand. <sup>1247</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1234</sup> Call Records of K.T. McFarland <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1235</sup> McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 5-6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1236</sup> McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 5-6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1237</sup> McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1238</sup> McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1239</sup> SF000001 (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynn to Flaherty).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1240</sup> SF000001 (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynn to Flaherty).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1241</sup> Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1242</sup> Michael Ledeen is married to Barbara Ledeen, the Senate staffer whose 2016 efforts to locate Hillary Clinton’s missing emails are described in <a href=\"#g-page-69\">Volume I, Section III.D.2</a>, <em>supra</em>.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1243</sup> Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3; Call Records of Michael Ledeen <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1244</sup> Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4; <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\">Flynn</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\"> Statement of Offense</a> ¶ 3(c); Call Records of K.T. McFarland <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span>; Call Records of Michael T. Flynn <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1245</sup> Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1246</sup> Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4; <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\">Flynn</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\"> Statement of Offense</a> ¶ 3(c); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-7</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1247</sup> Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 4; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-7.</p>"
720c720
< "markup": "<p>The next day, December 30, 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov remarked that Russia would respond in kind to the sanctions. <sup>1262</sup> Putin superseded that comment two hours later, releasing a statement that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions at that time.1263 Hours later President-Elect Trump tweeted, “Great move on delay (by V. Putin).” <sup>1264</sup> Shortly thereafter, Flynn sent a text message to McFarland summarizing his call with Kislyak from the day before, which she emailed to Kushner, Bannon, Priebus, and other Transition Team members. 1265 The text message and email did not include sanctions as one of the topics discussed with Kislyak. <sup>1266</sup> Flynn told the Office that he did not document his discussion of sanctions because it could be perceived as getting in the way of the Obama Administration’s foreign policy. <sup>1267</sup></p><p>On December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him the request had been received at the highest levels and that Russia had chosen not to retaliate to the sanctions in response to the request. <sup>1268</sup> Two hours later, Flynn spoke with McFarland and relayed his conversation with Kislyak. <sup>1269</sup> According to McFarland, Flynn remarked that the Russians wanted a better relationship and that the relationship was back on track. <sup>1270</sup> Flynn also told McFarland that he believed his phone call had made a difference.<sup>1271</sup> McFarland recalled congratulating Flynn in response. <sup>1272</sup> Flynn spoke with other Transition Team members that day, but does not recall whether they discussed the sanctions.<sup>1273</sup> Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions with Bannon the next day and that Bannon appeared to know about Flynn’s conversation with Kislyak. <sup>1274</sup> Bannon,</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1262</sup> <em><a href=\"http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2583996\">Comment by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on recent US sanctions and the expulsion of Russian diplomats</a></em>, Moscow, December 20, 2016, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Dec. 30, 2016 (5:32 a.m.)).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1263</sup> <a href=\"http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53678\">S</a><em><a href=\"http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53678\">tatement of the President of the Russian Federation, Kremlin</a></em>, Office of the President (Dec. 30, 2016 (7:15 a.m.)).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1264</sup> @realDonaldTrump 12/30/16 (11:41 a.m.) Tweet.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1265</sup> 12/30/16 Email, Flynn to McFarland; 12/30/16 Email, McFarland to Kushner et al.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1266</sup> 12/30/16 Email, McFarland to Kushner et al.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1267</sup> Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 4.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1268</sup> Call Records of Michael T. Flynn <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> ; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 1; Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 3; <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\">Flynn</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\"> Statement of Offense</a> ¶ 3(g).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1269</sup> Call Records of Michael T. Flynn <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> ; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 5; Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 3; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1270</sup> McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1271</sup> McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1272</sup> McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1273</sup> Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 5-6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1274</sup> Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 1; Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 3; Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 5; <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\">Flynn</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\"> Statement of Offense</a> ¶ 3(h).</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>The next day, December 30, 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov remarked that Russia would respond in kind to the sanctions. <sup>1262</sup> Putin superseded that comment two hours later, releasing a statement that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions at that time.<sup>1263</sup> Hours later President-Elect Trump tweeted, “Great move on delay (by V. Putin).” <sup>1264</sup> Shortly thereafter, Flynn sent a text message to McFarland summarizing his call with Kislyak from the day before, which she emailed to Kushner, Bannon, Priebus, and other Transition Team members. <sup>1265</sup> The text message and email did not include sanctions as one of the topics discussed with Kislyak. <sup>1266</sup> Flynn told the Office that he did not document his discussion of sanctions because it could be perceived as getting in the way of the Obama Administration’s foreign policy. <sup>1267</sup></p><p>On December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him the request had been received at the highest levels and that Russia had chosen not to retaliate to the sanctions in response to the request. <sup>1268</sup> Two hours later, Flynn spoke with McFarland and relayed his conversation with Kislyak. <sup>1269</sup> According to McFarland, Flynn remarked that the Russians wanted a better relationship and that the relationship was back on track. <sup>1270</sup> Flynn also told McFarland that he believed his phone call had made a difference.<sup>1271</sup> McFarland recalled congratulating Flynn in response. <sup>1272</sup> Flynn spoke with other Transition Team members that day, but does not recall whether they discussed the sanctions.<sup>1273</sup> Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions with Bannon the next day and that Bannon appeared to know about Flynn’s conversation with Kislyak. <sup>1274</sup> Bannon,</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1262</sup> <em><a href=\"http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2583996\">Comment by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on recent US sanctions and the expulsion of Russian diplomats</a></em>, Moscow, December 20, 2016, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Dec. 30, 2016 (5:32 a.m.)).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1263</sup> <a href=\"http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53678\">S</a><em><a href=\"http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53678\">tatement of the President of the Russian Federation, Kremlin</a></em>, Office of the President (Dec. 30, 2016 (7:15 a.m.)).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1264</sup> @realDonaldTrump 12/30/16 (11:41 a.m.) Tweet.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1265</sup> 12/30/16 Email, Flynn to McFarland; 12/30/16 Email, McFarland to Kushner et al.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1266</sup> 12/30/16 Email, McFarland to Kushner et al.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1267</sup> Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 4.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1268</sup> Call Records of Michael T. Flynn <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> ; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 1; Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 3; <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\">Flynn</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\"> Statement of Offense</a> ¶ 3(g).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1269</sup> Call Records of Michael T. Flynn <span data-color=\"red\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-red g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> ; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 5; Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 3; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1270</sup> McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1271</sup> McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1272</sup> McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1273</sup> Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 5-6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1274</sup> Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 1; Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 3; Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 5; <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\">Flynn</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\"> Statement of Offense</a> ¶ 3(h).</p>"
760c760
< "markup": "<p>The crime defined by Section 951 is complete upon knowingly acting in the United States as an unregistered foreign-government agent. 18 U.S.C. § 951(a). The statute does not require willfulness, and knowledge of the notification requirement is not an element of the offense. <em>United States v. Campa</em>, 529 F.3d 980, 998-99 (11th Cir. 2008); <em>Duran</em>, 596 F.3d at 1291-94; <em>Dumeisi</em>, 424 F.3d at 581.</p><p>The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) generally makes it illegal to act as an agent of a foreign principal by engaging in certain (largely political) activities in the United States without registering with the Attorney General. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621. The triggering agency relationship must be with a foreign principal or “a person any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign principal.” 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1). That includes a foreign government or political party and various foreign individuals and entities. 22 U.S.C. § 611(b). A covered relationship exists if a person “acts as an agent, representative, employee, or servant” or “in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the [foreign principal’s] direction or control.” 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1). It is sufficient if the person “agrees, consents, assumes or purports to act as, or who is or holds himself out to be, whether or not pursuant to contractual relationship, an agent of a foreign principal.” 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(2).</p><p>The triggering activity is that the agent “directly or through any other person” in the United States (1) engages in “political activities for or in the interests of [the] foreign principal,” which includes attempts to influence federal officials or the public; (2) acts as “public relations counsel, publicity agent, information-service employee or political consultant for or in the interests of such foreign principal”; (3) “solicits, collects, disburses, or dispenses contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for or in the interest of such foreign principal”; or (4) “represents the interests of such foreign principal” before any federal agency or official. 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1).</p><p>It is a crime to engage in a “[w]illful violation of any provision of the Act or any regulation thereunder.” 22 U.S.C. § 618(a)(1). It is also a crime willfully to make false statements or omissions of material facts in FARA registration statements or supplements. 22 U.S.C. § 618(a)(2). Most violations have a maximum penalty of five years of imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. 22 U.S.C. § 618.</p><h2>b. <em>Application</em></h2><p>The investigation uncovered extensive evidence that Paul Manafort’s and Richard Gates’s pre-campaign work for the government of Ukraine violated FARA. Manafort and Gates were charged for that conduct and admitted to it when they pleaded guilty to superseding criminal informations in the District of Columbia prosecution.280 The evidence underlying those charges is not addressed in this report because it was discussed in public court documents and in a separate</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1280</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1038796/download\">Gates </a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1038796/download\">Superseding Criminal Informatio</a>n; Waiver of Indictment, <em>United States v. Richard W. Gates III</em>, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 203; Waiver of Trial by Jury, <em>United States v. Richard W. Gates III</em>, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 204; <a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1038801/download\">Gates Plea Agreement</a>; <a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1038806/download\">Statement of Offense, </a><em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1038806/download\">United States v. Richard W. Gates III</a></em>, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 206; <a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1094151/download\">Plea Agreement, </a><em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1094151/download\">United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1094151/download\">.</a>, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018), Doc. 422; <a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1094156/download\">Statement of Offense, </a><em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1094156/download\">United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1094156/download\">.</a>, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018), Doc. 423.</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>The crime defined by Section 951 is complete upon knowingly acting in the United States as an unregistered foreign-government agent. 18 U.S.C. § 951(a). The statute does not require willfulness, and knowledge of the notification requirement is not an element of the offense. <em>United States v. Campa</em>, 529 F.3d 980, 998-99 (11th Cir. 2008); <em>Duran</em>, 596 F.3d at 1291-94; <em>Dumeisi</em>, 424 F.3d at 581.</p><p>The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) generally makes it illegal to act as an agent of a foreign principal by engaging in certain (largely political) activities in the United States without registering with the Attorney General. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621. The triggering agency relationship must be with a foreign principal or “a person any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign principal.” 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1). That includes a foreign government or political party and various foreign individuals and entities. 22 U.S.C. § 611(b). A covered relationship exists if a person “acts as an agent, representative, employee, or servant” or “in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the [foreign principal’s] direction or control.” 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1). It is sufficient if the person “agrees, consents, assumes or purports to act as, or who is or holds himself out to be, whether or not pursuant to contractual relationship, an agent of a foreign principal.” 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(2).</p><p>The triggering activity is that the agent “directly or through any other person” in the United States (1) engages in “political activities for or in the interests of [the] foreign principal,” which includes attempts to influence federal officials or the public; (2) acts as “public relations counsel, publicity agent, information-service employee or political consultant for or in the interests of such foreign principal”; (3) “solicits, collects, disburses, or dispenses contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for or in the interest of such foreign principal”; or (4) “represents the interests of such foreign principal” before any federal agency or official. 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1).</p><p>It is a crime to engage in a “[w]illful violation of any provision of the Act or any regulation thereunder.” 22 U.S.C. § 618(a)(1). It is also a crime willfully to make false statements or omissions of material facts in FARA registration statements or supplements. 22 U.S.C. § 618(a)(2). Most violations have a maximum penalty of five years of imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. 22 U.S.C. § 618.</p><h2>b. <em>Application</em></h2><p>The investigation uncovered extensive evidence that Paul Manafort’s and Richard Gates’s pre-campaign work for the government of Ukraine violated FARA. Manafort and Gates were charged for that conduct and admitted to it when they pleaded guilty to superseding criminal informations in the District of Columbia prosecution.<sup>1280</sup> The evidence underlying those charges is not addressed in this report because it was discussed in public court documents and in a separate</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1280</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1038796/download\">Gates </a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1038796/download\">Superseding Criminal Informatio</a>n; Waiver of Indictment, <em>United States v. Richard W. Gates III</em>, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 203; Waiver of Trial by Jury, <em>United States v. Richard W. Gates III</em>, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 204; <a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1038801/download\">Gates Plea Agreement</a>; <a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1038806/download\">Statement of Offense, </a><em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1038806/download\">United States v. Richard W. Gates III</a></em>, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 206; <a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1094151/download\">Plea Agreement, </a><em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1094151/download\">United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1094151/download\">.</a>, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018), Doc. 422; <a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1094156/download\">Statement of Offense, </a><em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1094156/download\">United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1094156/download\">.</a>, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018), Doc. 423.</p>"
764c764
< "markup": "<p>prosecution memorandum submitted to the Acting Attorney General before the original indictment in that case.</p><p>In addition, the investigation produced evidence of FARA violations involving Michael Flynn. Those potential violations, however, concerned a country other than Russia (<em>i.e.</em>, Turkey) and were resolved when Flynn admitted to the underlying facts in the Statement of Offense that accompanied his guilty plea to a false-statements charge. <a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\">Statement of Offense, </a><em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\">United States v. Michael T. Flynn</a></em>, No. 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 4 (“<em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\">Flynn</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\"> Statement of Offense</a>”). <sup>1281</sup></p><p>The investigation did not, however, yield evidence sufficient to sustain any charge that any individual affiliated with the Trump Campaign acted as an agent of a foreign principal within the meaning of FARA or, in terms of Section 951, subject to the direction or control of the government of Russia, or any official thereof. In particular, the Office did not find evidence likely to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Campaign officials such as Paul Manafort, George Papadopoulos, and Carter Page acted as agents of the Russian government-or at its direction, control, or request — during the relevant time period. 1282 <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-2 g-redacted-green g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80 g-c-100 g-c-120\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> As a result, the Office did not charge <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> any other Trump Campaign official with violating FARA or Section 951, or attempting or conspiring to do so, based on contacts with the Russian government or a Russian principal.</p><p>Finally, the Office investigated whether one of the above campaign advisors — George Papadopoulos — acted as an agent of, or at the direction and control of, the government of Israel. While the investigation revealed significant ties between Papadopoulos and Israel (and search warrants were obtained in part on that basis), the Office ultimately determined that the evidence was not sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction under FARA or Section 951.</p><h2><u>3. Campaign Finance </u></h2><p>Several areas of the Office’s investigation involved efforts or offers by foreign nationals to provide negative information about candidate Clinton to the Trump Campaign or to distribute that information to the public, to the anticipated benefit of the Campaign. As explained below, the Office considered whether two of those efforts in particular — the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1281</sup> <span data-color=\"white\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-2 g-redacted-white g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80 g-c-100 g-c-120\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1282</sup> On four occasions, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) issued warrants based on a finding of probable cause to believe that Page was an agent of a foreign power. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(b), 1805(a)(2)(A). The FISC’s probable-cause finding was based on a different (and lower) standard than the one governing the Office’s decision whether to bring charges against Page, which is whether admissible evidence would likely be sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Page acted as an agent of the Russian Federation during the period at issue. <em>Cf. United States v. Cardoza</em>, 713 F.3d 656, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (explaining that probable cause requires only “a fair probability,” and not “certainty, or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or proof by a preponderance of the evidence”).</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>prosecution memorandum submitted to the Acting Attorney General before the original indictment in that case.</p><p>In addition, the investigation produced evidence of FARA violations involving Michael Flynn. Those potential violations, however, concerned a country other than Russia (<em>i.e.</em>, Turkey) and were resolved when Flynn admitted to the underlying facts in the Statement of Offense that accompanied his guilty plea to a false-statements charge. <a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\">Statement of Offense, </a><em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\">United States v. Michael T. Flynn</a></em>, No. 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 4 (“<em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\">Flynn</a></em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download\"> Statement of Offense</a>”). <sup>1281</sup></p><p>The investigation did not, however, yield evidence sufficient to sustain any charge that any individual affiliated with the Trump Campaign acted as an agent of a foreign principal within the meaning of FARA or, in terms of Section 951, subject to the direction or control of the government of Russia, or any official thereof. In particular, the Office did not find evidence likely to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Campaign officials such as Paul Manafort, George Papadopoulos, and Carter Page acted as agents of the Russian government-or at its direction, control, or request — during the relevant time period. <sup>1282</sup> <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-2 g-redacted-green g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80 g-c-100 g-c-120\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> As a result, the Office did not charge <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-green \">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> any other Trump Campaign official with violating FARA or Section 951, or attempting or conspiring to do so, based on contacts with the Russian government or a Russian principal.</p><p>Finally, the Office investigated whether one of the above campaign advisors — George Papadopoulos — acted as an agent of, or at the direction and control of, the government of Israel. While the investigation revealed significant ties between Papadopoulos and Israel (and search warrants were obtained in part on that basis), the Office ultimately determined that the evidence was not sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction under FARA or Section 951.</p><h2><u>3. Campaign Finance </u></h2><p>Several areas of the Office’s investigation involved efforts or offers by foreign nationals to provide negative information about candidate Clinton to the Trump Campaign or to distribute that information to the public, to the anticipated benefit of the Campaign. As explained below, the Office considered whether two of those efforts in particular — the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1281</sup> <span data-color=\"white\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-2 g-redacted-white g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80 g-c-100 g-c-120\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1282</sup> On four occasions, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) issued warrants based on a finding of probable cause to believe that Page was an agent of a foreign power. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(b), 1805(a)(2)(A). The FISC’s probable-cause finding was based on a different (and lower) standard than the one governing the Office’s decision whether to bring charges against Page, which is whether admissible evidence would likely be sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Page acted as an agent of the Russian Federation during the period at issue. <em>Cf. United States v. Cardoza</em>, 713 F.3d 656, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (explaining that probable cause requires only “a fair probability,” and not “certainty, or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or proof by a preponderance of the evidence”).</p>"
836c836
< "markup": "<h2>TABLE OF CONTENTS - VOLUME II</h2><p><a href=\"#g-page-213\">INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME II</a></p><p><a href=\"http://g-page-215\">EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME II</a></p><p>I. <a href=\"#g-page-221\">BACKGROUND LEGAL AND EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPLES</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>A. <a href=\"#g-page-221\">Legal Framework of Obstruction of Justice</a></p><p>B. <a href=\"#g-page-224\">Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations</a></p></div><p>II. <a href=\"#g-page-225\">FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>A. <a href=\"#g-page-227\">The Campaign’s Response to Reports About Russian Support for Trump</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>1. <a href=\"#g-page-228\">Press Reports Allege Links Between the Trump Campaign and Russia</a></p><p>2. <a href=\"#g-page-229\">The Trump Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks’s Release of Hacked Emails</a></p><p>3. <a href=\"#g-page-230\">The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking to Aid Candidate Trump</a></p><p>4. <a href=\"#g-page-233\">After the Election, Trump Continues to Deny Any Contacts or Connections with Russia or That Russia Aided his Election</a></p></div><p>B. <a href=\"#g-page-236\">The President’s Conduct Concerning the Investigation of Michael Flynn</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>1. <a href=\"#g-page-236\">Incoming National Security Advisor Flynn Discusses Sanctions on Russia with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak</a></p><p>2. <a href=\"#g-page-239\">President-Elect Trump is Briefed on the Intelligence Community’s Assessment of Russian Interference in the Election and Congress Opens Election-Interference Investigations</a></p><p>3. <a href=\"#g-page-241\">Flynn Makes False Statements About his Communications with Kislyak to Incoming Administration Officials, the Media, and the FBI</a></p><p>4. <a href=\"#g-page-243\">DOJ Officials Notify the White House of Their Concerns About Flynn</a></p><p>5. <a href=\"#g-page-244\">McGahn has a Follow-Up Meeting About Flynn with Yates; President Trump has Dinner with FBI Director Comey</a></p><p>6. <a href=\"#g-page-248\">Flynn’s Resignation</a></p><p>7. <a href=\"#g-page-250\">The President Discusses Flynn with FBI Director Comey</a></p><p>8. <a href=\"#g-page-253\">The Media Raises Questions About the President’s Delay in Terminating Flynn</a></p><p>9. <a href=\"#g-page-254\">The President Attempts to Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness Statement Denying that he Directed Flynn’s Discussions with Kislyak</a></p></div><p>C. <a href=\"#g-page-260\">The President’s Reaction to Public Confirmation of the FBI’s Russia Investigation</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>1. <a href=\"#g-page-260\">Attorney General Sessions Recuses From the Russia Investigation</a></p></div></div>"
---
> "markup": "<h2>TABLE OF CONTENTS - VOLUME II</h2><p><a href=\"#g-page-213\">INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME II</a></p><p><a href=\"#g-page-215\">EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME II</a></p><p>I. <a href=\"#g-page-221\">BACKGROUND LEGAL AND EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPLES</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>A. <a href=\"#g-page-221\">Legal Framework of Obstruction of Justice</a></p><p>B. <a href=\"#g-page-224\">Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations</a></p></div><p>II. <a href=\"#g-page-225\">FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>A. <a href=\"#g-page-227\">The Campaign’s Response to Reports About Russian Support for Trump</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>1. <a href=\"#g-page-228\">Press Reports Allege Links Between the Trump Campaign and Russia</a></p><p>2. <a href=\"#g-page-229\">The Trump Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks’s Release of Hacked Emails</a></p><p>3. <a href=\"#g-page-230\">The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking to Aid Candidate Trump</a></p><p>4. <a href=\"#g-page-233\">After the Election, Trump Continues to Deny Any Contacts or Connections with Russia or That Russia Aided his Election</a></p></div><p>B. <a href=\"#g-page-236\">The President’s Conduct Concerning the Investigation of Michael Flynn</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>1. <a href=\"#g-page-236\">Incoming National Security Advisor Flynn Discusses Sanctions on Russia with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak</a></p><p>2. <a href=\"#g-page-239\">President-Elect Trump is Briefed on the Intelligence Community’s Assessment of Russian Interference in the Election and Congress Opens Election-Interference Investigations</a></p><p>3. <a href=\"#g-page-241\">Flynn Makes False Statements About his Communications with Kislyak to Incoming Administration Officials, the Media, and the FBI</a></p><p>4. <a href=\"#g-page-243\">DOJ Officials Notify the White House of Their Concerns About Flynn</a></p><p>5. <a href=\"#g-page-244\">McGahn has a Follow-Up Meeting About Flynn with Yates; President Trump has Dinner with FBI Director Comey</a></p><p>6. <a href=\"#g-page-248\">Flynn’s Resignation</a></p><p>7. <a href=\"#g-page-250\">The President Discusses Flynn with FBI Director Comey</a></p><p>8. <a href=\"#g-page-253\">The Media Raises Questions About the President’s Delay in Terminating Flynn</a></p><p>9. <a href=\"#g-page-254\">The President Attempts to Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness Statement Denying that he Directed Flynn’s Discussions with Kislyak</a></p></div><p>C. <a href=\"#g-page-260\">The President’s Reaction to Public Confirmation of the FBI’s Russia Investigation</a></p><div class=\"g-groupstart g-toc-indent\" id=\"\"><p>1. <a href=\"#g-page-260\">Attorney General Sessions Recuses From the Russia Investigation</a></p></div></div>"
852c852
< "markup": "<h2>INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME II</h2><p>This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c), which states that, “[a]t the conclusion of the Special Counsel’s work, he ... shall provide the Attorney General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions [the Special Counsel] reached.”</p><p>Beginning in 2017, the President of the United States took a variety of actions towards the ongoing FBI investigation into Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election and related matters that raised questions about whether he had obstructed justice. The Order appointing the Special Counsel gave this Office jurisdiction to investigate matters that arose directly from the FBI’s Russia investigation, including whether the President had obstructed justice in connection with Russia-related investigations. The Special Counsel’s jurisdiction also covered potentially obstructive acts related to the Special Counsel’s investigation itself. This Volume of our report summarizes our obstruction-of-justice investigation of the President.</p><p>We first describe the considerations that guided our obstruction-of-justice investigation, and then provide an overview of this Volume:</p><p>First, a traditional prosecution or declination decision entails a binary determination to initiate or decline a prosecution, but we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has issued an opinion finding that “the indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions” in violation of the constitutional separation of powers.”<sup>1</sup> Given the role of the Special Counsel as an attorney in the Department of Justice and the framework of the Special Counsel regulations, <em>see</em> 28 U.S.C. § 515; 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(a), this Office accepted OLC’s legal conclusion for the purpose of exercising prosecutorial jurisdiction. And apart from OLC’s constitutional view, we recognized that a federal criminal accusation against a sitting President would place burdens on the President’s capacity to govern and potentially preempt constitutional processes for addressing presidential misconduct. <sup>2</sup></p><p>Second, while the OLC opinion concludes that a sitting President may not be prosecuted, it recognizes that a criminal investigation during the President’s term is permissible. The OLC opinion also recognizes that a President does not have immunity after he leaves office. And if individuals other than the President committed an obstruction offense, they may be prosecuted at this time. Given those considerations, the facts known to us, and the strong public interest in</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1</sup> A<em><em> </em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/sitting-president%E2%80%99s-amenability-indictment-and-criminal-prosecution\">Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution</a></em>, 24 Op. O.L.C. 222, 222, 260 (2000) (OLC Op.).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>2</sup> See U.S. CONST. Art. I § 2, cl. 5; § 3, cl. 6; cf. OLC Op. at 257-258 (discussing relationship between impeachment and criminal prosecution of a sitting President).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>3</sup> OLC Op. at 257 n.36 (“A grand jury could continue to gather evidence throughout the period of immunity’).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>4</sup> OLC Op. at 255 ("Recognizing an immunity from prosecution for a sitting President would not preclude such prosecution once the President’s term is over or he is otherwise removed from office by resignation or impeachment”).</p>"
---
> "markup": "<h2>INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME II</h2><p>This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c), which states that, “[a]t the conclusion of the Special Counsel’s work, he ... shall provide the Attorney General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions [the Special Counsel] reached.”</p><p>Beginning in 2017, the President of the United States took a variety of actions towards the ongoing FBI investigation into Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election and related matters that raised questions about whether he had obstructed justice. The Order appointing the Special Counsel gave this Office jurisdiction to investigate matters that arose directly from the FBI’s Russia investigation, including whether the President had obstructed justice in connection with Russia-related investigations. The Special Counsel’s jurisdiction also covered potentially obstructive acts related to the Special Counsel’s investigation itself. This Volume of our report summarizes our obstruction-of-justice investigation of the President.</p><p>We first describe the considerations that guided our obstruction-of-justice investigation, and then provide an overview of this Volume:</p><p>First, a traditional prosecution or declination decision entails a binary determination to initiate or decline a prosecution, but we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has issued an opinion finding that “the indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions” in violation of the constitutional separation of powers.”<sup>1</sup> Given the role of the Special Counsel as an attorney in the Department of Justice and the framework of the Special Counsel regulations, <em>see</em> 28 U.S.C. § 515; 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(a), this Office accepted OLC’s legal conclusion for the purpose of exercising prosecutorial jurisdiction. And apart from OLC’s constitutional view, we recognized that a federal criminal accusation against a sitting President would place burdens on the President’s capacity to govern and potentially preempt constitutional processes for addressing presidential misconduct. <sup>2</sup></p><p>Second, while the OLC opinion concludes that a sitting President may not be prosecuted, it recognizes that a criminal investigation during the President’s term is permissible.<sup>3</sup> The OLC opinion also recognizes that a President does not have immunity after he leaves office.<sup>4</sup> And if individuals other than the President committed an obstruction offense, they may be prosecuted at this time. Given those considerations, the facts known to us, and the strong public interest in</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1</sup> A<em><em> </em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/sitting-president%E2%80%99s-amenability-indictment-and-criminal-prosecution\">Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution</a></em>, 24 Op. O.L.C. 222, 222, 260 (2000) (OLC Op.).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>2</sup> See U.S. CONST. Art. I § 2, cl. 5; § 3, cl. 6; cf. OLC Op. at 257-258 (discussing relationship between impeachment and criminal prosecution of a sitting President).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>3</sup> OLC Op. at 257 n.36 (“A grand jury could continue to gather evidence throughout the period of immunity’).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>4</sup> OLC Op. at 255 ("Recognizing an immunity from prosecution for a sitting President would not preclude such prosecution once the President’s term is over or he is otherwise removed from office by resignation or impeachment”).</p>"
916c916
< "markup": "<p>National Convention about the Trump Campaign’s involvement in changing the Republican platform’s stance on giving “weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces.” <sup>18</sup></p><h2><u>2. The Trump Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks’s Release of Hacked Emails</u></h2><p>On June 14, 2016, a cybersecurity firm that had conducted in-house analysis for the Democratic National Committee (DNC) posted an announcement that Russian government hackers had infiltrated the DNC’s computer and obtained access to documents. <sup>19</sup></p><p>On July 22, 2016, the day before the Democratic National Convention, WikiLeaks posted thousands of hacked DNC documents revealing sensitive internal deliberations. <sup>20</sup> Soon thereafter, Hillary Clinton’s campaign manager publicly contended that Russia had hacked the DNC emails and arranged their release in order to help candidate Trump. <sup>21</sup> On July 26, 2016, the New York Times reported that U.S. “intelligence agencies ha[d] told the White House they now have ’high confidence that the Russian government was behind the theft of emails and documents from the Democratic National Committee.” <sup>22</sup></p><p>Within the Trump Campaign, aides reacted with enthusiasm to reports of the hacks. <sup>22</sup> <span data-color=\"white\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-white g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> discussed with Campaign officials that WikiLeaks would release the hacked material. <sup>24</sup> Some witnesses said that Trump himself discussed the possibility of upcoming releases <span data-color=\"white\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-white g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span>. Michael Cohen, then-executive vice president of the Trump Organization and special counsel to Trump, recalled hearing <span data-color=\"white\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-2 g-redacted-white g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80 g-c-100 g-c-120\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> <sup>25</sup> Cohen recalled that Trump responded, “oh good, alright,"</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>18</sup> Josh Rogin, <em><a href=\"https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/trump-campaign-guts-gops-anti-russia-stance-on-ukraine/2016/07/18/98adb3b0-4cf3-11e6-a7d8-13d06b37f256_story.html\">Trump campaign guts GOP’s anti-Russia stance on Ukraine</a></em>, Washington Post, Opinions (July 18, 2016). The Republican Platform events are described in <a href=\"#g-page-131\">Volume I, Section IV.A.6</a>, <em>supra</em>.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>19</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/\">Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee</a></em>, CrowdStrike (June 15, 2016) (post originally appearing on June 14, 2016, according to records of the timing provided by CrowdStrike); Ellen Nakashima, <em><a href=\"https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-government-hackers-penetrated-dnc-stole-opposition-research-on-trump/2016/06/14/cf006cb4-316e-11e6-8ff7-7b6c1998b7a0_story.html\">Russian government hackers penetrated DNC, stole opposition research on Trump</a></em>, Washington Post (June 14, 2016).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>20</sup> Tom Hamburger and Karen Tumulty, <em><a href=\"https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/07/22/on-eve-of-democratic-convention-wikileaks-releases-thousands-of-documents-about-clinton-the-campaign-and-internal-deliberations/\">WikiLeaks releases thousands of documents about Clinton and internal deliberations</a></em>, Washington Post (July 22, 2016).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>21</sup> Amber Phillips, <em><a href=\"https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/07/24/clinton-campaign-manager-russians-leaked-democrats-emails-to-help-donald-trump/\">Clinton campaign manager: Russians leaked Democrats’ emails to help Donald Trump</a></em>, Washington Post (July 24, 2016).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>22</sup> David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, <em><a href=\"https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/27/us/politics/spy-agency-consensus-grows-that-russia-hacked-dnc.html\">Spy Agency Consensus Grows That Russia Hacked D.N.C.</a></em>, New York Times (July 26, 2016).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>23</sup> Gates 4/10/18 302, at 5; Newman 8/23/18 302, at 1.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>24</sup> Gates 4/11/18 302, at 2-3 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18 302, at 2; <em>see also</em> <a href=\"#g-page-59\">Volume 1, Section III.D.1</a>, <em>supra</em>.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>25</sup> Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 8; <em>see also</em> <a href=\"#g-page-59\">Volume I, Section III.D.1</a>, <em>supra</em>. According to Cohen, after WikiLeaks’s subsequent release of stolen DNC emails on July 22, 2016, Trump said to Cohen words to the effect of, <span data-color=\"white\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-white g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 10. Cohen’s role in the candidate’s and later President’s activities, and his own criminal conduct, is described in <a href=\"#g-page-346\">Volume II, Section II.K</a>, <em>infra</em>, and in <a href=\"#g-page-75\">Volume I, Section IV.A.1</a>, <em>supra</em>.</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>National Convention about the Trump Campaign’s involvement in changing the Republican platform’s stance on giving “weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces.” <sup>18</sup></p><h2><u>2. The Trump Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks’s Release of Hacked Emails</u></h2><p>On June 14, 2016, a cybersecurity firm that had conducted in-house analysis for the Democratic National Committee (DNC) posted an announcement that Russian government hackers had infiltrated the DNC’s computer and obtained access to documents. <sup>19</sup></p><p>On July 22, 2016, the day before the Democratic National Convention, WikiLeaks posted thousands of hacked DNC documents revealing sensitive internal deliberations. <sup>20</sup> Soon thereafter, Hillary Clinton’s campaign manager publicly contended that Russia had hacked the DNC emails and arranged their release in order to help candidate Trump. <sup>21</sup> On July 26, 2016, the New York Times reported that U.S. “intelligence agencies ha[d] told the White House they now have ’high confidence that the Russian government was behind the theft of emails and documents from the Democratic National Committee.” <sup>22</sup></p><p>Within the Trump Campaign, aides reacted with enthusiasm to reports of the hacks. <sup>23</sup> <span data-color=\"white\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-white g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> discussed with Campaign officials that WikiLeaks would release the hacked material. <sup>24</sup> Some witnesses said that Trump himself discussed the possibility of upcoming releases <span data-color=\"white\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-white g-c-20 g-c-40\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span>. Michael Cohen, then-executive vice president of the Trump Organization and special counsel to Trump, recalled hearing <span data-color=\"white\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-2 g-redacted-white g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80 g-c-100 g-c-120\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> <sup>25</sup> Cohen recalled that Trump responded, “oh good, alright,"</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>18</sup> Josh Rogin, <em><a href=\"https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/trump-campaign-guts-gops-anti-russia-stance-on-ukraine/2016/07/18/98adb3b0-4cf3-11e6-a7d8-13d06b37f256_story.html\">Trump campaign guts GOP’s anti-Russia stance on Ukraine</a></em>, Washington Post, Opinions (July 18, 2016). The Republican Platform events are described in <a href=\"#g-page-131\">Volume I, Section IV.A.6</a>, <em>supra</em>.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>19</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/\">Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee</a></em>, CrowdStrike (June 15, 2016) (post originally appearing on June 14, 2016, according to records of the timing provided by CrowdStrike); Ellen Nakashima, <em><a href=\"https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-government-hackers-penetrated-dnc-stole-opposition-research-on-trump/2016/06/14/cf006cb4-316e-11e6-8ff7-7b6c1998b7a0_story.html\">Russian government hackers penetrated DNC, stole opposition research on Trump</a></em>, Washington Post (June 14, 2016).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>20</sup> Tom Hamburger and Karen Tumulty, <em><a href=\"https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/07/22/on-eve-of-democratic-convention-wikileaks-releases-thousands-of-documents-about-clinton-the-campaign-and-internal-deliberations/\">WikiLeaks releases thousands of documents about Clinton and internal deliberations</a></em>, Washington Post (July 22, 2016).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>21</sup> Amber Phillips, <em><a href=\"https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/07/24/clinton-campaign-manager-russians-leaked-democrats-emails-to-help-donald-trump/\">Clinton campaign manager: Russians leaked Democrats’ emails to help Donald Trump</a></em>, Washington Post (July 24, 2016).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>22</sup> David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, <em><a href=\"https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/27/us/politics/spy-agency-consensus-grows-that-russia-hacked-dnc.html\">Spy Agency Consensus Grows That Russia Hacked D.N.C.</a></em>, New York Times (July 26, 2016).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>23</sup> Gates 4/10/18 302, at 5; Newman 8/23/18 302, at 1.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>24</sup> Gates 4/11/18 302, at 2-3 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18 302, at 2; <em>see also</em> <a href=\"#g-page-59\">Volume 1, Section III.D.1</a>, <em>supra</em>.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>25</sup> Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 8; <em>see also</em> <a href=\"#g-page-59\">Volume I, Section III.D.1</a>, <em>supra</em>. According to Cohen, after WikiLeaks’s subsequent release of stolen DNC emails on July 22, 2016, Trump said to Cohen words to the effect of, <span data-color=\"white\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-0 g-redacted-white g-c-20\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span> Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 10. Cohen’s role in the candidate’s and later President’s activities, and his own criminal conduct, is described in <a href=\"#g-page-346\">Volume II, Section II.K</a>, <em>infra</em>, and in <a href=\"#g-page-75\">Volume I, Section IV.A.1</a>, <em>supra</em>.</p>"
940c940
< "markup": "<p>electability.<sup>69</sup> The assessment further concluded with high confidence that Putin and the Russian government had developed a clear preference for Trump.<sup>70</sup></p><p>Several days later, BuzzFeed published unverified allegations compiled by former British intelligence officer Christopher Steele during the campaign about candidate Trump’s Russia connections under the headline “These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia.”<sup>72</sup> In a press conference the next day, the President-Elect called the release “an absolute disgrace” and said, “I have no dealings with Russia. I have no deals that could happen in Russia, because we’ve stayed away. ... So I have no deals, I have no loans and I have no dealings. We could make deals in Russia very easily if we wanted to, I just don’t want to because I think that would be a conflict."<sup>72</sup></p><p>Several advisors recalled that the President-Elect viewed stories about his Russian connections, the Russia investigations, and the intelligence community assessment of Russian interference as a threat to the legitimacy of his electoral victory.<sup>73</sup></p><p>Hicks, for example, said that the President-Elect viewed the intelligence community assessment as his “Achilles heel” because, even if Russia had no impact on the election, people would think Russia helped him win, taking away from what he had accomplished.<sup>74</sup> Sean Spicer, the first White House communications director, recalled that the President thought the Russia story was developed to undermine the legitimacy of his election.<sup>75</sup> Gates said the President viewed the Russia investigation as an attack on the legitimacy of his win.<sup>76</sup> And Priebus recalled that when the intelligence assessment came out, the President-Elect was concerned people would question the legitimacy of his win.<sup>77</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>69</sup> Office of the Director of National Intelligence, <em>Russia’s Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election</em>, at 1 (Jan. 6, 2017).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>70</sup> Office of the Director of National Intelligence, <em>Russia’s Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election</em>, at 1 (Jan. 6, 2017).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>71</sup> Ken Bensinger et al., <em>These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia</em>, BuzzFeed (Jan. 10, 2017).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>72</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/us/politics/trump-press-conference-transcript.html\">Donald Trump’s News Conference: Full Transcript and Video</a></em>, New York Times (Jan. 11, 2017), <em>available at </em><a href=\"https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/us/politics/trump-press-conference-\">https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/us/politics/trump-press-conference-transcript.html</a>.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>73</sup> Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 18; Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 6; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 2; Gates 4/18/18 302, at 3; see Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 2 (the President believed that the purpose of the Russia investigation was to delegitimize his presidency).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>74</sup> Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 18.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>75</sup> Spicer 10/17/17 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>76</sup> Gates 4/18/18 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>77</sup> Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 7.</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>electability.<sup>69</sup> The assessment further concluded with high confidence that Putin and the Russian government had developed a clear preference for Trump.<sup>70</sup></p><p>Several days later, BuzzFeed published unverified allegations compiled by former British intelligence officer Christopher Steele during the campaign about candidate Trump’s Russia connections under the headline “These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia.”<sup>71</sup> In a press conference the next day, the President-Elect called the release “an absolute disgrace” and said, “I have no dealings with Russia. I have no deals that could happen in Russia, because we’ve stayed away. ... So I have no deals, I have no loans and I have no dealings. We could make deals in Russia very easily if we wanted to, I just don’t want to because I think that would be a conflict."<sup>72</sup></p><p>Several advisors recalled that the President-Elect viewed stories about his Russian connections, the Russia investigations, and the intelligence community assessment of Russian interference as a threat to the legitimacy of his electoral victory.<sup>73</sup></p><p>Hicks, for example, said that the President-Elect viewed the intelligence community assessment as his “Achilles heel” because, even if Russia had no impact on the election, people would think Russia helped him win, taking away from what he had accomplished.<sup>74</sup> Sean Spicer, the first White House communications director, recalled that the President thought the Russia story was developed to undermine the legitimacy of his election.<sup>75</sup> Gates said the President viewed the Russia investigation as an attack on the legitimacy of his win.<sup>76</sup> And Priebus recalled that when the intelligence assessment came out, the President-Elect was concerned people would question the legitimacy of his win.<sup>77</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>69</sup> Office of the Director of National Intelligence, <em>Russia’s Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election</em>, at 1 (Jan. 6, 2017).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>70</sup> Office of the Director of National Intelligence, <em>Russia’s Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election</em>, at 1 (Jan. 6, 2017).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>71</sup> Ken Bensinger et al., <em>These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia</em>, BuzzFeed (Jan. 10, 2017).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>72</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/us/politics/trump-press-conference-transcript.html\">Donald Trump’s News Conference: Full Transcript and Video</a></em>, New York Times (Jan. 11, 2017), <em>available at </em><a href=\"https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/us/politics/trump-press-conference-\">https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/us/politics/trump-press-conference-transcript.html</a>.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>73</sup> Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 18; Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 6; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 2; Gates 4/18/18 302, at 3; see Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 2 (the President believed that the purpose of the Russia investigation was to delegitimize his presidency).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>74</sup> Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 18.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>75</sup> Spicer 10/17/17 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>76</sup> Gates 4/18/18 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>77</sup> Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 7.</p>"
972c972
< "markup": "<h2><u>4. DOJ Officials Notify the White House of Their Concerns About Flynn</u></h2><p>On January 26, 2017, Acting Attorney General Sally Yates contacted White House Counsel Donald McGahn and informed him that she needed to discuss a sensitive matter with him in person.<sup>142</sup> Later that day, Yates and Mary McCord, a senior national security official at the Department of Justice, met at the White House with McGahn and White House Counsel’s Office attorney James Burnham.<sup>143</sup> Yates said that the public statements made by the Vice President denying that Flynn and Kislyak discussed sanctions were not true and put Flynn in a potentially compromised position because the Russians would know he had lied.<sup>144</sup> Yates disclosed that Flynn had been interviewed by the FBI.<sup>145</sup> She declined to answer a specific question about how Flynn had performed during that interview,<sup>146</sup> but she indicated that Flynn’s statements to the FBI were similar to the statements he had made to Pence and Spicer denying that he had discussed sanctions.<sup>147</sup> McGahn came away from the meeting with the impression that the FBI had not pinned Flynn down in lies,<sup>148</sup> but he asked John Eisenberg, who served as legal advisor to the National Security Council, to examine potential legal issues raised by Flynn’s FBI interview and his contacts with Kislyak.<sup>149</sup></p><p>That afternoon, McGahn notified the President that Yates had come to the White House to discuss concerns about Flynn.<sup>150</sup> McGahn described what Yates had told him, and the President asked him to repeat it, so he did.<sup>151</sup> McGahn recalled that when he described the FBI interview of Flynn, he said that Flynn did not disclose having discussed sanctions with Kislyak, but that there may not have been a clear violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.152 The President asked about Section 1001, and McGahn explained the law to him, and also explained the Logan Act.153 The President</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>142</sup>Yates 8/15/17 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>143</sup> Yates 8/15/17 302, at 6; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 6; SCR015_000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>144</sup> Yates 8/15/17 302, at 6-8; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 6-7; Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 4; SCR015_000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>145</sup> McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 5; Yates 8/15/17 302, at 7; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 7; Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 4.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>146</sup> Yates 8/15/17 302, at 7; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 7.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>147</sup> SCR015 000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President); Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 4.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>148</sup> McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 5.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>149</sup> SCR015 000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President); McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 6, 8.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>150</sup> McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 6; SCR015_000278 (White House Counsel’s Office Memorandum re: “Flynn Tick Tock”) (on January 26, “McGahn IMMEDIATELY advises POTUS”); SCR015 000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>151</sup> McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>152</sup> McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 7.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>153</sup> McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 7.</p>"
---
> "markup": "<h2><u>4. DOJ Officials Notify the White House of Their Concerns About Flynn</u></h2><p>On January 26, 2017, Acting Attorney General Sally Yates contacted White House Counsel Donald McGahn and informed him that she needed to discuss a sensitive matter with him in person.<sup>142</sup> Later that day, Yates and Mary McCord, a senior national security official at the Department of Justice, met at the White House with McGahn and White House Counsel’s Office attorney James Burnham.<sup>143</sup> Yates said that the public statements made by the Vice President denying that Flynn and Kislyak discussed sanctions were not true and put Flynn in a potentially compromised position because the Russians would know he had lied.<sup>144</sup> Yates disclosed that Flynn had been interviewed by the FBI.<sup>145</sup> She declined to answer a specific question about how Flynn had performed during that interview,<sup>146</sup> but she indicated that Flynn’s statements to the FBI were similar to the statements he had made to Pence and Spicer denying that he had discussed sanctions.<sup>147</sup> McGahn came away from the meeting with the impression that the FBI had not pinned Flynn down in lies,<sup>148</sup> but he asked John Eisenberg, who served as legal advisor to the National Security Council, to examine potential legal issues raised by Flynn’s FBI interview and his contacts with Kislyak.<sup>149</sup></p><p>That afternoon, McGahn notified the President that Yates had come to the White House to discuss concerns about Flynn.<sup>150</sup> McGahn described what Yates had told him, and the President asked him to repeat it, so he did.<sup>151</sup> McGahn recalled that when he described the FBI interview of Flynn, he said that Flynn did not disclose having discussed sanctions with Kislyak, but that there may not have been a clear violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.<sup>152</sup> The President asked about Section 1001, and McGahn explained the law to him, and also explained the Logan Act.<sup>153</sup> The President</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>142</sup>Yates 8/15/17 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>143</sup> Yates 8/15/17 302, at 6; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 6; SCR015_000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>144</sup> Yates 8/15/17 302, at 6-8; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 6-7; Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 4; SCR015_000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>145</sup> McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 5; Yates 8/15/17 302, at 7; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 7; Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 4.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>146</sup> Yates 8/15/17 302, at 7; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 7.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>147</sup> SCR015 000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President); Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 4.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>148</sup> McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 5.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>149</sup> SCR015 000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President); McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 6, 8.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>150</sup> McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 6; SCR015_000278 (White House Counsel’s Office Memorandum re: “Flynn Tick Tock”) (on January 26, “McGahn IMMEDIATELY advises POTUS”); SCR015 000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>151</sup> McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>152</sup> McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 7.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>153</sup> McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 7.</p>"
992c992
< "markup": "<p>under oath in congressional proceedings and in a subsequent interview with investigators subject to penalties for lying under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Comey’s memory of the details of the dinner, including that the President requested loyalty, has remained consistent throughout.<sup>188</sup></p><h2><u>6. Flynn’s Resignation</u></h2><p>On February 2, 2017, Eisenberg reviewed the underlying information relating to Flynn’s calls with Kislyak.<sup>189</sup> Eisenberg recalled that he prepared a memorandum about criminal statutes that could apply to Flynn’s conduct, but he did not believe the White House had enough information to make a definitive recommendation to the President.<sup>190</sup> Eisenberg and McGahn discussed that Eisenberg’s review of the underlying information confirmed his preliminary conclusion that Flynn was unlikely to be prosecuted for violating the Logan Act.<sup>191</sup> Because White House officials were uncertain what Flynn had told the FBI, however, they could not assess his exposure to prosecution for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001.<sup>191</sup></p><p>The week of February 6, Flynn had a one-on-one conversation with the President in the Oval Office about the negative media coverage of his contacts with Kislyak. <sup>193</sup> Flynn recalled that the President was upset and asked him for information on the conversations.<sup>194</sup> Flynn listed the specific dates on which he remembered speaking with Kislyak, but the President corrected one of the dates he listed.<sup>195</sup> The President asked Flynn what he and Kislyak discussed and Flynn responded that he might have talked about sanctions.<sup>196</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>188</sup> There also is evidence that corroborates other aspects of the memoranda Comey wrote documenting his interactions with the President. For example, Comey recalled, and his memoranda reflect, that he told the President in his January 6, 2017 meeting, and on phone calls on March 30 and April 11, 2017, that the FBI was not investigating the President personally. On May 8, 2017, during White House discussions about firing Comey, the President told Rosenstein and others that Comey had told him three times that he was not under investigation, including once in person and twice on the phone. Gauhar-000058 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>189</sup> Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 5; FBI 2/7/17 Electronic Communication, at 1 (documenting 2/2/17 meeting with Eisenberg).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>190</sup> Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>191</sup> Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9; SCR015_000200 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>192</sup> Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>193</sup> Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>194</sup> Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>195</sup> Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>196</sup> Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2-3.</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>under oath in congressional proceedings and in a subsequent interview with investigators subject to penalties for lying under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Comey’s memory of the details of the dinner, including that the President requested loyalty, has remained consistent throughout.<sup>188</sup></p><h2><u>6. Flynn’s Resignation</u></h2><p>On February 2, 2017, Eisenberg reviewed the underlying information relating to Flynn’s calls with Kislyak.<sup>189</sup> Eisenberg recalled that he prepared a memorandum about criminal statutes that could apply to Flynn’s conduct, but he did not believe the White House had enough information to make a definitive recommendation to the President.<sup>190</sup> Eisenberg and McGahn discussed that Eisenberg’s review of the underlying information confirmed his preliminary conclusion that Flynn was unlikely to be prosecuted for violating the Logan Act.<sup>191</sup> Because White House officials were uncertain what Flynn had told the FBI, however, they could not assess his exposure to prosecution for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001.<sup>192</sup></p><p>The week of February 6, Flynn had a one-on-one conversation with the President in the Oval Office about the negative media coverage of his contacts with Kislyak. <sup>193</sup> Flynn recalled that the President was upset and asked him for information on the conversations.<sup>194</sup> Flynn listed the specific dates on which he remembered speaking with Kislyak, but the President corrected one of the dates he listed.<sup>195</sup> The President asked Flynn what he and Kislyak discussed and Flynn responded that he might have talked about sanctions.<sup>196</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>188</sup> There also is evidence that corroborates other aspects of the memoranda Comey wrote documenting his interactions with the President. For example, Comey recalled, and his memoranda reflect, that he told the President in his January 6, 2017 meeting, and on phone calls on March 30 and April 11, 2017, that the FBI was not investigating the President personally. On May 8, 2017, during White House discussions about firing Comey, the President told Rosenstein and others that Comey had told him three times that he was not under investigation, including once in person and twice on the phone. Gauhar-000058 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>189</sup> Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 5; FBI 2/7/17 Electronic Communication, at 1 (documenting 2/2/17 meeting with Eisenberg).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>190</sup> Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>191</sup> Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9; SCR015_000200 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>192</sup> Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>193</sup> Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>194</sup> Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>195</sup> Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>196</sup> Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2-3.</p>"
996c996
< "markup": "<p>On February 9, 2017, the Washington Post reported that Flynn discussed sanctions with Kislyak the month before the President took office.<sup>197</sup> After the publication of that story, Vice President Pence learned of the Department of Justice’s notification to the White House about the content of Flynn’s calls.<sup>198</sup> He and other advisors then sought access to and reviewed the underlying information about Flynn’s contacts with Kislyak.<sup>199</sup> FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe, who provided the White House officials access to the information and was present when they reviewed it, recalled the officials asking him whether Flynn’s conduct violated the Logan Act.<sup>200</sup> McCabe responded that he did not know, but the FBI was investigating the matter because it was a possibility.<sup>201</sup> Based on the evidence of Flynn’s contacts with Kislyak, McGahn and Priebus concluded that Flynn could not have forgotten the details of the discussions of sanctions and had instead been lying about what he discussed with Kislyak.<sup>202</sup> Flynn had also told White House officials that the FBI had told him that the FBI was closing out its investigation of him,<sup>203</sup> but Eisenberg did not believe him.<sup>204</sup> After reviewing the materials and speaking with Flynn, McGahn and Priebus concluded that Flynn should be terminated and recommended that course of action to the President.<sup>205</sup></p><p>That weekend, Flynn accompanied the President to Mar-a-Lago.<sup>206</sup> Flynn recalled that on February 12, 2017, on the return flight to D.C. on Air Force One, the President asked him whether he had lied to the Vice President <sup>207</sup> Flynn responded that he may have forgotten details of his calls, but he did not think he lied.<sup>2-8</sup> The President responded, “Okay. That’s fine. I got it."<sup>209</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>197</sup> Greg Miller et al.,<em><a href=\"https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/national-security-adviser-flynn-discussed-sanctions-with-russian-ambassador-despite-denials-officials-say/2017/02/09/f85b29d6-ee11-11e6-b4ff-ac2cf509efe5_story.html\"> National security adviser Flynn discussed sanctions with Russian ambassador, despite denials, officials say</a></em>, Washington Post (Feb. 9, 2017).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>198</sup> SCR015 000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President); McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>199</sup> SCR015 000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President); McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 11-13; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 10; McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>200</sup> McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 13.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>201</sup> McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 13.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>202</sup> McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12; Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 8; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 10; SCR015_000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>203</sup> McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 11; Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 11.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>204</sup> Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>205</sup> SCR015_000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 10; McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>206</sup> Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 8.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>207</sup> Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 8.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>208</sup> Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 8; Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>209</sup> Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9.</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>On February 9, 2017, the Washington Post reported that Flynn discussed sanctions with Kislyak the month before the President took office.<sup>197</sup> After the publication of that story, Vice President Pence learned of the Department of Justice’s notification to the White House about the content of Flynn’s calls.<sup>198</sup> He and other advisors then sought access to and reviewed the underlying information about Flynn’s contacts with Kislyak.<sup>199</sup> FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe, who provided the White House officials access to the information and was present when they reviewed it, recalled the officials asking him whether Flynn’s conduct violated the Logan Act.<sup>200</sup> McCabe responded that he did not know, but the FBI was investigating the matter because it was a possibility.<sup>201</sup> Based on the evidence of Flynn’s contacts with Kislyak, McGahn and Priebus concluded that Flynn could not have forgotten the details of the discussions of sanctions and had instead been lying about what he discussed with Kislyak.<sup>202</sup> Flynn had also told White House officials that the FBI had told him that the FBI was closing out its investigation of him,<sup>203</sup> but Eisenberg did not believe him.<sup>204</sup> After reviewing the materials and speaking with Flynn, McGahn and Priebus concluded that Flynn should be terminated and recommended that course of action to the President.<sup>205</sup></p><p>That weekend, Flynn accompanied the President to Mar-a-Lago.<sup>206</sup> Flynn recalled that on February 12, 2017, on the return flight to D.C. on Air Force One, the President asked him whether he had lied to the Vice President <sup>207</sup> Flynn responded that he may have forgotten details of his calls, but he did not think he lied.<sup>208</sup> The President responded, “Okay. That’s fine. I got it."<sup>209</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>197</sup> Greg Miller et al.,<em><a href=\"https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/national-security-adviser-flynn-discussed-sanctions-with-russian-ambassador-despite-denials-officials-say/2017/02/09/f85b29d6-ee11-11e6-b4ff-ac2cf509efe5_story.html\"> National security adviser Flynn discussed sanctions with Russian ambassador, despite denials, officials say</a></em>, Washington Post (Feb. 9, 2017).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>198</sup> SCR015 000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President); McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>199</sup> SCR015 000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President); McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 11-13; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 10; McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>200</sup> McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 13.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>201</sup> McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 13.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>202</sup> McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12; Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 8; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 10; SCR015_000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>203</sup> McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 11; Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 11.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>204</sup> Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>205</sup> SCR015_000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 10; McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>206</sup> Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 8.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>207</sup> Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 8.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>208</sup> Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 8; Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>209</sup> Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9.</p>"
1024c1024
< "markup": "<p>historic proportion!"<sup>266</sup> In late March or early April, the President asked McFarland to pass a message to Flynn telling him the President felt bad for him and that he should stay strong<sup>267</sup></p><h2>Analysis</h2><p>In analyzing the President’s conduct related to the Flynn investigation, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice:</p><p>a. <u>Obstructive act.</u> According to Comey’s account of his February 14, 2017 meeting in the Oval Office, the President told him, “I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go.... I hope you can let this go.” In analyzing whether these statements constitute an obstructive act, a threshold question is whether Comey’s account of the interaction is accurate, and, if so, whether the President’s statements had the tendency to impede the administration of justice by shutting down an inquiry that could result in a grand jury investigation and a criminal charge.</p><p>After Comey’s account of the President’s request to “let[] Flynn go” became public, the President publicly disputed several aspects of the story. The President told the New York Times that he did not “shoo other people out of the room” when he talked to Comey and that he did not remember having a one-on-one conversation with Comey.<sup>268</sup> The President also publicly denied that he had asked Comey to “let[] Flynn go” or otherwise communicated that Comey should drop the investigation of Flynn.<sup>269</sup> In private, the President denied aspects of Comey’s account to White House advisors, but acknowledged to Priebus that he brought Flynn up in the meeting with Comey and stated that Flynn was a good guy.<sup>279</sup> Despite those denials, substantial evidence corroborates Comey’s account.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>266</sup> @realDonaldTrump 3/31/17 (7:04 a.m. ET) Tweet; see Shane Harris at al., <em><a href=\"https://www.wsj.com/articles/mike-flynn-offers-to-testify-in-exchange-for-immunity-1490912959\">Mike Flynn Offers to Testify in Exchange for Immunity</a></em>, Wall Street Journal (Mar. 30, 2017).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>267</sup> McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 18.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>268</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/us/politics/trump-interview-transcript.html\">Excerpts From The Times’s Interview With Trump</a></em>, New York Times (July 19, 2017). Hicks recalled that the President told her he had never asked Comey to stay behind in his office. Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 12.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>269</sup> In a statement on May 16, 2017, the White House said: “While the President has repeatedly expressed his view that General Flynn is a decent man who served and protected our country, the President has never asked Mr. Comey or anyone else to end any investigation, including any investigation involving General Flynn. ... This is not a truthful or accurate portrayal of the conversation between the President and Mr. Comey.” <em>See </em>Michael S. Schmidt, <em><a href=\"https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/us/politics/james-comey-trump-flynn-russia-investigation.html\">Comey Memorandum Says Trump Asked Him to End Flynn Investigation</a></em>, New York Times (May 16, 2017) (quoting White House statement); @realDonald Trump 12/3/17 (6:15 a.m. ET) Tweet (“I never asked Comey to stop investigating Flynn. Just more Fake News covering another Comey lie!”).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>270</sup> Priebus recalled that the President acknowledged telling Comey that Flynn was a good guy and he hoped “everything worked out for him.” Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 19. McGahn recalled that the President denied saying to Comey that he hoped Comey would let Flynn go, but added that he was “allowed to hope.” The President told McGahn he did not think he had crossed any lines. McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 8.</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>historic proportion!"<sup>266</sup> In late March or early April, the President asked McFarland to pass a message to Flynn telling him the President felt bad for him and that he should stay strong<sup>267</sup></p><h2>Analysis</h2><p>In analyzing the President’s conduct related to the Flynn investigation, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice:</p><p>a. <u>Obstructive act.</u> According to Comey’s account of his February 14, 2017 meeting in the Oval Office, the President told him, “I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go.... I hope you can let this go.” In analyzing whether these statements constitute an obstructive act, a threshold question is whether Comey’s account of the interaction is accurate, and, if so, whether the President’s statements had the tendency to impede the administration of justice by shutting down an inquiry that could result in a grand jury investigation and a criminal charge.</p><p>After Comey’s account of the President’s request to “let[] Flynn go” became public, the President publicly disputed several aspects of the story. The President told the New York Times that he did not “shoo other people out of the room” when he talked to Comey and that he did not remember having a one-on-one conversation with Comey.<sup>268</sup> The President also publicly denied that he had asked Comey to “let[] Flynn go” or otherwise communicated that Comey should drop the investigation of Flynn.<sup>269</sup> In private, the President denied aspects of Comey’s account to White House advisors, but acknowledged to Priebus that he brought Flynn up in the meeting with Comey and stated that Flynn was a good guy.<sup>270</sup> Despite those denials, substantial evidence corroborates Comey’s account.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>266</sup> @realDonaldTrump 3/31/17 (7:04 a.m. ET) Tweet; see Shane Harris at al., <em><a href=\"https://www.wsj.com/articles/mike-flynn-offers-to-testify-in-exchange-for-immunity-1490912959\">Mike Flynn Offers to Testify in Exchange for Immunity</a></em>, Wall Street Journal (Mar. 30, 2017).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>267</sup> McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 18.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>268</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/us/politics/trump-interview-transcript.html\">Excerpts From The Times’s Interview With Trump</a></em>, New York Times (July 19, 2017). Hicks recalled that the President told her he had never asked Comey to stay behind in his office. Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 12.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>269</sup> In a statement on May 16, 2017, the White House said: “While the President has repeatedly expressed his view that General Flynn is a decent man who served and protected our country, the President has never asked Mr. Comey or anyone else to end any investigation, including any investigation involving General Flynn. ... This is not a truthful or accurate portrayal of the conversation between the President and Mr. Comey.” <em>See </em>Michael S. Schmidt, <em><a href=\"https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/us/politics/james-comey-trump-flynn-russia-investigation.html\">Comey Memorandum Says Trump Asked Him to End Flynn Investigation</a></em>, New York Times (May 16, 2017) (quoting White House statement); @realDonald Trump 12/3/17 (6:15 a.m. ET) Tweet (“I never asked Comey to stop investigating Flynn. Just more Fake News covering another Comey lie!”).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>270</sup> Priebus recalled that the President acknowledged telling Comey that Flynn was a good guy and he hoped “everything worked out for him.” Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 19. McGahn recalled that the President denied saying to Comey that he hoped Comey would let Flynn go, but added that he was “allowed to hope.” The President told McGahn he did not think he had crossed any lines. McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 8.</p>"
1060c1060
< "markup": "<p>In his opening remarks at the HPSCI hearing, which were drafted in consultation with the Department of Justice, Comey stated that he had “been authorized by the Department of Justice to confirm that the FBI, as part of [its] counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election and that includes investigating the nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian government and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and Russia’s efforts. As with any counterintelligence investigation, this will also include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed.”<sup>313</sup> Comey added that he would not comment further on what the FBI was “doing and whose conduct [it] [was] examining” because the investigation was ongoing and classified — but he observed that he had “taken the extraordinary step in consultation with the Department of Justice of briefing this Congress’s leaders ... in a classified setting in detail about the investigation.<sup>314</sup> Comey was specifically asked whether President Trump was “under investigation during the campaign” or “under investigation now."<sup>316</sup> Comey declined to answer, stating, “Please don’t over interpret what I’ve said as — as the chair and ranking know, we have briefed him in great detail on the subjects of the investigation and what we’re doing, but I’m not gonna answer about anybody in this forum.”316 Comey was also asked whether the FBI was investigating the information contained in the Steele reporting, and he declined to answer.<sup>317</sup></p><p>According to McGahn and Donaldson, the President had expressed frustration with Comey before his March 20 testimony, and the testimony made matters worse.<sup>318</sup> The President had previously criticized Comey for too frequently making headlines and for not attending intelligence briefings at the White House, and the President suspected Comey of leaking certain information to the media.<sup>319</sup> McGahn said the President thought Comey was acting like “his own branch of government."<sup>320</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>312</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.c-span.org/video/?425087-1/fbi-director-investigating-links-trump-campaign-russia\">Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee</a></em>, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 11) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey); Comey 11/15/17302, at 17; Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5 (confirming that the Department of Justice authorized Comey’s remarks).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>314</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.c-span.org/video/?425087-1/fbi-director-investigating-links-trump-campaign-russia\">Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee</a></em>, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 11) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey ).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>315</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.c-span.org/video/?425087-1/fbi-director-investigating-links-trump-campaign-russia\">Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee</a></em>, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 130) (question by Rep. Swalwell).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>316</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.c-span.org/video/?425087-1/fbi-director-investigating-links-trump-campaign-russia\">Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee</a></em>, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 130) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>317</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.c-span.org/video/?425087-1/fbi-director-investigating-links-trump-campaign-russia\">Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee</a></em>, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 143) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>318</sup> Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 21; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>319</sup> Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 21; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 6-9.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>320</sup> McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7.</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>In his opening remarks at the HPSCI hearing, which were drafted in consultation with the Department of Justice, Comey stated that he had “been authorized by the Department of Justice to confirm that the FBI, as part of [its] counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election and that includes investigating the nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian government and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and Russia’s efforts. As with any counterintelligence investigation, this will also include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed.”<sup>313</sup> Comey added that he would not comment further on what the FBI was “doing and whose conduct [it] [was] examining” because the investigation was ongoing and classified — but he observed that he had “taken the extraordinary step in consultation with the Department of Justice of briefing this Congress’s leaders ... in a classified setting in detail about the investigation.<sup>314</sup> Comey was specifically asked whether President Trump was “under investigation during the campaign” or “under investigation now."<sup>315</sup> Comey declined to answer, stating, “Please don’t over interpret what I’ve said as — as the chair and ranking know, we have briefed him in great detail on the subjects of the investigation and what we’re doing, but I’m not gonna answer about anybody in this forum.”<sup>316</sup> Comey was also asked whether the FBI was investigating the information contained in the Steele reporting, and he declined to answer.<sup>317</sup></p><p>According to McGahn and Donaldson, the President had expressed frustration with Comey before his March 20 testimony, and the testimony made matters worse.<sup>318</sup> The President had previously criticized Comey for too frequently making headlines and for not attending intelligence briefings at the White House, and the President suspected Comey of leaking certain information to the media.<sup>319</sup> McGahn said the President thought Comey was acting like “his own branch of government."<sup>320</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>313</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.c-span.org/video/?425087-1/fbi-director-investigating-links-trump-campaign-russia\">Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee</a></em>, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 11) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey); Comey 11/15/17302, at 17; Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5 (confirming that the Department of Justice authorized Comey’s remarks).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>314</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.c-span.org/video/?425087-1/fbi-director-investigating-links-trump-campaign-russia\">Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee</a></em>, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 11) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey ).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>315</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.c-span.org/video/?425087-1/fbi-director-investigating-links-trump-campaign-russia\">Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee</a></em>, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 130) (question by Rep. Swalwell).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>316</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.c-span.org/video/?425087-1/fbi-director-investigating-links-trump-campaign-russia\">Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee</a></em>, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 130) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>317</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.c-span.org/video/?425087-1/fbi-director-investigating-links-trump-campaign-russia\">Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee</a></em>, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 143) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>318</sup> Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 21; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>319</sup> Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 21; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 6-9.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>320</sup> McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7.</p>"
1068c1068
< "markup": "<p>to intervene with Comey<sup>331</sup> McGahn recalled Boente telling him in calls that day that he did not think it was sustainable for Comey to stay on as FBI director for the next four years, which McGahn said he conveyed to the President.<sup>332</sup> Boente did not recall discussing with McGahn or anyone else the idea that Comey should not continue as FBI director.<sup>330</sup></p><h2><u>3. The President Asks Intelligence Community Leaders to Make Public Statements that he had No Connection to Russia</u></h2><p>In the weeks following Comey’s March 20, 2017 testimony, the President repeatedly asked intelligence community officials to push back publicly on any suggestion that the President had a connection to the Russian election-interference effort. On March 22, 2017, the President asked Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats and CIA Director Michael Pompeo to stay behind in the Oval Office after a Presidential Daily Briefing.<sup>334</sup> According to Coats, the President asked them whether they could say publicly that no link existed between him and Russia.<sup>335</sup> Coats responded that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has nothing to do with investigations and it was not his role to make a public statement on the Russia investigation.<sup>336</sup> Pompeo had no recollection of being asked to stay behind after the March 22 briefing, but he recalled that the President regularly urged officials to get the word out that he had not done anything wrong related to Russia.<sup>337</sup></p><p>Coats told this Office that the President never asked him to speak to Comey about the FBI investigation.<sup>338</sup> Some ODNI staffers, however, had a different recollection of how Coats described the meeting immediately after it occurred. According to senior ODNI official Michael Dempsey, Coats said after the meeting that the President had brought up the Russia investigation and asked him to contact Comey to see if there was a way to get past the investigation, get it over with, end it, or words to that effect.<sup>339</sup> Dempsey said that Coats described the President’s comments as falling “somewhere between musing about hating the investigation” and wanting Coats to “do something to stop it."340 Dempsey said Coats made it clear that he would not get involved with an ongoing FBI investigation.341 Edward Gistaro, another ODNI official, recalled <sup>340</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>331</sup> SC AD_00210 (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes); McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7; Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 19.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>332</sup> McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7; Burnham 11/03/17 302, at 11.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>333</sup> Boente 1/31/18 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>334</sup> Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3; Culver 6/14/17 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>335</sup> Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>336</sup>Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>337</sup> Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 1-3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>338</sup> Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>339</sup> Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>340</sup> Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at 2-3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>341</sup> Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at 3.</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>to intervene with Comey<sup>331</sup> McGahn recalled Boente telling him in calls that day that he did not think it was sustainable for Comey to stay on as FBI director for the next four years, which McGahn said he conveyed to the President.<sup>332</sup> Boente did not recall discussing with McGahn or anyone else the idea that Comey should not continue as FBI director.<sup>333</sup></p><h2><u>3. The President Asks Intelligence Community Leaders to Make Public Statements that he had No Connection to Russia</u></h2><p>In the weeks following Comey’s March 20, 2017 testimony, the President repeatedly asked intelligence community officials to push back publicly on any suggestion that the President had a connection to the Russian election-interference effort. On March 22, 2017, the President asked Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats and CIA Director Michael Pompeo to stay behind in the Oval Office after a Presidential Daily Briefing.<sup>334</sup> According to Coats, the President asked them whether they could say publicly that no link existed between him and Russia.<sup>335</sup> Coats responded that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has nothing to do with investigations and it was not his role to make a public statement on the Russia investigation.<sup>336</sup> Pompeo had no recollection of being asked to stay behind after the March 22 briefing, but he recalled that the President regularly urged officials to get the word out that he had not done anything wrong related to Russia.<sup>337</sup></p><p>Coats told this Office that the President never asked him to speak to Comey about the FBI investigation.<sup>338</sup> Some ODNI staffers, however, had a different recollection of how Coats described the meeting immediately after it occurred. According to senior ODNI official Michael Dempsey, Coats said after the meeting that the President had brought up the Russia investigation and asked him to contact Comey to see if there was a way to get past the investigation, get it over with, end it, or words to that effect.<sup>339</sup> Dempsey said that Coats described the President’s comments as falling “somewhere between musing about hating the investigation” and wanting Coats to “do something to stop it."<sup>340</sup> Dempsey said Coats made it clear that he would not get involved with an ongoing FBI investigation.<sup>341</sup> Edward Gistaro, another ODNI official, recalled <sup>340</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>331</sup> SC AD_00210 (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes); McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7; Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 19.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>332</sup> McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7; Burnham 11/03/17 302, at 11.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>333</sup> Boente 1/31/18 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>334</sup> Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3; Culver 6/14/17 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>335</sup> Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>336</sup>Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>337</sup> Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 1-3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>338</sup> Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>339</sup> Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>340</sup> Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at 2-3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>341</sup> Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at 3.</p>"
1076c1076
< "markup": "<p>investigation itself.<sup>353</sup> Rogers later testified in a congressional hearing that as NSA Director he had “never been directed to do anything [he] believe[d] to be illegal, immoral, unethical or inappropriate” and did not recall ever feeling pressured to do so."<sup>354</sup></p><p>In addition to the specific comments made to Coats, Pompeo, and Rogers, the President spoke on other occasions in the presence of intelligence community officials about the Russia investigation and stated that it interfered with his ability to conduct foreign relations.<sup>355</sup> On at least two occasions, the President began Presidential Daily Briefings by stating that there was no collusion with Russia and he hoped a press statement to that effect could be issued.<sup>357</sup> Pompeo recalled that the President vented about the investigation on multiple occasions, complaining that there was no evidence against him and that nobody would publicly defend him.<sup>352</sup> Rogers recalled a private conversation with the President in which he “vent[ed]” about the investigation, said he had done nothing wrong, and said something like the “Russia thing has got to go away."<sup>358</sup> Coats recalled the President bringing up the Russia investigation several times, and Coats said he finally told the President that Coats’s job was to provide intelligence and not get involved in investigations.<sup>359</sup></p><h2><u>4. The President Asks Comey to “Lift the Cloud” Created by the Russia Investigation</u></h2><p>On the morning of March 30, 2017, the President reached out to Comey directly about the Russia investigation.<sup>360</sup> According to Comey’s contemporaneous record of the conversation, the President said “he was trying to run the country and the cloud of this Russia business was making</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>353</sup> Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 5; Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>354</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-fisa-legislation-0#\">Hearing on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee</a></em>, 115th Cong. (June 7, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 20) (testimony by Admiral Michael Rogers, Director of the National Security Agency).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>355</sup> Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at 1, 3; Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 2-3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>356</sup> Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at 1.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>357</sup> Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>358</sup>Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>359</sup> Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3-4.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>360</sup> SCR0126_000044 (President’s Daily Diary, 3/30/17, reflecting call to Comey from 8:14 - 8:24 a.m.); <a href=\"https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4443042/James-Comey-s-memos-on-his-meetings-with-Trump.pdf\">Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum</a>, at 1 ("The President called me on my CMS phone at 8:13 am today. ... The call lasted 11 minutes (about 10 minutes when he was connected)."; <em><a href=\"https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-jcomey-060817.pdf\">Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee</a></em>, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (<a href=\"https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-jcomey-060817.pdf\">Statement for the Record of James B. Comey</a>, former Director of the FBI, at 6).</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>investigation itself.<sup>353</sup> Rogers later testified in a congressional hearing that as NSA Director he had “never been directed to do anything [he] believe[d] to be illegal, immoral, unethical or inappropriate” and did not recall ever feeling pressured to do so."<sup>354</sup></p><p>In addition to the specific comments made to Coats, Pompeo, and Rogers, the President spoke on other occasions in the presence of intelligence community officials about the Russia investigation and stated that it interfered with his ability to conduct foreign relations.<sup>355</sup> On at least two occasions, the President began Presidential Daily Briefings by stating that there was no collusion with Russia and he hoped a press statement to that effect could be issued.<sup>356</sup> Pompeo recalled that the President vented about the investigation on multiple occasions, complaining that there was no evidence against him and that nobody would publicly defend him.<sup>357</sup> Rogers recalled a private conversation with the President in which he “vent[ed]” about the investigation, said he had done nothing wrong, and said something like the “Russia thing has got to go away."<sup>358</sup> Coats recalled the President bringing up the Russia investigation several times, and Coats said he finally told the President that Coats’s job was to provide intelligence and not get involved in investigations.<sup>359</sup></p><h2><u>4. The President Asks Comey to “Lift the Cloud” Created by the Russia Investigation</u></h2><p>On the morning of March 30, 2017, the President reached out to Comey directly about the Russia investigation.<sup>360</sup> According to Comey’s contemporaneous record of the conversation, the President said “he was trying to run the country and the cloud of this Russia business was making</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>353</sup> Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 5; Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>354</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-fisa-legislation-0#\">Hearing on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee</a></em>, 115th Cong. (June 7, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 20) (testimony by Admiral Michael Rogers, Director of the National Security Agency).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>355</sup> Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at 1, 3; Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 2-3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>356</sup> Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at 1.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>357</sup> Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>358</sup>Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 6.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>359</sup> Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3-4.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>360</sup> SCR0126_000044 (President’s Daily Diary, 3/30/17, reflecting call to Comey from 8:14 - 8:24 a.m.); <a href=\"https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4443042/James-Comey-s-memos-on-his-meetings-with-Trump.pdf\">Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum</a>, at 1 ("The President called me on my CMS phone at 8:13 am today. ... The call lasted 11 minutes (about 10 minutes when he was connected)."; <em><a href=\"https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-jcomey-060817.pdf\">Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee</a></em>, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (<a href=\"https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-jcomey-060817.pdf\">Statement for the Record of James B. Comey</a>, former Director of the FBI, at 6).</p>"
1168c1168
< "markup": "<p>would function as a kind of “shock collar” that the President could use any time he wanted; Priebus said the President had “DOJ by the throat.”<sup>522</sup> Priebus and Bannon told Sessions they would attempt to get the letter back from the President with a notation that he was not accepting Sessions’s resignation.”<sup>523<sup></sup></sup></p><p>On May 19, 2017, the President left for a trip to the Middle East.<sup>524</sup> Hicks recalled that on the President’s flight from Saudi Arabia to Tel Aviv, the President pulled Sessions’s resignation letter from his pocket, showed it to a group of senior advisors, and asked them what he should do about it.<sup>525</sup> During the trip, Priebus asked about the resignation letter so he could return it to Sessions, but the President told him that the letter was back at the White House, somewhere in the residence.<sup>526</sup> It was not until May 30, three days after the President returned from the trip, that the President returned the letter to Sessions with a notation saying, “Not accepted.”<sup>527</sup></p><h2><u>2. The President Asserts that the Special Counsel has Conflicts of Interest</u></h2><p>In the days following the Special Counsel’s appointment, the President repeatedly told advisors, including Priebus, Bannon, and McGahn, that Special Counsel Mueller had conflicts of interest.<sup>528</sup> The President cited as conflicts that Mueller had interviewed for the FBI Director position shortly before being appointed as Special Counsel, that he had worked for a law firm that represented people affiliated with the President, and that Mueller had disputed certain fees relating to his membership in a Trump golf course in Northern Virginia.<sup>529</sup> The President’s advisors pushed</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>522</sup> Hunt-000050 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 21; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 21.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>523</sup> Hunt-000051 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>524</sup> SCR026_000110 (President’s Daily Diary, 5/19/17).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>525</sup> Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 22.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>526</sup> Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 21. Hunt’s notes state that when Priebus returned from the trip, Priebus told Hunt that the President was supposed to have given him the letter, but when he asked for it, the President “slapped the desk” and said he had forgotten it back at the hotel. Hunt-000052 (Hunt Notes, undated).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>527</sup> Hunt-000052-53 (Hunt 5/30/17 Notes); 5/18/17 Letter, Sessions to President Trump (resignation letter). Robert Porter, who was the White House Staff Secretary at the time, said that in the days after the President returned from the Middle East trip, the President took Sessions’s letter out of a drawer in the Oval Office and showed it to Porter. Porter 4/13/18 302, at 8. <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-1 g-redacted-green g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80 g-c-100 g-c-120\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>528</sup> Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 12; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 10; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10; Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>529</sup> Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 12; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 10. In October 2011, Mueller resigned his family’s membership from Trump National Golf Club in Sterling, Virginia, in a letter that noted that “we live in the District and find that we are unable to make full use of the Club” and that inquired “whether we would be entitled to a refund of a portion of our initial membership fee,” which was paid in 1994. 10/12/11 Letter, Muellers to Trump National Golf Club. About two weeks later, the controller of the club responded that the Muellers’ resignation would be effective October 31, 2011, and that they would be “placed on a waitlist to be refunded on a first resigned / first refunded basis” in accordance with the club’s legal</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>would function as a kind of “shock collar” that the President could use any time he wanted; Priebus said the President had “DOJ by the throat.”<sup>522</sup> Priebus and Bannon told Sessions they would attempt to get the letter back from the President with a notation that he was not accepting Sessions’s resignation.”<sup>523</sup></p><p>On May 19, 2017, the President left for a trip to the Middle East.<sup>524</sup> Hicks recalled that on the President’s flight from Saudi Arabia to Tel Aviv, the President pulled Sessions’s resignation letter from his pocket, showed it to a group of senior advisors, and asked them what he should do about it.<sup>525</sup> During the trip, Priebus asked about the resignation letter so he could return it to Sessions, but the President told him that the letter was back at the White House, somewhere in the residence.<sup>526</sup> It was not until May 30, three days after the President returned from the trip, that the President returned the letter to Sessions with a notation saying, “Not accepted.”<sup>527</sup></p><h2><u>2. The President Asserts that the Special Counsel has Conflicts of Interest</u></h2><p>In the days following the Special Counsel’s appointment, the President repeatedly told advisors, including Priebus, Bannon, and McGahn, that Special Counsel Mueller had conflicts of interest.<sup>528</sup> The President cited as conflicts that Mueller had interviewed for the FBI Director position shortly before being appointed as Special Counsel, that he had worked for a law firm that represented people affiliated with the President, and that Mueller had disputed certain fees relating to his membership in a Trump golf course in Northern Virginia.<sup>529</sup> The President’s advisors pushed</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>522</sup> Hunt-000050 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 21; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 21.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>523</sup> Hunt-000051 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>524</sup> SCR026_000110 (President’s Daily Diary, 5/19/17).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>525</sup> Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 22.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>526</sup> Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 21. Hunt’s notes state that when Priebus returned from the trip, Priebus told Hunt that the President was supposed to have given him the letter, but when he asked for it, the President “slapped the desk” and said he had forgotten it back at the hotel. Hunt-000052 (Hunt Notes, undated).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>527</sup> Hunt-000052-53 (Hunt 5/30/17 Notes); 5/18/17 Letter, Sessions to President Trump (resignation letter). Robert Porter, who was the White House Staff Secretary at the time, said that in the days after the President returned from the Middle East trip, the President took Sessions’s letter out of a drawer in the Oval Office and showed it to Porter. Porter 4/13/18 302, at 8. <span data-color=\"green\" class=\"g-redacted g-redacted-1 g-redacted-green g-c-20 g-c-40 g-c-60 g-c-80 g-c-100 g-c-120\">■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■</span></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>528</sup> Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 12; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 10; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10; Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>529</sup> Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 12; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 10. In October 2011, Mueller resigned his family’s membership from Trump National Golf Club in Sterling, Virginia, in a letter that noted that “we live in the District and find that we are unable to make full use of the Club” and that inquired “whether we would be entitled to a refund of a portion of our initial membership fee,” which was paid in 1994. 10/12/11 Letter, Muellers to Trump National Golf Club. About two weeks later, the controller of the club responded that the Muellers’ resignation would be effective October 31, 2011, and that they would be “placed on a waitlist to be refunded on a first resigned / first refunded basis” in accordance with the club’s legal</p>"
1188c1188
< "markup": "<p>before she was cleared & they talk about obstruction?”<sup>568</sup> The next day, June 16, 2017, the President wrote additional tweets criticizing the investigation: “After 7 months of investigations & committee hearings about my ‘collusion with the Russians,’ nobody has been able to show any proof. Sad!”,<sup>569</sup> and “I am being investigated for firing the FBI Director by the man who told me to fire the FBI Director! Witch Hunt."<sup>570</sup></p><p>On Saturday, June 17, 2017, the President called McGahn and directed him to have the Special Counsel removed.<sup>571</sup> McGahn was at home and the President was at Camp David.<sup>572</sup> In interviews with this Office, McGahn recalled that the President called him at home twice and on both occasions directed him to call Rosenstein and say that Mueller had conflicts that precluded him from serving as Special Counsel.<sup>573</sup></p><p>On the first call, McGahn recalled that the President said something like, “You gotta do this. You gotta call Rod."<sup>574</sup> McGahn said he told the President that he would see what he could do.<sup>575</sup> McGahn was perturbed by the call and did not intend to act on the request.<sup>576</sup> He and other advisors believed the asserted conflicts were “silly” and “not real,” and they had previously communicated that view to the President.<sup>577</sup> McGahn also had made clear to the President that the White House Counsel’s Office should not be involved in any effort to press the issue of conflicts.<sup>578</sup> McGahn was concerned about having any role in asking the Acting Attorney General to fire the Special Counsel because he had grown up in the Reagan era and wanted to be more like Judge</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>568</sup> @realDonaldTrump 6/15/17 (3:56 p.m. ET) Tweet.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>569</sup> @realDonaldTrump 6/16/17 (7:53 a.m. ET) Tweet.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>570</sup> @realDonaldTrump 6/16/17 (9:07 a.m. ET) Tweet.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>571</sup> McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>572</sup> McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1, 3; SCR026 000196 (President’s Daily Diary, 6/17/17) (records showing President departed the White House at 11:07 a.m. on June 17, 2017, and arrived at Camp David at 11:37 a.m.).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>572</sup> McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10. Phone records show that the President called McGahn in the afternoon on June 17, 2017, and they spoke for approximately 23 minutes. SCR026_000196 (President’s Daily Diary, 6/17/17) (reflecting call from the President to McGahn on 6/17/17 with start time 2:23 p.m. and end time 2:46 p.m.); (Call Records of Don McGahn). Phone records do not show another call between McGahn and the President that day. Although McGahn recalled receiving multiple calls from the President on the same day, in light of the phone records he thought it was possible that the first call instead occurred on June 14, 2017, shortly after the press reported that the President was under investigation for obstruction of justice. McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 1-3. While McGahn was not certain of the specific dates of the calls, McGahn was confident that he had at least two phone conversations with the President in which the President directed him to call the Acting Attorney General to have the Special Counsel removed. McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 1-3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>574</sup> McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>575</sup> McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>576</sup> McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>577</sup> McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>578</sup> McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2.</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>before she was cleared & they talk about obstruction?”<sup>568</sup> The next day, June 16, 2017, the President wrote additional tweets criticizing the investigation: “After 7 months of investigations & committee hearings about my ‘collusion with the Russians,’ nobody has been able to show any proof. Sad!”,<sup>569</sup> and “I am being investigated for firing the FBI Director by the man who told me to fire the FBI Director! Witch Hunt."<sup>570</sup></p><p>On Saturday, June 17, 2017, the President called McGahn and directed him to have the Special Counsel removed.<sup>571</sup> McGahn was at home and the President was at Camp David.<sup>572</sup> In interviews with this Office, McGahn recalled that the President called him at home twice and on both occasions directed him to call Rosenstein and say that Mueller had conflicts that precluded him from serving as Special Counsel.<sup>573</sup></p><p>On the first call, McGahn recalled that the President said something like, “You gotta do this. You gotta call Rod."<sup>574</sup> McGahn said he told the President that he would see what he could do.<sup>575</sup> McGahn was perturbed by the call and did not intend to act on the request.<sup>576</sup> He and other advisors believed the asserted conflicts were “silly” and “not real,” and they had previously communicated that view to the President.<sup>577</sup> McGahn also had made clear to the President that the White House Counsel’s Office should not be involved in any effort to press the issue of conflicts.<sup>578</sup> McGahn was concerned about having any role in asking the Acting Attorney General to fire the Special Counsel because he had grown up in the Reagan era and wanted to be more like Judge</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>568</sup> @realDonaldTrump 6/15/17 (3:56 p.m. ET) Tweet.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>569</sup> @realDonaldTrump 6/16/17 (7:53 a.m. ET) Tweet.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>570</sup> @realDonaldTrump 6/16/17 (9:07 a.m. ET) Tweet.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>571</sup> McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>572</sup> McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1, 3; SCR026 000196 (President’s Daily Diary, 6/17/17) (records showing President departed the White House at 11:07 a.m. on June 17, 2017, and arrived at Camp David at 11:37 a.m.).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>573</sup> McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10. Phone records show that the President called McGahn in the afternoon on June 17, 2017, and they spoke for approximately 23 minutes. SCR026_000196 (President’s Daily Diary, 6/17/17) (reflecting call from the President to McGahn on 6/17/17 with start time 2:23 p.m. and end time 2:46 p.m.); (Call Records of Don McGahn). Phone records do not show another call between McGahn and the President that day. Although McGahn recalled receiving multiple calls from the President on the same day, in light of the phone records he thought it was possible that the first call instead occurred on June 14, 2017, shortly after the press reported that the President was under investigation for obstruction of justice. McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 1-3. While McGahn was not certain of the specific dates of the calls, McGahn was confident that he had at least two phone conversations with the President in which the President directed him to call the Acting Attorney General to have the Special Counsel removed. McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 1-3.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>574</sup> McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>575</sup> McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>576</sup> McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>577</sup> McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>578</sup> McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2.</p>"
1204c1204
< "markup": "<p>the Special Counsel. Also during this time period, the President reached out to Christie to get his thoughts on firing the Special Counsel. This evidence shows that the President was not just seeking an examination of whether conflicts existed but instead was looking to use asserted conflicts as a way to terminate the Special Counsel.</p><p>b. <u>Nexus to an official proceeding</u>. To satisfy the proceeding requirement, it would be necessary to establish a nexus between the President’s act of seeking to terminate the Special Counsel and a pending or foreseeable grand jury proceeding.</p><p>Substantial evidence indicates that by June 17, 2017, the President knew his conduct was under investigation by a federal prosecutor who could present any evidence of federal crimes to a grand jury. On May 23, 2017, McGahn explicitly warned the President that his “biggest exposure” was not his act of firing Comey but his “other contacts” and “calls,” and his “ask re: Flynn.” By early June, it was widely reported in the media that federal prosecutors had issued grand jury subpoenas in the Flynn inquiry and that the Special Counsel had taken over the Flynn investigation.602 On June 9, 2017, the Special Counsel’s Office informed the White House that investigators would be interviewing intelligence agency officials who allegedly had been asked by the President to push back against the Russia investigation. On June 14, 2017, news outlets began reporting that the President was himself being investigated for obstruction of justice. Based on widespread reporting, the President knew that such an investigation could include his request for Comey’s loyalty; his request that Comey “let[] Flynn go"; his outreach to Coats and Rogers; and his termination of Comey and statement to the Russian Foreign Minister that the termination had relieved “great pressure” related to Russia. And on June 16, 2017, the day before he directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President publicly acknowledged that his conduct was under investigation by a federal prosecutor, tweeting, “I am being investigated for firing the FBI Director by the man who told me to fire the FBI Director!”</p><p>c. <u>Intent</u>. Substantial evidence indicates that the President’s attempts to remove the Special Counsel were linked to the Special Counsel’s oversight of investigations that involved the President’s conduct — and, most immediately, to reports that the President was being investigated for potential obstruction of justice.</p><p>Before the President terminated Comey, the President considered it critically important that he was not under investigation and that the public not erroneously think he was being investigated. As described in <a href=\"#g-page-274\">Volume II, Section II.D</a>, <em>supra</em>, advisors perceived the President, while he was drafting the Comey termination letter, to be concerned more than anything else about getting out that he was not personally under investigation. When the President learned of the appointment of the Special Counsel on May 17, 2017, he expressed further concern about the investigation, saying “[t]his is the end of my Presidency.” The President also faulted Sessions for recusing, saying “you were supposed to protect me.”</p><p>On June 14, 2017, when the Washington Post reported that the Special Counsel was investigating the President for obstruction of justice, the President was facing what he had wanted</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>602</sup> <em>See, e.g.</em>, Evan Perez et al., <em><a href=\"https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/09/politics/grand-jury-fbi-russia/\">CNN exclusive: Grand jury subpoenas issued in FBI’s Russia investigation</a></em>, CNN (May 9, 2017); Matt Ford, <em><a href=\"https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/mueller-michael-flynn-turkey/529011/\">Why Mueller Is Taking Over the Michael Flynn Grand Jury</a></em>, The Atlantic (June 2, 2017).</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>the Special Counsel. Also during this time period, the President reached out to Christie to get his thoughts on firing the Special Counsel. This evidence shows that the President was not just seeking an examination of whether conflicts existed but instead was looking to use asserted conflicts as a way to terminate the Special Counsel.</p><p>b. <u>Nexus to an official proceeding</u>. To satisfy the proceeding requirement, it would be necessary to establish a nexus between the President’s act of seeking to terminate the Special Counsel and a pending or foreseeable grand jury proceeding.</p><p>Substantial evidence indicates that by June 17, 2017, the President knew his conduct was under investigation by a federal prosecutor who could present any evidence of federal crimes to a grand jury. On May 23, 2017, McGahn explicitly warned the President that his “biggest exposure” was not his act of firing Comey but his “other contacts” and “calls,” and his “ask re: Flynn.” By early June, it was widely reported in the media that federal prosecutors had issued grand jury subpoenas in the Flynn inquiry and that the Special Counsel had taken over the Flynn investigation.<sup>602</sup> On June 9, 2017, the Special Counsel’s Office informed the White House that investigators would be interviewing intelligence agency officials who allegedly had been asked by the President to push back against the Russia investigation. On June 14, 2017, news outlets began reporting that the President was himself being investigated for obstruction of justice. Based on widespread reporting, the President knew that such an investigation could include his request for Comey’s loyalty; his request that Comey “let[] Flynn go"; his outreach to Coats and Rogers; and his termination of Comey and statement to the Russian Foreign Minister that the termination had relieved “great pressure” related to Russia. And on June 16, 2017, the day before he directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President publicly acknowledged that his conduct was under investigation by a federal prosecutor, tweeting, “I am being investigated for firing the FBI Director by the man who told me to fire the FBI Director!”</p><p>c. <u>Intent</u>. Substantial evidence indicates that the President’s attempts to remove the Special Counsel were linked to the Special Counsel’s oversight of investigations that involved the President’s conduct — and, most immediately, to reports that the President was being investigated for potential obstruction of justice.</p><p>Before the President terminated Comey, the President considered it critically important that he was not under investigation and that the public not erroneously think he was being investigated. As described in <a href=\"#g-page-274\">Volume II, Section II.D</a>, <em>supra</em>, advisors perceived the President, while he was drafting the Comey termination letter, to be concerned more than anything else about getting out that he was not personally under investigation. When the President learned of the appointment of the Special Counsel on May 17, 2017, he expressed further concern about the investigation, saying “[t]his is the end of my Presidency.” The President also faulted Sessions for recusing, saying “you were supposed to protect me.”</p><p>On June 14, 2017, when the Washington Post reported that the Special Counsel was investigating the President for obstruction of justice, the President was facing what he had wanted</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>602</sup> <em>See, e.g.</em>, Evan Perez et al., <em><a href=\"https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/09/politics/grand-jury-fbi-russia/\">CNN exclusive: Grand jury subpoenas issued in FBI’s Russia investigation</a></em>, CNN (May 9, 2017); Matt Ford, <em><a href=\"https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/mueller-michael-flynn-turkey/529011/\">Why Mueller Is Taking Over the Michael Flynn Grand Jury</a></em>, The Atlantic (June 2, 2017).</p>"
1232c1232
< "markup": "<p>and Priebus discussed the possibility that they would both have to resign rather than carry out the President’s order to fire Sessions.<sup>652</sup></p><p>That afternoon, the President followed up with Priebus about demanding Sessions’s resignation, using words to the effect of, “Did you get it? Are you working on it?”<sup>653</sup> Priebus said that he believed that his job depended on whether he followed the order to remove Sessions, although the President did not directly say so.<sup>654</sup> Even though Priebus did not intend to carry out the President’s directive, he told the President he would get Sessions to resign.655 Later in the day, Priebus called the President and explained that it would be a calamity if Sessions resigned because Priebus expected that Rosenstein and Associate Attorney General Rachel Brand would also resign and the President would be unable to get anyone else confirmed.<sup>656</sup> The President agreed to hold off on demanding Sessions’s resignation until after the Sunday shows the next day, to prevent the shows from focusing on the firing.<sup>657</sup></p><p>By the end of that weekend, Priebus recalled that the President relented and agreed not to ask Sessions to resign.<sup>658</sup> Over the next several days, the President tweeted about Sessions. On the morning of Monday, July 24, 2017, the President criticized Sessions for neglecting to investigate Clinton and called him “beleaguered.”<sup>659</sup> On July 25, the President tweeted, “Attorney General Jeff Sessions has taken a VERY weak position on Hillary Clinton crimes (where are E-mails & DNC server) & Intel leakers!"660 The following day, July 26, the President tweeted, “Why didn’t A.G. Sessions replace Acting FBI Director Andrew McCabe, a Comey friend who was in charge of Clinton investigation."<sup>661</sup> According to Hunt, in light of the President’s frequent public attacks, Sessions prepared another resignation letter and for the rest of the year carried it with him in his pocket every time he went to the White House.<sup>662</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>652</sup> McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 11; RP_000074 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes) ("discuss resigning together”).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>653</sup> Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 14; Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>654</sup> Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>655</sup> Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>656</sup> Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>657</sup> Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>658</sup> Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>659</sup> @realDonaldTrump 7/24/17 (8:49 a.m. ET) Tweet ("So why aren’t the Committees and investigators, and of course our beleaguered A.G., looking into Crooked Hillarys crimes & Russia relations?”).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>660</sup> @realDonaldTrump 7/25/17 (6:12 a.m. ET) Tweet. The President sent another tweet shortly before this one asking “where is the investigation A.G.” @realDonald Trump 7/25/17 (6:03 a.m. ET) Tweet.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>661</sup> @realDonaldTrump 7/26/17 (9:48 a.m. ET) Tweet.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>662</sup> Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 24-25.</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>and Priebus discussed the possibility that they would both have to resign rather than carry out the President’s order to fire Sessions.<sup>652</sup></p><p>That afternoon, the President followed up with Priebus about demanding Sessions’s resignation, using words to the effect of, “Did you get it? Are you working on it?”<sup>653</sup> Priebus said that he believed that his job depended on whether he followed the order to remove Sessions, although the President did not directly say so.<sup>654</sup> Even though Priebus did not intend to carry out the President’s directive, he told the President he would get Sessions to resign.<sup>655</sup> Later in the day, Priebus called the President and explained that it would be a calamity if Sessions resigned because Priebus expected that Rosenstein and Associate Attorney General Rachel Brand would also resign and the President would be unable to get anyone else confirmed.<sup>656</sup> The President agreed to hold off on demanding Sessions’s resignation until after the Sunday shows the next day, to prevent the shows from focusing on the firing.<sup>657</sup></p><p>By the end of that weekend, Priebus recalled that the President relented and agreed not to ask Sessions to resign.<sup>658</sup> Over the next several days, the President tweeted about Sessions. On the morning of Monday, July 24, 2017, the President criticized Sessions for neglecting to investigate Clinton and called him “beleaguered.”<sup>659</sup> On July 25, the President tweeted, “Attorney General Jeff Sessions has taken a VERY weak position on Hillary Clinton crimes (where are E-mails & DNC server) & Intel leakers!"<sup>660</sup> The following day, July 26, the President tweeted, “Why didn’t A.G. Sessions replace Acting FBI Director Andrew McCabe, a Comey friend who was in charge of Clinton investigation."<sup>661</sup> According to Hunt, in light of the President’s frequent public attacks, Sessions prepared another resignation letter and for the rest of the year carried it with him in his pocket every time he went to the White House.<sup>662</sup></p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>652</sup> McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 11; RP_000074 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes) ("discuss resigning together”).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>653</sup> Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 14; Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>654</sup> Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>655</sup> Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>656</sup> Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>657</sup> Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>658</sup> Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>659</sup> @realDonaldTrump 7/24/17 (8:49 a.m. ET) Tweet ("So why aren’t the Committees and investigators, and of course our beleaguered A.G., looking into Crooked Hillarys crimes & Russia relations?”).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>660</sup> @realDonaldTrump 7/25/17 (6:12 a.m. ET) Tweet. The President sent another tweet shortly before this one asking “where is the investigation A.G.” @realDonald Trump 7/25/17 (6:03 a.m. ET) Tweet.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>661</sup> @realDonaldTrump 7/26/17 (9:48 a.m. ET) Tweet.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>662</sup> Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 24-25.</p>"
1324c1324
< "markup": "<p>meeting that McGahn’s account differed and that McGahn was firm in his views. Shortly after the story broke, the President’s counsel told McGahn’s counsel that the President wanted McGahn to make a statement denying he had been asked to fire the Special Counsel, but McGahn responded through his counsel that that aspect of the story was accurate and he therefore could not comply with the President’s request. The President then directed Sanders to tell McGahn to correct the story, but McGahn told her he would not do so because the story was accurate in reporting on the President’s order. Consistent with that position, McGahn never issued a correction. More than a week later, the President brought up the issue again with Porter, made comments indicating the President thought McGahn had leaked the story, and directed Porter to have McGahn create a record denying that the President had tried to fire the Special Counsel. At that point, the President said he might “have to get rid of” McGahn if McGahn did not comply. McGahn again refused and told Porter, as he had told Sanders and as his counsel had told the President’s counsel, that the President had in fact ordered him to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel. That evidence indicates that by the time of the Oval Office meeting the President was aware that McGahn did not think the story was false and did not want to issue a statement or create a written record denying facts that McGahn believed to be true. The President nevertheless persisted and asked McGahn to repudiate facts that McGahn had repeatedly said were accurate.</p><p>b. <u>Nexus to an official proceeding</u>. By January 2018, the Special Counsel’s use of a grand jury had been further confirmed by the return of several indictments. The President also was aware that the Special Counsel was investigating obstruction-related events because, among other reasons, on January 8, 2018, the Special Counsel’s Office provided his counsel with a detailed list of topics for a possible interview with the President. 830 The President knew that McGahn had personal knowledge of many of the events the Special Counsel was investigating and that McGahn had already been interviewed by Special Counsel investigators. And in the Oval Office meeting, the President indicated he knew that McGahn had told the Special Counsel’s Office about the President’s effort to remove the Special Counsel. The President challenged McGahn for disclosing that information and for taking notes that he viewed as creating unnecessary legal exposure. That evidence indicates the President’s awareness that the June 17, 2017 events were relevant to the Special Counsel’s investigation and any grand jury investigation that might grow out of it.</p><p>To establish a nexus, it would be necessary to show that the President’s actions would have the natural tendency to affect such a proceeding or that they would hinder, delay, or prevent the communication of information to investigators. Because McGahn had spoken to Special Counsel investigators before January 2018, the President could not have been seeking to influence his prior statements in those interviews. But because McGahn had repeatedly spoken to investigators and the obstruction inquiry was not complete, it was foreseeable that he would be interviewed again on obstruction-related topics. If the President were focused solely on a press strategy in seeking to have McGahn refute the New York Times article, a nexus to a proceeding or to further investigative interviews would not be shown. But the President’s efforts to have McGahn write a letter “for our records” approximately ten days after the stories had come out — well past the typical</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>830</sup> 1/29/18 Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel’s Office, at 1-2 ("In our conversation of January 8, your office identified the following topics as areas you desired to address with the President in order to complete your investigation on the subjects of alleged collusion and obstruction of justice"; listing 16 topics).</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>meeting that McGahn’s account differed and that McGahn was firm in his views. Shortly after the story broke, the President’s counsel told McGahn’s counsel that the President wanted McGahn to make a statement denying he had been asked to fire the Special Counsel, but McGahn responded through his counsel that that aspect of the story was accurate and he therefore could not comply with the President’s request. The President then directed Sanders to tell McGahn to correct the story, but McGahn told her he would not do so because the story was accurate in reporting on the President’s order. Consistent with that position, McGahn never issued a correction. More than a week later, the President brought up the issue again with Porter, made comments indicating the President thought McGahn had leaked the story, and directed Porter to have McGahn create a record denying that the President had tried to fire the Special Counsel. At that point, the President said he might “have to get rid of” McGahn if McGahn did not comply. McGahn again refused and told Porter, as he had told Sanders and as his counsel had told the President’s counsel, that the President had in fact ordered him to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel. That evidence indicates that by the time of the Oval Office meeting the President was aware that McGahn did not think the story was false and did not want to issue a statement or create a written record denying facts that McGahn believed to be true. The President nevertheless persisted and asked McGahn to repudiate facts that McGahn had repeatedly said were accurate.</p><p>b. <u>Nexus to an official proceeding</u>. By January 2018, the Special Counsel’s use of a grand jury had been further confirmed by the return of several indictments. The President also was aware that the Special Counsel was investigating obstruction-related events because, among other reasons, on January 8, 2018, the Special Counsel’s Office provided his counsel with a detailed list of topics for a possible interview with the President. <sup>830</sup> The President knew that McGahn had personal knowledge of many of the events the Special Counsel was investigating and that McGahn had already been interviewed by Special Counsel investigators. And in the Oval Office meeting, the President indicated he knew that McGahn had told the Special Counsel’s Office about the President’s effort to remove the Special Counsel. The President challenged McGahn for disclosing that information and for taking notes that he viewed as creating unnecessary legal exposure. That evidence indicates the President’s awareness that the June 17, 2017 events were relevant to the Special Counsel’s investigation and any grand jury investigation that might grow out of it.</p><p>To establish a nexus, it would be necessary to show that the President’s actions would have the natural tendency to affect such a proceeding or that they would hinder, delay, or prevent the communication of information to investigators. Because McGahn had spoken to Special Counsel investigators before January 2018, the President could not have been seeking to influence his prior statements in those interviews. But because McGahn had repeatedly spoken to investigators and the obstruction inquiry was not complete, it was foreseeable that he would be interviewed again on obstruction-related topics. If the President were focused solely on a press strategy in seeking to have McGahn refute the New York Times article, a nexus to a proceeding or to further investigative interviews would not be shown. But the President’s efforts to have McGahn write a letter “for our records” approximately ten days after the stories had come out — well past the typical</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>830</sup> 1/29/18 Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel’s Office, at 1-2 ("In our conversation of January 8, your office identified the following topics as areas you desired to address with the President in order to complete your investigation on the subjects of alleged collusion and obstruction of justice"; listing 16 topics).</p>"
1332c1332
< "markup": "<p>good person.<sup>831</sup> The President also privately asked advisors to pass messages to Flynn conveying that the President still cared about him and encouraging him to stay strong.</p><p>In late November 2017, Flynn began to cooperate with this Office. On November 22, 2017, Flynn withdrew from a joint defense agreement he had with the President.<sup>833</sup> Flynn’s counsel told the President’s personal counsel and counsel for the White House that Flynn could no longer have confidential communications with the White House or the President.<sup>834</sup> Later that night, the President’s personal counsel left a voicemail for Flynn’s counsel that said:</p><p>I understand your situation, but let me see if I can’t state it in starker terms.... [I]t wouldn’t surprise me if you’ve gone on to make a deal with ... the government. ... [I]f ... there’s information that implicates the President, then we’ve got a national security issue, ... so, you know, ... we need some kind of heads up. Um, just for the sake of protecting all our interests if we can. ... [R]emember what we’ve always said about the President and his feelings toward Flynn and, that still remains ... <sup>835</sup></p><p>On November 23, 2017, Flynn’s attorneys returned the call from the President’s personal counsel to acknowledge receipt of the voicemail.<sup>836</sup> Flynn’s attorneys reiterated that they were no longer in a position to share information under any sort of privilege.<sup>837</sup> According to Flynn’s attorneys, the President’s personal counsel was indignant and vocal in his disagreement.<sup>838</sup> The President’s personal counsel said that he interpreted what they said to him as a reflection of Flynn’s</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>831</sup> <em><em>See, e.g., </em><a href=\"https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-conference/\">Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House</a></em><a href=\"https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-conference/\"> (Feb. 16, 2018) </a>(stating that “Flynn is a fine person” and “I don’t think [Flynn] did anything wrong. If anything, he did something right ... You know, he was just doing his job”); <em><a href=\"https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-reveals-he-asked-comey-whether-he-was-under-investigation-n757821\">Interview of Donald J. Trump</a></em><a href=\"https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-reveals-he-asked-comey-whether-he-was-under-investigation-n757821\">, NBC (May 11, 2017)</a> (stating that Flynn is a “very good person”).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>832</sup> <em>See</em> Priebus 1/18/17 302, at 9-10 (the President asked Priebus to contact Flynn the week he was terminated to convey that the President still cared about him and felt bad about what happened to him; Priebus thought the President did not want Flynn to have a problem with him); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 18 (about a month or two after Flynn was terminated, the President asked McFarland to get in touch with Flynn and tell him that he was a good guy, he should stay strong, and the President felt bad for him); Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9 (recalling the call from Priebus and an additional call from Hicks who said she wanted to relay on behalf of the President that the President hoped Flynn was okay); Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3 (describing a phone conversation between Kushner and Flynn the day after Flynn was fired where Kushner said, “You know the President respects you. The President cares about you. I’ll get the President to send out a positive tweet about you later,” and the President nodded his assent to Kushner’s comment promising a tweet).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>833</sup> Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at 1.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>834</sup> Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at 1.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>835</sup> 11/22/17 Voicemail Transcript, President’s Personal Counsel to Counsel for Michael Flynn.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>836</sup> Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at 1.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>837</sup> Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at 1.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>838</sup> Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at 1. 121</p>"
---
> "markup": "<p>good person.<sup>831</sup> The President also privately asked advisors to pass messages to Flynn conveying that the President still cared about him and encouraging him to stay strong.<sup>832</sup></p><p>In late November 2017, Flynn began to cooperate with this Office. On November 22, 2017, Flynn withdrew from a joint defense agreement he had with the President.<sup>833</sup> Flynn’s counsel told the President’s personal counsel and counsel for the White House that Flynn could no longer have confidential communications with the White House or the President.<sup>834</sup> Later that night, the President’s personal counsel left a voicemail for Flynn’s counsel that said:</p><p>I understand your situation, but let me see if I can’t state it in starker terms.... [I]t wouldn’t surprise me if you’ve gone on to make a deal with ... the government. ... [I]f ... there’s information that implicates the President, then we’ve got a national security issue, ... so, you know, ... we need some kind of heads up. Um, just for the sake of protecting all our interests if we can. ... [R]emember what we’ve always said about the President and his feelings toward Flynn and, that still remains ... <sup>835</sup></p><p>On November 23, 2017, Flynn’s attorneys returned the call from the President’s personal counsel to acknowledge receipt of the voicemail.<sup>836</sup> Flynn’s attorneys reiterated that they were no longer in a position to share information under any sort of privilege.<sup>837</sup> According to Flynn’s attorneys, the President’s personal counsel was indignant and vocal in his disagreement.<sup>838</sup> The President’s personal counsel said that he interpreted what they said to him as a reflection of Flynn’s</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>831</sup> <em><em>See, e.g., </em><a href=\"https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-conference/\">Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House</a></em><a href=\"https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-conference/\"> (Feb. 16, 2018) </a>(stating that “Flynn is a fine person” and “I don’t think [Flynn] did anything wrong. If anything, he did something right ... You know, he was just doing his job”); <em><a href=\"https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-reveals-he-asked-comey-whether-he-was-under-investigation-n757821\">Interview of Donald J. Trump</a></em><a href=\"https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-reveals-he-asked-comey-whether-he-was-under-investigation-n757821\">, NBC (May 11, 2017)</a> (stating that Flynn is a “very good person”).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>832</sup> <em>See</em> Priebus 1/18/17 302, at 9-10 (the President asked Priebus to contact Flynn the week he was terminated to convey that the President still cared about him and felt bad about what happened to him; Priebus thought the President did not want Flynn to have a problem with him); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 18 (about a month or two after Flynn was terminated, the President asked McFarland to get in touch with Flynn and tell him that he was a good guy, he should stay strong, and the President felt bad for him); Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9 (recalling the call from Priebus and an additional call from Hicks who said she wanted to relay on behalf of the President that the President hoped Flynn was okay); Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3 (describing a phone conversation between Kushner and Flynn the day after Flynn was fired where Kushner said, “You know the President respects you. The President cares about you. I’ll get the President to send out a positive tweet about you later,” and the President nodded his assent to Kushner’s comment promising a tweet).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>833</sup> Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at 1.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>834</sup> Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at 1.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>835</sup> 11/22/17 Voicemail Transcript, President’s Personal Counsel to Counsel for Michael Flynn.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>836</sup> Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at 1.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>837</sup> Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at 1.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>838</sup> Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at 1. 121</p>"
1448c1448
< "markup": "<blockquote>anyone else at the Trump Organization, although it is possible. I do not recall being aware at the time of any communications between Mr. Cohen and Felix Sater and any Russian government official regarding the Letter of Intent.<sup>1050</sup></blockquote><p>On November 29, 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress based on his statements about the Trump Tower Moscow project.<sup>1051</sup> In a plea agreement with this Office, Cohen agreed to “provide truthful information regarding any and all matters as to which this Office deems relevant.”<sup>l052</sup> Later on November 29, after Cohen’s guilty plea had become public, the President spoke to reporters about the Trump Tower Moscow project, saying:</p><blockquote>I decided not to do the project. ... I decided ultimately not to do it. There would have been nothing wrong if I did do it. If I did do it, there would have been nothing wrong. That was my business. ... It was an option that I decided not to do.... I decided not to do it. The primary reason ... I was focused on running for President. ... I was running my business while I was campaigning. There was a good chance that I wouldn’t have won, in which case I would've gone back into the business. And why should I lose lots of opportunities?<sup>1053</sup></blockquote><p>The President also said that Cohen was “a weak person. And by being weak, unlike other people that you watch — he is a weak person. And what he’s trying to do is get a reduced sentence. So he’s lying about a project that everybody knew about.”<sup>1054</sup> The President also brought up Cohen’s written submission to Congress regarding the Trump Tower Moscow project: “So here’s the story: Go back and look at the paper that Michael Cohen wrote before he testified in the House and/or Senate. It talked about his position.”<sup>1055</sup> The President added, “Even if [Cohen] was right, it doesn’t matter because I was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign.”<sup>1056</sup></p><p>In light of the President’s public statements following Cohen’s guilty plea that he “decided not to do the project,” this Office again sought information from the President about whether he participated in any discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer pursued, including when he “decided not to do the project,” who he spoke to about that decision, and what motivated</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1050</sup> Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 15 (Response to Question III, Parts (a) through (g))</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1051</sup> <em>Cohen</em> Information; <em>Cohen</em> 8/21/18 Transcript.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1052</sup> Plea Agreement at 4, <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1115566/download\">United States v. Michael Cohen</a></em>, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1053</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.c-span.org/video/?455194-1/president-trump-accuses-personal-lawyer-michael-cohen-lying\">President Trump Departure Remarks</a></em>, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018). In contrast to the President’s remarks following Cohen’s guilty plea, Cohen’s August 28, 2017 statement to Congress stated that Cohen, not the President, “decided to abandon the proposal” in late January 2016; that Cohen “did not ask or brief Mr. Trump ... before I made the decision to terminate further work on the proposal"; and that the decision to abandon the proposal was “unrelated” to the Campaign. P-SCO-000009477 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1054</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.c-span.org/video/?455194-1/president-trump-accuses-personal-lawyer-michael-cohen-lying\">President Trump Departure Remarks</a></em>, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1055</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.c-span.org/video/?455194-1/president-trump-accuses-personal-lawyer-michael-cohen-lying\">President Trump Departure Remarks</a></em>, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1056</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.c-span.org/video/?455194-1/president-trump-accuses-personal-lawyer-michael-cohen-lying\">President Trump Departure Remarks</a></em>, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018).</p>"
---
> "markup": "<blockquote>anyone else at the Trump Organization, although it is possible. I do not recall being aware at the time of any communications between Mr. Cohen and Felix Sater and any Russian government official regarding the Letter of Intent.<sup>1050</sup></blockquote><p>On November 29, 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress based on his statements about the Trump Tower Moscow project.<sup>1051</sup> In a plea agreement with this Office, Cohen agreed to “provide truthful information regarding any and all matters as to which this Office deems relevant.”<sup>1052</sup> Later on November 29, after Cohen’s guilty plea had become public, the President spoke to reporters about the Trump Tower Moscow project, saying:</p><blockquote>I decided not to do the project. ... I decided ultimately not to do it. There would have been nothing wrong if I did do it. If I did do it, there would have been nothing wrong. That was my business. ... It was an option that I decided not to do.... I decided not to do it. The primary reason ... I was focused on running for President. ... I was running my business while I was campaigning. There was a good chance that I wouldn’t have won, in which case I would've gone back into the business. And why should I lose lots of opportunities?<sup>1053</sup></blockquote><p>The President also said that Cohen was “a weak person. And by being weak, unlike other people that you watch — he is a weak person. And what he’s trying to do is get a reduced sentence. So he’s lying about a project that everybody knew about.”<sup>1054</sup> The President also brought up Cohen’s written submission to Congress regarding the Trump Tower Moscow project: “So here’s the story: Go back and look at the paper that Michael Cohen wrote before he testified in the House and/or Senate. It talked about his position.”<sup>1055</sup> The President added, “Even if [Cohen] was right, it doesn’t matter because I was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign.”<sup>1056</sup></p><p>In light of the President’s public statements following Cohen’s guilty plea that he “decided not to do the project,” this Office again sought information from the President about whether he participated in any discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer pursued, including when he “decided not to do the project,” who he spoke to about that decision, and what motivated</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1050</sup> Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 15 (Response to Question III, Parts (a) through (g))</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1051</sup> <em>Cohen</em> Information; <em>Cohen</em> 8/21/18 Transcript.</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1052</sup> Plea Agreement at 4, <em><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/file/1115566/download\">United States v. Michael Cohen</a></em>, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1053</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.c-span.org/video/?455194-1/president-trump-accuses-personal-lawyer-michael-cohen-lying\">President Trump Departure Remarks</a></em>, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018). In contrast to the President’s remarks following Cohen’s guilty plea, Cohen’s August 28, 2017 statement to Congress stated that Cohen, not the President, “decided to abandon the proposal” in late January 2016; that Cohen “did not ask or brief Mr. Trump ... before I made the decision to terminate further work on the proposal"; and that the decision to abandon the proposal was “unrelated” to the Campaign. P-SCO-000009477 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1054</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.c-span.org/video/?455194-1/president-trump-accuses-personal-lawyer-michael-cohen-lying\">President Trump Departure Remarks</a></em>, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1055</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.c-span.org/video/?455194-1/president-trump-accuses-personal-lawyer-michael-cohen-lying\">President Trump Departure Remarks</a></em>, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018).</p><p class=\"g-footnote\"><sup>1056</sup> <em><a href=\"https://www.c-span.org/video/?455194-1/president-trump-accuses-personal-lawyer-michael-cohen-lying\">President Trump Departure Remarks</a></em>, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018).</p>"